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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the potential of imposing obligations relating to environmental and human 
rights protection on International Oil Companies (IOCs) in Nigeria’s Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) for the protection of the environment and the human rights of Nigeria’s Niger 
Delta people. While the thesis does not discount the importance of improving Nigeria’s domestic 
laws to address environmental concerns which adversely impact human rights of the Niger Delta 
communities, it argues that Nigeria’s BITs could be explored to enhance the accountability of 
IOCs in their operations in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria. 
This research makes a significant contribution to knowledge by analyzing how IOCs’ 
environmental and human rights obligations could be enforced. It argues that the enforcement of 
these obligations could take one of two directions. First, it argues that they could be enforced by 
the Nigerian government in arbitral tribunals under the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes system. Second, it analyzes how the impacted Niger Delta communities 
could enforce these obligations in IOCs’ home states. It also examines the practicability of the 
enforcement mechanisms and provides useful insight into how the legal difficulties facing these 
mechanisms could be solved. 
In addition to a review of Nigeria’s domestic laws, the thesis analyzes international mechanisms 
for regulating the impact of IOCs’ operations on the environment and human rights. Specifically, 
it reviews international norms, principles, codes and guidelines that seek to regulate IOCs. It 
argues that the current approach of these international instruments has failed to effectively curb 
IOCs’ violations of environmental and human rights standards in their operations in the Niger 
Delta. Given the ineffectiveness of these mechanisms in mitigating the environmental and human 
rights impacts of oil and gas development in the Niger Delta, the thesis turns its attention to 
BITs. It examines the adverse effects of some clauses in some of Nigeria’s BITs on the 
protection of the environment and human rights. In spite of the adverse impacts of these BIT 
clauses, the thesis argues that BITs present opportunities for mitigating environmental and 
human rights impacts of oil and gas development. By imposing environmental and human rights 
obligations on IOCs in BITs, these instruments complement efforts that are made domestically 
by providing a different perspective that should be explored. 
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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
1.1 General Introduction 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has long acknowledged 
the need to address the adverse effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the environment and 
human rights1 as there are clear indications that parts of the operations of Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) especially in developing countries violate human rights.2 Similarly, in 
Nigeria, some of the activities of the International Oil Corporations (IOCs)3 cause environmental 
hazards as well as have detrimental effects on human rights that manifest in various forms, either 
directly or indirectly.4 
Broadly, human rights violations involved in the operations of the oil and gas (O&G) sector in 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta communities are twofold. First, human rights violations arise as a result of 
government’s use of violence to quell the protests of the members of the host communities 
against the unrestrained activities of IOCs that damage their environment.5 Instances of the use 
of military and police force by the Nigerian government with the complicity of the IOCs to deal 
with the protesters that result in violations of human rights are well documented.6 
Second, environmental degradation causes grave human rights violations.7 The bulk of human 
rights violations in the Niger Delta region stem from environmental pollution from oil spills and 
gas flaring.8 Environmental pollution, which dates back to 1956 when oil was discovered in 
 
1 UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance 2015” (2015) at 126 
online (pdf): <unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf> at 126.  
2 Jun Zhao, “Human Rights Accountability of Transnational Corporations: A Potential Response from Bilateral 
Investment Treaties” (2015) 8 J East Asian & Intl L 47 at 48.  
3 In this thesis, the acronyms TNC and IOC are often used interchangeably despite that generally, the former 
encompasses all multinational companies, while the latter is more specific and refers to oil companies whose 
operations are multinational in scope. The subtle definitional difference does not affect their usage in this thesis. 
Although most literature analyzed in this work use the term TNC perhaps for its broader scope, this thesis prefers 
the term IOC since it specifically captures transnational corporations that operate in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector.     
4 Ifeanyi Onwuazombe, “Human Rights Abuse and Violations in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Oil-Producing 
Nigeria Communities in the Niger Delta Region” (2017) 22 Annual Survey Intl & Comparative L 115 at 118 
[Onwuazombe]. 
5 Martin-Joe Ezeudu, “Revisiting corporate violations of human rights in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region: Canvassing 
the potential role of the International Criminal Court” (2011) African Human Rights LJ 23 at 30 [Ezeudu]. 
6 Onwuazombe, supra note 4. 
7 Ezeudu, supra note 5 at 29. 
8 Human Rights Council, Cases of Environmental Human Rights Violations by Shell in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, 
UNGAOR, 26th Sess. UN Doc A/HRC/26/NGO/100, June 2014. This is a joint written statement to the United 
Nations General Assembly which was submitted by the Europe-Third World Centre (CETIM), a non-governmental 
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commercial quantity in Nigeria, violates civil and political rights as well as economic and social 
rights.9 There is a strong connection between environmental pollution and human rights, as an 
array of human rights depends on a healthy environment. Constant oil spills and gas flaring 
threaten the right to life and the dignity of the human person, which are guaranteed in the 
constitution of Nigeria.10 
The right to life which is recognized by almost all international human rights treaties was 
initially aimed at prohibiting arbitrary killing by government or misuse of political power but has 
also been acknowledged to address environmental concerns which threaten the right to life 
directly or indirectly,11 and this view has been judicially recognized by a Nigerian court.12 In 
Jonah Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited, a Nigerian court 
held that the right to life includes the right to be free from pollution such as gas flaring that 
endangers life.13 A United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s report recognized that 
environmental degradation is one of the threats to life.14 Similarly, the UN Human Rights 
Committee’s recent interpretation of the right to life under Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights15 is extensive and clarifies that environmental pollution 
constitutes one of the most “serious threats to the ability of present and future generations to 
enjoy the right to life.”16 Accordingly, states “must preserve the environment and protect it 
 
organization in general consultative status, and the Environmental Rights Action / Friends of the Earth Nigeria, a 
nongovernmental organization in special consultative status that highlights in detail how gas flaring and oil spills 
have continually violated human rights of the Niger Delta such as right to life. See also Wafaa Taleb, 
“Environmental-related Human Rights Violations in the Niger Delta in Nigeria” (2017) 4 Intl J Humanities & 
Cultural Studies 355 at 367 [Taleb]. 
9 By civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights, this thesis refers to human rights that are listed in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, GA Res 2200 (XXI), (entered into 
force 23 March 1976) (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
1966, GA Res 2200 (XXI), (entered into force 3 January 1976) (ICESCR) respectively. 
10 Onwuazombe, supra note 4. See also S. D. Kamga & O. O. Ajoku “Reflections on How to Address Human Rights 
by Extractive Sector in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Nigeria and South Africa” (2014) online (pdf): 
<file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/103252-277674-1-PB.pdf>.   
11 David Hunter, James Salzman & Durwood Zaelke, International Environmental Law & Policy 3rded (New York: 
Foundation Press, 2017) 1378 [Hunter, Salzman & Zaelke]. 
12 Jonah Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited, Unreported, Suit No. 
FHC/B/CS53/05 [Gbemre v SPDC]. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UNGAOR, 59th 
Sess, UN Doc A/59/565 (2004) at 25. 
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 9. 
16 General Comments No 36 on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right, UNHRC 124th Session, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/CG//36 (2018) at 62 [General Comment No 36]. 
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against harm [and] pollution… caused by public and private actors” to fulfill their obligation to 
respect and protect the right to life.17 
Apart from the right to life, economic and social rights such as human rights to a healthy 
environment, health, and adequate standard of living, including rights to water and food that are 
protected under international human rights treaties are also violated. Nigeria is a party to human 
rights treaties that provide for these rights and by which Nigeria has an international obligation 
to respect, fulfill and protect its citizens against violations by private actors, which include 
IOCs.18 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights acknowledges that 
corporate activities adversely impact economic, social and cultural rights19 and clarifies the 
obligations of states, including Nigeria, in addressing corporate operations that negatively affect 
these rights.20 The specific obligations that are required from states are to respect, fulfill and 
protect the human rights of their citizens in the context of business activities and they apply to 
both violations of economic, social and cultural rights within states’ territory and outside their 
territory in situations where states can exercise control.21 States are required to take appropriate 
measures to prevent human rights violations outside their territory by businesses that are 
domiciled in their territory regardless of whether the relevant businesses are incorporated under 
their laws.22 
The apparent link between environmental degradation and human rights has been widely 
acknowledged.23 International law jurisprudence recognizes that the environment is “a vital part 
of contemporary human rights doctrine,”24 and “a sine qua non for numerous human rights”25 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 9, Article 6 on the right to life. International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 9, Articles 11 and 12 on the rights to adequate 
standard of living and health. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Nigeria, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 
(entered into force October 21, 1986) (African Charter), Article 24 on the right to a healthy environment. 
19 General Comment No 24 on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the Context of Business Activities, UNESCR, 61st Session UN Doc E/C.12/GC/24, (2017) para 1 [General 
Comment 24]. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, para 10. 
22 Ibid, para 26. 
23 Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo, “A Human Right to a Healthy Environment” (2015) The Global Community 
Yearbook of Intl L & Jurisprudence at 3. 
24 Gabcikovo-Nagymarous Project (Hungary v Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 88 at 91. 
25 Ibid. 
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such as right to life and right to health.26 The issue that has remained unresolved, however, is to 
determine the most suitable perspective within international law from which human rights 
violations as a result of environmental degradation can be addressed. Indeed, it is observed that 
human rights and environmental protection are fundamentally interdependent so that a healthy 
environment is essential for the enjoyment of human rights, and conversely, protecting human 
rights is a necessary effort towards the protection of the environment.27 The idea of addressing 
questions of environmental pollution through the lens of human rights is a marked departure 
from the traditional approach to environmental protection28 that solely focuses on the 
improvement of environmental protection laws. 
1.2 Recognizing Regulatory Lapses in International Law and Nigeria’s Domestic Law 
Concerning the violations of human rights as have been highlighted above,  it is regrettable that 
while the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission) has 
pronounced that the lack of strong environmental regulatory measures by the Nigerian 
government, and its involvement in providing security forces against the Niger Delta people 
violate the human rights of the latter,29 there seems to be no serious efforts by the Nigerian 
government to put an end to the environmental concerns and the consequent human rights 
violations.30 
Chapter 2 of this thesis lays out some of the gaps in Nigeria’s laws that regulate environmental 
pollution caused by IOCs. Scholars have cited lapses in Nigeria’s laws as the primary reason for 
these violations and have suggested that the government should improve its laws to protect the 
environment and human rights of host communities of the Niger Delta.31 That is not all. The 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 John H. Knox & Ramin Pejan, Introduction to the Human Right to a Healthy Environment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018) at 201. 
28 Nickie Vlavianos, “The Intersection of Human Rights Law and Environmental Law” (Paper delivered at a 
Symposium on Environment in the Courtroom: Key Environmental Concepts and the Unique Nature of 
Environmental Damage at University of Calgary, 23 – 24 March 2012) at 1, online (pdf): 
<//cirl.ca/files/cirl/nickie_vlavianos-en.pdf>. 
29 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria (2001) 
Communication 155/96, [SERAC v Nigeria]. 
30 By the use of the phrase “serious efforts,” this thesis does not suggest that there are no ongoing legislative and 
policy-based efforts to tackle environmental pollutions in Nigeria, but rather implies that the steps that have been 
taken have not been particularly effective.    
31 Ogwezzy Michael, “Violation of Human Rights in Nigeria: An Appraisal of the Activities of the Transnational Oil 
Corporations in the Niger Delta Region” (2013) 2 Christ U L J 1 at 16. 
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ineffectiveness of Nigeria’s environmental regulatory agencies and the deficiency in Nigeria’s 
judicial process represent other lapses32 and need to be addressed. However, being a Third World 
country, the Nigerian government appears to concentrate more on the economic value of the 
investments of the IOCs than on the negative impacts of their activities on the host communities. 
This means that Nigeria, as a Third World country, may be reticent to impose measures that will 
constrain IOCs concerning human rights violations to retain IOCs’ investments.33 
The argument about regulatory lapses, however, does not necessarily suggest that there are no 
existing laws that regulate the activities of IOCs in Nigeria. The laws either need improvement or 
political will to enforce them, and the Nigerian government seems to currently lack the latter. 
Additionally, the economic influence of the TNCs over developing countries could be 
overwhelming. As a result, it has been argued that TNCs can “capture” the regulatory 
mechanisms in these countries.34 Oshionebo unequivocally makes this claim in respect of 
Nigeria’s O&G sector and thus states as follows: 
As well, TNCs often use their economic clout to control and manipulate the 
exercise of sovereign powers by host developing countries. For example, [oil] 
and gas TNCs have used their financial power to thwart the enactment of a new 
petroleum law in Nigeria, thereby hindering the ability of the Nigerian 
government to exercise sovereign control over its territory. Moreover, in an 
instance where TNCs capture the governments of host states, the government’s 
ability to exercise its sovereign powers is severely compromised, particularly in 
relation to matters relating to the economic interests of TNCs.35 
While this thesis acknowledges that Nigeria’s weak governance is of significant concern, it also 
claims that international law has a major role to play. However, international law does not 
recognize the liabilities of IOCs that are involved in environmental degradation and human rights 
violations. IOCs do not bear obligations relating to environmental and human rights protection 
under international law and therefore are not liable for the breach of these obligations. The 
 
32 Evaristus Oshionebo, Regulating Transnational Corporations in Domestic and International Regimes: An African 
Case Study, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) at 71 – 7 [Oshionebo, Regulating Transnational 
Cororations]. 
33 Penelope Simons & Audrey Macklin, The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human Rights, and the Home 
State Advantage (Oxon: Routledge, 2014) at 181[Simons & Macklin]. 
34 Ibid at 421. “Regulatory capture” entails that the regulatory agency of the government is used as “a tool of the 
regulated, governed by the commercial interests of the parties it regulates, rather than the public interest”. See Tracy 
Cohen, “Rethinking (Reluctant) Capture: South African Telecommunications and the Impact of Regulation” (2003) 
47 J of African L 65 at 73.   
35 Evaristus Oshionebo, “Corporations and Nations: Power Imbalance in the Extractive Sector” (2018) 77 American 
J of Economics & Sociology 419 at 433 [Oshionebo, Corporations and Nations].  
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extensive discussion in chapter 3 regarding the content of extant international instruments 
regulating corporations’ operations shows the weakness of international law in addressing IOCs’ 
activities that violate human rights as well as degrade the environment. Therefore, since holding 
IOCs liable is generally not the approach of international law, they operate under no real risk. 
However, the UN Human Rights Council through the UN Intergovernmental Working Group on 
TNCs is currently negotiating the Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, under International 
Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises 
(the Zero Draft Treaty).36 A more detailed discussion of the content and the prospects of the 
successful negotiation of the Zero Draft Treaty are contained in section 3.3.6 of chapter 3. The 
Zero Draft Treaty provides for the rights of the affected individuals and communities that 
include access to justice, compensation, restitution and environmental remediation.37 While it 
provides for civil and criminal liability of TNCs that violate human rights, the states bear the 
responsibility to ensure that their domestic laws offer an appropriate system of legal liability.38 
The Zero Draft Treaty also stipulates the jurisdiction of states’ courts in respect of violations of 
human rights and environmental degradation caused by TNCs.39 However, it does not impose 
direct obligations on TNCs. Indeed, much of the obligations articulated in the Zero Draft Treaty 
are imposed on states to ensure that TNCs do not degrade the environment and violate human 
rights.40 Since the passage of time will determine the success of the Zero Draft Treaty in 
addressing IOCs’ pollution of the environment and violation of human rights, the premise of this 
thesis is that the existing legal frameworks – international and domestic – are not sufficient by 
themselves to protect the host communities. 
This thesis, therefore, investigates the potential value of placing direct obligations regarding 
environmental protection and human rights on IOCs in Nigeria’s Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs). Specifically, this thesis argues that Nigeria’s BITs should be amended to ensure the 
protection of the host communities’ environment and human rights by holding IOCs liable for 
 
36 Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, In International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Revised Draft 16.7.2019, online (pdf): 
<ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf> (Zero Draft 
Treaty) 
37 Ibid, Article 4.  
38 Ibid, Article 6. 
39 Ibid, Article 7 
40 Ibid, see Articles 4 – 8, 10, 11 and 12. 
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their misconduct, which leads to environmental pollution and flagrant abuse of human rights. 
This thesis focuses on the formulation of future BITs as well as the renegotiation of those that 
are in force between the government of Nigeria and the home states of the IOCs that operate in 
the O&G sector in Nigeria.41 What informs the selection of these BITs for this research is that 
the major IOCs such as Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and Agip in Nigeria are 
protected by their provisions. 
Ensuring that the IOCs are held responsible for environmental degradation and human rights 
violations in international law is the primary concern of this thesis. By articulating and imposing 
direct obligations which are related to the environment and human rights on IOCs in Nigeria’s 
BITs, this thesis presents a practical mechanism for holding IOCs accountable for the apparent 
abuse of the environment and human rights of the Niger Delta communities under international 
law without contradicting any established international law. As has been argued, imposing 
obligations on IOCs in BITs will give room for an enforcement mechanism that is treaty-based.42 
Therefore, this thesis argues that the obligations regarding environmental and human rights 
protection should be enforced through either of two ways. 
First, this thesis argues that the Nigerian government can enforce these BIT obligations against 
IOCs before an investment tribunal under the auspices of the International Center for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID).43 Although the dominant practice is for investors to institute 
claims before investment tribunals, the extensive review of the jurisdiction of investment 
tribunals constituted under the ICSID Convention in section 4.3.1 of chapter four shows that the 
Nigerian government can enforce obligations relating to environmental and human rights 
protection before an investment tribunal. However, as part of the requirements under Article 25 
of the ICSID Convention, the written consent of IOCs to the jurisdiction of an investment 
 
41 The Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 11 December 
1990, No 66 (entered into force 11 December 1990) [Nigeria – UK BIT], the Agreement on Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2 
November 1992 (entered into force 1 February 1994) [Nigeria – Netherlands BIT] and the Agreement between the 
Government of the Italian Republic and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 27 September 2000 
(entered into force 22 August 2005) [Nigeria – Italy BIT].  
42 Penelope Simons, “International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountability for Violations 
of Human Rights” (2012) 3 J Human Rights & Environment 5 at 18 [Simons]. 
43 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other states, (entered into 
force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 159; 4 ILM 532 (1965) (ICSID Convention). 
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tribunal must be obtained by the Nigerian government.44 In this regard, the thesis argues that the 
Nigerian government should renegotiate its investment contracts, such as the oil mining lease, to 
include the consent of IOCs to the jurisdiction of the investment tribunals under the ICSID 
Convention.45 Furthermore, this thesis argues that as presently constituted, all Nigeria’s relevant 
BITs do not confer standing on the Nigerian government to arbitrate against IOCs before 
investment tribunals.46 Therefore, there is also a need for the Nigerian government to amend the 
dispute resolution clause in its BITs to expressly confer a right to arbitrate before investment 
tribunals on host states. 
Secondly, the thesis argues that the obligations regarding environmental and human rights 
protection in Nigeria’s BITs could be enforced by the Niger Delta communities against IOCs in 
their home states’ courts. While the jurisdiction of home states’ courts for the violation of human 
rights outside states’ territory has remained controversial, this thesis argues that the Niger Delta 
people can enforce a breach of IOCs’ BIT obligations in their home states’ courts. Authors have 
argued that it is too early to suggest that a home state’s court has jurisdiction over human rights 
and environmental abuses outside the state’s territory,47 others contend that home states’ courts 
could exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the host states’ courts, especially when an IOC is 
involved in human rights violations in the extractive industries.48 As noted by Odumosu-Ayanu, 
establishing the jurisdiction of a home state is an arduous task49 owing to the complicated rules 
of international law and the reluctant disposition of home states towards assuming extra-
territorial jurisdiction, especially where there is no legal basis. 
 
44 Ibid, Article 25 of the ICSID Convention provides for three other requirements which are discussed in detail in 
section 4.3.1 of chapter 4 of this thesis. 
45 Investment contracts are agreements between the Nigerian government and IOCs containing the terms and 
conditions for IOCs operations in the O&G sector, including exploration and production activities. See section 4.3.1 
of chapter 4 for detail on other types of investment contracts that are used in Nigeria’s O&G sector. 
46 While the Nigeria – UK BIT, supra note 41, Article 8 confers a right to arbitrate on both investors and the 
Nigerian government, while the Nigeria – Italy BIT, supra note 41, Article 8 and the Nigeria – Netherlands BIT, 
supra note 41, Article 9 do not confer the right to arbitrate on the Nigerian government.   
47 Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 162 [De 
Schutter]. See also Jolyon Ford, “Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Governance Gap” (September 2015), at 
19, online (pdf): 
<chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20150922BusinessHumanRightsFordV2.pdf> [Ford]. 
48 Sara Seck, “Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining” (2008) 11 Yale 
Human Rights & Development J 1 at 18 [Seck]. 
49 Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, “Governments, Investors and Local Communities: Analysis of Multi-actor Investment 
Framework” (2014) 15 Melbourne J Int’l L1 at 20 [Odumosu-Ayanu, Government, Investors and Local 
Communities]. 
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For instance, the United States’ Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),50 which had for several decades 
allowed United States of America (US) courts to assume jurisdiction over allegations regarding 
an investor that has a connection with the US,51 has been significantly eviscerated by the US 
Supreme Court in 2013 – in a case that involved human rights violation by an IOC that operates 
in Nigeria – when it held that only behaviours that concern the US could be challenged under the 
statute.52 There is no doubt that providing a basis for the victims of environmental pollution and 
human rights violations to pursue a legal remedy in the home states of the IOCs would be an 
essential possibility for holding IOCs accountable,53 and providing obligations relating to the 
environment and human rights in BITs offers a basis for home state responsibility. 
In the light of this controversy, this thesis argues that the relevant Nigeria BITs should be 
amended to also include IOCs’ civil liability in their home states that can be relied upon by the 
impacted Niger Delta communities. This thesis argues that such an amendment, which should 
give a right to the impacted host communities to make claims for the liability of IOCs in their 
home states, is relevant as it provides an actual basis for the IOCs’ home states’ courts to 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. This approach is consistent with the General Comment No 
15 on the right to water of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [CESCR] 
that “steps should be taken by states parties to prevent their own citizens and companies from 
violating the right to water of individuals and communities in other countries.”54 
1.3 Reforms in Nigeria’s Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Since imposing obligations regarding environmental and human rights protection on IOCs 
involves the amendment of relevant Nigeria’s BITs, this thesis proposes that some BIT clauses 
such as the clause regarding expropriation and the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) clause 
should be amended and expunged respectively. Besides, the need to improve and effectively 
enforce Nigeria’s domestic laws regarding environmental pollution may be undermined by the 
content of these clauses. Generally, BITs impose obligations on host states such as Nigeria 
 
50 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350 1789 [ATCA]. 
51 James Gathi & Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, “The Turn to Contractual Responsibility in the Global Extractive 
Industry” (2015) 1 Bus & Human Rights J 69 at 74 [Gathi & Odumosu-Ayanu]. 
52 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Company [2013] 133 SC at 1659. See also, Gathi & Odumosu-Ayanu, ibid. 
53 Gathi & Odumosu-Ayanu, ibid at 76. 
54 General Comment 15, the right to water, (Articles. 11 and 12 ICESCR), CESCR, UN Doc No E/C.12/2002/11 
(2002), at para 33 [General Comment No 15].  
 
 
10 
 
regarding standards of treatment to ensure that they do not unduly impede the rights of a foreign 
investor.55 The traditional purpose for the investment protection clauses found in BITs such as 
the clause regarding expropriation and the FET clause is to improve economic ties between two 
state parties, with the ultimate goal of advancing economic development in the states.56 These 
clauses boost the confidence of IOCs by protecting their investments and thereby attracting a 
significant amount of investment in the O&G sector. As a result of the nature of these BITs, an 
investor is often considered to be in an advantaged position as it is permitted to initiate a claim 
against a host government for a breach of standards of protection in a BIT by activating the 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism in BITs. 
As explored in detail in chapter 3 of this thesis, several authors have suggested that BITs are 
structured to protect the interests of the investors such as the IOCs in Nigeria without striking a 
balance between the interests of the investors, states and the public57 and this is precisely the 
case with Nigeria’s BITs under inquiry. For instance, the provision against expropriation which 
is present in all the BITs under investigation in this thesis requires that in taking measures that 
either directly or indirectly affect the economic interest of foreign investors, including IOCs, the 
Nigerian government must ensure that such measures are taken for a public purpose (or interest), 
not discriminatory and are accompanied by adequate and just compensation.58 However, given 
the fact that traditional BITs such as Nigeria’s BITs do not provide a guide for the interpretation 
of clauses, it leaves ISDS tribunals with broad discretion, which may be detrimental to the host 
state’s regulatory measure59 and public interest. The extensive meaning of an expropriation 
clause, which prohibits not only an act of the government that explicitly deprives an investor of 
its assets but also an act that has a severe financial implication on investment,60 makes it 
 
55 Rodulf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 2nd ed. (Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 13. 
56 David Collins, An Introduction to International Investment Law (Cambridge: University Printing Press, 2017) at 
35 [Collins]. 
57 Tarcisio Gazzini, “Bilateral Investment Treaties” in Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De Brabandere, ed, International 
Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations (The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2012) at 105 
[Gazzini]. See also Collins, ibid at 105. 
58 Nigeria – UK BIT, supra note 41, Article 5, Nigeria – Netherlands BIT, supra note 41, Article 6 and Nigeria – 
Italy BIT, supra note 41, Article 5.  
59 Prabhash Ranjan & Pushkar Anand, “The 2016 Model Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Critical 
Deconstruction” (2017) Northwestern J Intl 1 at 33. 
60 Metalclad Corporations v United Mexican States, (2000) Case No ARB (AF)/97/1 at 103 (International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Professor Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Mr Benjamin R. Civiletti and Mr 
José Luis Siqueiros) [Metalclad Corporations v United Mexican States]. 
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challenging to have a right balance between the interests of states and investors in BITs. A 
tribunal held that once an expropriation clause has been breached, the investor is entitled to 
compensation even when the measures taken by the government are for a public purpose such as 
environmental protection.61 
Awarding compensation on the grounds of expropriation despite a measure being taken for a 
public purpose may discourage host governments from taking regulatory actions for a public 
purpose.62 The practice of some arbitral tribunals to neglect the impact of public purpose in their 
examination of an expropriation clause is partly attributed to the fact that most traditional BITs, 
including Nigeria’s BITs, do not provide for environmental protection63 and human rights. 
Therefore, in the context of public purpose, which includes environmental and human rights 
protection, the clause regarding expropriation in Nigeria’s BITs potentially inhibits the 
government’s ability to protect the environment and human rights.64 Therefore, the thesis argues 
that the clause regarding expropriation should be amended to expressly provide that 
environmental regulatory measures taken by the Nigerian government do not amount to 
expropriation under the relevant Nigeria’s BITs. 
Similarly, the thesis argues in chapter 3 that the FET standard of treatment for investors, 
including IOCs, in Nigeria’s BITs should be deleted as it could affect Nigeria’s domestic efforts 
towards environmental measures. This is because the FET clause compels the Nigerian 
government to protect the reasonable expectation of IOCs, and this reasonable expectation could 
be that the legal regime contained in investment contracts between the Nigerian government and 
 
61 Compania Del Desarrollo De Santa Elena, S. A. v The Republic of Costa Rica (2000), FILJ 169 at 192 paras 72 – 
73 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: L. Yves Fortier, Professor Sir Elihu 
Lauterpacht, Professor Prosper Weil) [De Santa Elena v The Republic of Costa Rica].  
62 Vicki Been, “NAFTA's Investment Protections and the Division of Authority for Land Use and Environmental 
Controls” (2002) 20 Pace Environment L Rev 19 at 21 [Been].  
63 Qiang Ren, Public Interests in International Investment Law: Balancing Protection for Investor and Environment 
(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018) at 124 [Ren].  
64 To further strengthen the argument for a possibility of IOCs’ threat to make claims under any standards for 
treatment for IOCs in Nigeria’s BITs, which could potentially inhibit the federal government of Nigeria from taking 
regulatory actions, this thesis refers to the report of The Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations [The 
Report]. The Report titled: “Shell put Nigeria under Pressure with ISDS Process to obtain Oil Field OPL 245” (2 
February 2019) online: <isds.bilaterals.org/?shell-put-nigeria-under-pressure> claims that Shell secured a 
concession by threatening to sue the Nigerian government for compensation by activating the investor-to-state 
dispute settlement clause in Nigeria’s BIT with Netherlands.  
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an IOC should not change.65 According to Oshionebo, a new law that intends to impose an 
additional obligation on an IOC may be regarded as a breach of the FET clause.66 On this basis, 
the thesis argues that since IOCs have been flaring gas since 1956 when oil exploration began in 
Nigeria, insisting that IOCs should utilize gas instead of flaring gas may be considered a 
violation of the reasonable expectation of IOCs by an investment tribunal. This is so because it is 
far cheaper to flare gas than to utilize it. The broad interpretation of the FET clause, as discussed 
in detail in chapter 3, necessitates the argument of this thesis that it should be expunged from 
Nigeria’s BITs. The arguments of this thesis for the clause regarding expropriation to be 
amended and the FET clause expunged fit into the recommendation of the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that states should take into consideration the negative 
human rights impacts of BIT clauses when negotiating them.67 
1.4 Research Questions 
This thesis extends to answer the following research questions: 
i. What value could imposing obligations relating to human rights and the environment on 
IOCs in Nigeria’s BITs offer to the quest to hold IOCs accountable for the violation of 
these obligations? 
ii. Are there any legal impediments to imposing enforceable obligations relating to human 
rights and the environment on IOCs in BITs? 
1.5 Literature Review 
This section reviews literature that analyzes international and domestic laws regulating foreign 
investment in Nigeria’s O&G sector and its impacts on the environment and human rights of the 
Niger Delta communities. This review analyzes the following: 
i.        The lack of recognition of the human right to a healthy environment in Nigeria’s 
constitution and by the United Nations. 
ii.       The human rights impacts of the operations of the IOCs in Nigeria’s Niger Delta; 
 
65 Evaristus Oshionebo, “Stabilization Clauses in Natural Resources Extraction Contracts: Legal, Economic and 
Social Implications for Developing Countries” (2010) 1 Asper Rev Intl Bus & Trade L 1 at 27 [Oshionebo, 
Stabilization Clause]. 
66 Evaristus Oshionebo, Corporations and Nations, supra note 35  at 429 
67 General Comment 24, supra note 19, para 13. 
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iii. The regulatory lapses in Nigeria’s O&G sector; 
iv. International law’s regulatory failure; 
v. The potential adverse impact of BIT clauses on Nigeria’s environmental regulation; and 
vi. The potential enforcement value of having obligations regarding environmental 
protection and human rights in Nigeria’s BITs. 
Literature has identified several violations of human rights of the Niger Delta communities by 
IOCs in the O&G sector68 despite Nigeria being obligated under international and regional 
human rights treaties to protect their human rights.69 Almost all the IOCs that have operated in 
Nigeria for more than five decades have either directly or indirectly violated the human rights of 
the Niger Delta communities.70 
There is a growing debate on whether environmental human rights are protected under the 
constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Nigerian constitution) as it does not provide for 
a human right to a healthy environment.71 Commenting on section 20 of the Nigerian 
constitution that recognizes that the government shall “protect and improve the environment,” 
Ogbodo argues that the purpose of the section is to ensure a clean and safe environment for 
Nigerians.72 Abdulkadir argues that Nigeria’s domestication of the African Charter,73  which 
contains the right to a healthy environment, entails that the right to a healthy environment is an 
integral part of Nigerian human rights law.74  Adejunwo-Osho writes that the Nigerian judiciary 
 
68 See generally T. C. Emejuru, “Human Rights and Environment: Whither Nigeria?” (2015) 35 J L Policy & 
Globalization 19 [Emejuru]. See also Onwuazombe, supra note 4. 
69 Examples of the treaties are: the ICESR, supra note 9 and the African Charter supra note 18. 
70 Onwuazombe, supra note 4 at 7. 
71 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) Cap 24, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
2000 [Nigerian Constitution].  
72 Gozie Ogbodo “Environmental Protection in Nigeria: Two Decades after Koko Incidence” (2010) 15 Annual 
Survey Intl & Comparative L 1 at18 [Ogbodo]. Note that while section 20 of the Nigerian constitution, ibid, 
provides that the government should “protect and improve the environment,” section 6 (6) (c) of the Nigerian 
constitution provides for the “injusticiability” of environmental protection under section 20. This means that an 
aggrieved person cannot invoke or rely on section 20 of the Nigerian constitution to prove a breach of human rights 
to a healthy environment by a government authority or any person in Nigeria. This is the basis upon which an 
argument has been made that international treaties that provide for human rights to healthy environment are 
inconsistent with the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and are void to the extent of their 
inconsistencies.       
73 African Charter, supra note 18. 
74 Abdulkadir Bolaji Abdulkadir, “The Rights to Healthful Environment in Nigeria: A Review of Alternative 
Pathways to Environmental Justice to Nigeria” (2014) 3 J Sustainable Development L & Policy 118 at 126 
[Abdulkadir]. The African Charter, ibid, is domesticated in Nigeria through the the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. The 
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has been hesitant to make orders compelling companies whose operations degrade the 
environment to desist from such actions.75 He further argues that environmental degradation 
hurts the “quality of life, the enjoyment of life,” other “fundamental human rights and, 
ultimately,” affects the attainment of sustainable development.76 
Although Boyd’s study shows that about 177 countries recognize the right to a healthy 
environment in their legislation,77 there is no multilateral treaty that recognizes the right to a 
healthy environment as a stand-alone human right. Boyd argues that although international law 
has a role to play in addressing violations of human rights, the reality is that almost all the 
actions required to protect the human right to a healthy environment are done at the domestic 
level.78  However, there is an ongoing debate for its recognition by the United Nations.79 Knox 
argues that the recognition of the right to a healthy environment by the UN would ensure that 
there is a consistent and clear development of human rights norms regarding environmental 
protection.80 He further argues that, among others, the “recognition of the right to a healthy 
environment by the United Nations would not only make this right universal in application but 
would also serve as a catalyst for the implementation of stronger measures to effectively respect, 
fulfill and promote this right.”81 
Emphasizing the importance of the right to life, Emejuru writes that the right to life being the 
most important of all human rights implies the right to live without the harmful “invasion of 
pollution, environmental degradation and ecological imbalances.”82 Agarwal argued that the 
 
domestication of the African Charter through this Act of Nigeria’s National Assembly means that Nigerians have a 
right to enforce the provisions of the African Charter in Nigerian courts 
75 Oluwatoyin Adejonwo-Osho, “The Evolution of Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection in 
Nigeria” (last visited 28 November 2019) at 11, online (pdf): < 
www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCsQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fww
w.iucnael.org%2Fen%2Fdocuments%2Fdoc_download%2F70-adejonwo-osho-the-evolution-of-human-rights-
approaches-to-environmental-protection-in-nigeria-.html&ei=hraCT-
zpE8GcOveF6ewG&usg=AFQjCNGlif407uqs1m0mi02MScwdZEUKcA&sig2=MhonQaop1X0TwdXk3s_mWA> 
11 [Adejonwo-Osho]. 
76 Ibid at 3. 
77 David R Boyd, “The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment” (2012) 54 Science & Policy for Sustainable 
Development 3 at 4. 
78 Ibid at 5. 
79 See the United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights 
Obligation Relation to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UNGAOR, 73rdSess, 
Supp No 74, UN Doc A/73/188 1(2018) 1 [Report of the Special Rapporteur on Issues of Human Rights]. 
80 Ibid at 14, para 39. 
81 Ibid at 18, para 54. 
82 Emejuru, supra note 68 at 23. 
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discharge of effluents into the atmosphere and oil spills considerably affect the quality of human 
life.83 Similarly, Addo pointed out that the right to life, which prohibits the termination of life or 
threat to do so, means that corporations should ensure that the working environment is safe and 
secure.84 Abdulkadir argues that this case shows that citizens of Nigeria and other countries that 
have domesticated the African Charter can rely on the provisions of the right to life, and the 
general satisfactory environment as stipulated in the African Charter to avert environmental 
pollution.85 
Apart from the right to a healthy environment and the right to life, economic and social rights 
such as human rights to water, food and health are also violated by environmental pollution. 
Ahmed writes that acid rain resulting from gas flaring pollutes drinkable rainwater.86 Regarding 
the right to food, Onwuazombe argues that the increasing pollution of the environment 
contaminates farmlands and rivers, and therefore affects farm produce due to the increased level 
of soil acidity.87 He further highlights that other human rights such as rights to dignity and worth 
of the human person, right to means of livelihood, subsistence and employment, and right to 
development, among others, are linked to the activities of the IOCs in the host communities of 
the Niger Delta.88 
Onwuazombe argues that gas flaring pollutes the air, emits particulates and other substances that 
can cause cancer and other deadly diseases into the air and that the judiciary has affirmed that it 
threatens the right to life of the Niger Delta communities.89 Adewale and Mustapha are of the 
opinion that emissions of sulphur and nitrous oxide, along with atmospheric conditions, are 
likely to lead to acid rain.90 Further stressing the health implications of gas flaring, Taleb laments 
that dermal exposure to the hydrocarbons in the air can lead to skin redness, oedema dermatitis, 
 
83 H. O. Agarwal, International law and Human Rights (Allahada: Central Law Publications, 2000) 670 cited in 
Emejuru, ibid at 111. 
84 Micheal Addo, “Human Rights and Transnational Corporation – An Introduction” in Micheal Addo, ed, Human 
Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 
1999) 28. 
85 Abdulkadir, supra note 74 at 128. 
86 Farah Hiral Ahmed, “Human Rights Violation: Niger Delta Region” (last visited 28 November 2019) Online: 
<www.academia.edu/7327379/Human_Rights_Violation_Niger_Delta_Region> at 3 [Ahmed]. 
87 Onwuazombe, supra note 4 at 147. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid at 18. 
90 Omoniyi Omotayo Adewale & Ubale Mustapha, “The Impact of Gas Flaring in Nigeria” (2015) 3 Intl J Science, 
Technology & Society 40 at 44. 
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rashes, and blisters, that inhaling hydrocarbons can cause watery, red, and itchy eyes, coughing, 
throat irritation, shortness of breath, headache and confusion, and ingestion of hydrocarbons can 
lead to nausea and diarrhea.91 Further, gas flaring also disrupts wildlife in the region, as Hutchful 
explains.92 A closely related activity of IOCs that raises human rights concerns in the Niger Delta 
region is oil spillage. Taleb argues that oil spills in the Niger Delta result from leaks in the 
dilapidated pipelines that run from oil wells to refineries and from blow-outs and uncontrolled 
discharges of oil from oil wells.93 The leaks pollute the water bodies. In adding his voice, Eaton 
expressed the view that water pollution by petroleum products constitutes one of the most severe 
challenges in the Niger Delta region.94 
Mohammed identifies the Associated Gas Re-injection Act (AGRA)95 as the first significant 
framework that specifically combats associated gas flaring in Nigeria.96 Regarding the provision 
of the AGRA that permits gas flaring in Nigeria in exceptional circumstances,97 Omorogbe 
observed several years ago that the provision on exceptional circumstances for gas flaring in the 
AGRA had automatically exempted 86 out of 155 oilfields from the provision that prohibits gas 
flaring.98 She further argues that the objective of the AGRA to combat gas flaring proved to be 
unrealistic for reasons including the insistence of the IOCs on their inability to meet the 
deadline.99 Eze and Eze identify the lack of institutional framework as a significant challenge to 
ensuring the prevention of pollution under the AGRA.100 
As regards oil spills, one of the major regulations that regulate oil spillage is the Environmental 
Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) issued by the 
 
91 Taleb, supra note 8 at 364. 
92 Eboe Hutchful, “Disarmament and Development: An African View” (1985) 16 IDS Bull 61-67 cited in Uwem 
Udok & Enobong Bassey, “Gas Flaring in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects” (2017) 5 Global J of Politics & L 
Research 16 at 25 [Udok & Bassey]. 
93 Taleb, supra note 8 at 361. 
94 Joshua P. Eaton, “The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, and the 
Human Right to a Healthy Environment” (1997) 15 Boston U. Int'l LJ 261 at 267 [Eaton]. 
95 Associated Gas Re-Injection Act 1984, Cap A 25, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 [AGRA]. 
96 Jamilu Ibn Mohammed, “Comparing Nigeria’s Legal Framework for Combating Gas Flaring with that of Norway-
Lessons for Nigeria” (2016) 2 Intl JL Rev 1252 at 1253 [Mohammed]. 
97 AGRA, supra note 95, s. 3. 
98 Yinka Omoregbe, Oil and Gas in Nigeria Simplified (Lagos: Malthouse Press, 2003) 59 [Omoregbe]. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Amaka Eze & Ted Eze, “A Survey of the Legal Framework for the Control of Oil and Gas Pollution from some 
selected Countries” (2014) 31 JL Policy & Globalization 2. 
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Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR).101 Commenting on EGASPIN’s requirement for a 
self-regulated mechanism for oil companies,102 Oshionebo argues that the reason why the 
guidelines require self-regulation is that detecting the presence of the oil-related wastes requires 
some depth of scientific knowledge as well as necessary laboratory equipment, which the DPR 
does not possess.103 As Oshionebo argues, the major drawback of another law that regulates 
environmental pollution in Nigeria – the National Environmental Standards and Regulation 
Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act (NESREA Act)104 – is that dangerous substances are 
only prohibited from being released into the atmosphere, land and water under the NESREA Act 
if they are of “harmful quantities,” and according to him, it follows that “unharmful” quantities 
of such substances are permitted to be discharged.105 He further argues that such provision could 
be dangerous to public health if the quantity is incorrectly determined by NESREA to be 
“unharmful” when, in fact, it is harmful.106 
The literature demonstrates that Nigeria has laws that were designed to prevent environmental 
pollution and human rights violations. However, Oshionebo argues that the debacle in Nigeria’s 
O&G sector is as a result of the deficiencies in the statutes and regulations and the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms.107 Ruggie suggests that one of the regulatory deficiencies that affect 
human rights is states’ lack of capacity.108 Accordingly, he argues that the failure of states to 
either adopt appropriate legislation or enforce their laws is because they do not have the means to 
do so, or they fear the negative implications of doing so in the global market which is 
competitive or because their leaders place their private gains above the public good.109 
It is also important to note there have been efforts by international organizations to encourage 
businesses to respect human rights of host communities. In this regard, Odumosu-Ayanu notes 
that no agreement has yet been reached by the international community with regards to foreign 
 
101 Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN), 2002 [EGAPSIN]. 
102 Ibid, at 23 – 5, Table II 8 and at 53 – 9, Table III – 2. See also Article 4 of the EGASPIN, Ibid, at 56 – 7. 
103 Oshionebo, Regulating Transnational Corporations, supra note 32 at 56. 
104 National Environmental Standards and Regulation Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act 2007, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2004, cap N16 [NESREA Act]. 
105 Oshionebo, Regulating Transnational Corporations, supra note 32 at 57. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid at 60. 
108 John Ruggie, “3rd Responsible Investment Forum Key Note Address” (12 January 2009) online 
(pdf):www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-address-to-Responsible-
Invest-Forum-12-Jan-2009.pdf>.  
109 Ibid.  
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investors’ obligations in host communities.110 Globally, one of the attempts to engage the 
business community to respect human rights is through the United Nations Global Compact 
(UNGC).111 Sethi and Scherpes note that the UNGC was the inspiration of the former United 
Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan as he challenged the international business 
community to enact a Global Compact between the UN and non-state actors to advance human 
rights, promote good labour conditions, and ensure that the environment is protected.112 Despite 
its mission, Knight and Smith note that the UNGC has been subject to extensive criticisms from 
social activists, academics, and observers.113 Some of these criticisms, according to Knight and 
Smith, include the argument that the UNGC favours TNCs, involves self-regulation and 
voluntary participation of TNCs.114 
The most recent of the initiatives of the UN on the relationship between business and human 
rights is the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) which 
are built upon three pillars proposed by Ruggie in his protect, respect and remedy framework.115 
Commenting on the duty of states to protect human rights in the context of business, Ruggie 
states that the UNGPs are standard conduct for states to protect human rights, and therefore, 
states are not per se responsible for violations of human rights by private actors.116 Abe argues 
that the UNGPs appeal to the moral sentiments of IOCs to take responsibility to respect human 
rights.117 In the words of Davitti, the responsibility to respect human rights is in reality ‘a do no 
harm’ responsibility.118 In contrast, Muchlinski argues that the responsibility to respect human 
rights does not imply the exclusion of binding legal duties on corporations as nothing precludes a 
 
110 Odumosu-Ayanu, Governments, Investors and Local Communities, supra note 49 at 20. 
111 United Nations Global Compact, (2000) online: <globalcompact.ca/about/ungc-10-principles/> [UNGC] 
112 Prakash Sethi & Donald Scherpes, “United Nations Global Compact: The Promise–Performance Gap” (2014) J 
Bus Ethics 193 at 198. 
113 Graham Knight & Jackie Smith, “The Global Compact and Its Critics: Activism, Power Relations, and Corporate 
Social Responsibility” (2008) online: https://www.scribd.com/document/17030875/2008-The-Global-Compact-and-
its-critics at 2. 
114 Ibid at 3 – 4. 
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state from imposing human rights obligations on private actors that operate within or outside its 
jurisdiction.119 
Commenting on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the Guidelines),120 Reinert, 
Reinert, and Debebe identify that there have been at least two improved versions, the latest being 
that of 2011 that recognizes human rights considerations.121 Simons and Macklin also identify 
that the 2011 version of the Guidelines dedicates a chapter to human rights issues.122 At the 
international level, all the initiatives that are targeted towards human rights protection in the 
context of business are not binding on the IOCs, but there are more general and core 
international human rights treaties that are binding on states.123 However, Weiss explained that 
such nonbinding instruments might be an initial step that leads to the negotiation of binding 
agreements and that some legally binding instruments that provide for human rights obligations 
began as soft instruments.124 However, this thesis argues in chapter 3 that the status of the 
international norms, codes, guidelines, and principles as soft laws is one major cause of 
violations of human rights by IOCs. 
There is an ongoing effort by the UN Human Rights Council to draft a binding instrument to 
ensure that the operations of the TNCs as they relate to human rights are regulated. This is to be 
achieved through the Zero Draft Treaty, which is being negotiated.125 Jabarin and Abdollah are 
of the opinion that the Zero Draft Treaty provides a “potential alternative avenue for individuals 
and communities that are affected by corporate violations of human rights.126 Commenting on 
Article 15 that requires states to “take all necessary legislative, administrative or other action…to 
 
119 Peter Muchlinski, “Implementing the UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications for Corporate Law, 
Governance, and Regulation” (2012) 22 Bus Ethics Q 145 at 148. 
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121 Kenneth A. Reinert, Oda T. Reinert & Gelaye Debebe, “The New OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: Better but not Enough” (2016) 26 Development in Practice 816 at 818. 
122 Simons & Macklin, supra note 33 at 102. For the 2011 edition see Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Developments, “OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2011 Edition” (2011) at 31, online (pdf): 
www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf. [OECD Guidelines 2011]. 
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ensure effective implementation of the [Zero Draft Treaty],” Smart questions why the Zero Draft 
Treaty limits its implementation to the national level.127 He argues that since the Zero Draft 
Treaty acknowledges that violations of human rights by corporations are globally predominant, 
there is no reason why it should not provide a remedy at the international level as a combination 
of both national and global mechanisms would be more effective in ensuring corporate 
accountability.128 He further argues that the Zero Draft Treaty should create a direct human 
rights obligation on TNCs instead of establishing direct obligations of state parties.129 
Some writers have argued that the provisions of BITs could have an impact on the protection of 
the environment and human rights of host communities. The investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism in Nigeria's BITs can also have an impact on human rights protection. Although 
Cordes, Johnson & Szoke-Burke argue that investment tribunals tend to avoid addressing the 
conflicting obligations that a state has under human rights and investment treaties, Kube & 
Petersmann argue that a host state can rely on its human rights obligation in a counterclaim to 
defend a denial of protection.130 
On the one hand, Cordes, Johnson & Szoke-Burke argue that where host states or an amicus 
curiae make submissions requesting that host states’ human rights obligations should be taken 
into consideration by investment tribunals while assessing host states’ possible liabilities to a 
foreign investor, it seems tribunals have tended to dismiss such arguments. On the other hand, 
Sheffer argues that the language used in a BIT determines whether a tribunal will address 
environmental protection and human rights violations so that where the BIT specifies that only 
an investment dispute can be arbitrated by states parties, the tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction 
over other issues.131 For Sheffer, tribunals only refer to human rights issues when the human 
rights of the investor are at stake.132 In analyzing the Niger Delta situation, Ejims appears to 
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agree with Sheffer’s argument when he argues that in practice, the question remains whether 
human rights of the host communities could be given due consideration by investment tribunals 
in their decision making.133 
A BIT provision that may impede the protection of the environment and human rights is the 
provision against expropriation. Indeed, Ren’s work demonstrates how BIT provisions could 
have negative impacts on environmental and human rights protection.134 Undoubtedly, Nigeria’s 
BITs prohibit the government from taking measures that may amount to either direct or indirect 
expropriation unless they are taken for a public purpose, among other conditions. However, 
Waincymer argues that the lack of articulation of the content of direct and indirect expropriation 
by BITs, including Nigeria’s BITs, expands the list of measures that could amount to either 
direct or indirect expropriation that require compensation.135 While stating that in practice, 
tribunals have awarded compensation over actions that were taken for a public purpose, Ren 
argues strongly that legitimate public purpose should be interpreted to reduce compensation.136 
Concerning compensation, Been argues that host states are deterred from taking steps that protect 
the environment due to the possibility of paying huge compensation.137 This is because, as 
Waincymer argues, an investor may easily allege that any form of regulatory behaviour by a 
government has a negative implication on its business and therefore amounts to indirect 
expropriation that requires compensation.138 Further, Waincymer argues that developed countries 
that are rich and disposed to paying compensation may not have problems with the regulation of 
TNCs even if investment tribunals expand the scope of expropriation, unlike the case for 
developing nations whose inability to pay compensation may have the effect of regulatory 
chill.139 
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Mann states that earlier BITs focused only on investors’ rights and that reference to social issues 
such as environmental protection [and human rights] in BITs were made post-1990.140 Odumosu-
Ayanu marks that most treaties do not place obligations on foreign investors.141 While Tienhaara 
expressed that modern treaties incorporate clauses that deal with human rights and environmental 
issues,142 Odumosu-Ayanu bemoans that such incorporations do not stipulate enforceable human 
and environmental rights in favour of local communities as they provide for foreign investors.143 
The literature analyzed so far demonstrates that a high premium is placed on investment 
protection while the environment and human rights of host communities are neglected. The 
current state of Nigeria’s BITs does not guarantee the protection of the environment and human 
rights of host communities, as they are mostly skewed to favour foreign investors. 
Commenting on the lack of corporations’ BIT obligations, Dumberry and Aubin argue that there 
is nothing that limits the state parties’ power from making the provision for commitments 
towards human rights a condition for the enjoyment of investment protection by investors under 
BITs.144 Beyond suggesting that there is a growing consensus among authors that BITs should 
incorporate human rights obligations, Dumberry and Aubin examined how states should draft 
their BITs to incorporate an obligation regarding human rights protection.145 The work of 
Dumberry and Aubin examined where human rights obligations should be located in BITs, the 
type of language that human rights obligations should be drafted with, the international human 
rights instruments that should be referred to in BITs and the appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms that could be adopted by states.146 Further, Choudhury argues that it is sensible to 
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incorporate obligations on investors in BITs because BITs also create enforceable rights for 
investors.147 
Regarding the enforcement of human rights obligations, Dumberry and Aubin argue that it is 
meaningless to set up direct human rights obligations in BITs without considering effective 
means of enforcing it.148 As Vazquez argues, it would “not enhance human rights, but trivialize 
international law.”149 However, Choudhury argues that direct enforcement of the human rights 
obligations against corporations by states before investment tribunals may be problematic as 
obtaining the consent of corporations to trigger the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals will be 
difficult.150 Therefore, Choudhury argues that one of the viable means of enforcing human rights 
obligations is for states to initiate counterclaims against corporations that violate human right 
obligations stipulated in BITs. Alternatively, Choudhury argues that states could obtain the 
consent of corporations by obtaining the consent of corporations through an investment 
agreement.151 Simons reiterates that one of the ways to address the asymmetrical provisions of 
the BITs is to include human rights obligations in the BITs.152 She further argues that making 
such incorporation in BITs will address some challenges that confront host states in their efforts 
to regulate the conduct of investors because it will give room for an enforcement mechanism that 
is treaty-based.153 Krajewski added his voice to this argument as he argues that such imposition 
in BITs will clearly show the legal basis for investors’ obligation.154 However, he argues that a 
mere reference to the human rights obligations of corporations in BITs remains insufficient 
unless its elements are clearly articulated.155 
It appears that authors in the field of international investment law have observed no impediments 
to the objective of this thesis to impose obligations on IOCs in BITs. As Ruggie notes, 
innovative solutions still have a role to play in human rights concerns, and there could be a 
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further evolution of laws at the international level as it relates to human rights and business that 
may form part of these solutions.156 Commenting on the investment tribunal’s decision in 
Urbaser S. A. v the Argentine Republic (the Urbaser Case) that corporations could have human 
rights obligations,157 Krajewski argues that the tribunal in Urbaser Case did not engage in the 
debate of whether a corporation’s human rights obligation can be rooted in BITs and therefore 
did not connect with the broader academic arguments.158 However, Krajewski argues that the 
nature of human rights obligation that corporations could have under BITs is for corporations to 
abstain from activities that violate human rights.159 
Given that this thesis partly argues that the obligations imposed on IOCs could be enforced in 
their home states, a review of scholars’ views on this is necessary. Home state jurisdiction over 
human rights violations by companies outside its territory has remained controversial under 
international human rights law. Seck argues that a home state could regulate a TNC’s behaviour 
on the justification of either the nationality or territoriality principles of international law.160 She 
further contends that home states could exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the host states, 
especially when a TNC is involved in human rights violations in the extractive industries.161 Ford 
opines that although there is a likelihood that support would continue to grow for a home state’s 
duty to regulate a corporation’s human rights violations abroad, it appears early to suggest that 
such duty already exists.162 De Schutter argues that apart from a gross abuse of human rights that 
amounts to an international crime, an apparent obligation is yet to crystalize for home states to 
provide a remedy for environmental and human rights abuses that are committed abroad.163 
Against this background, having an obligation relating to the environment and human rights in 
BITs as this thesis proposes provides an actual basis for IOCs’ home states’ extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to crystalize. 
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While several authors have identified the need to place obligations on TNCs in BITs, only a few 
have undertaken an analysis of its practical relevance for the host communities. Analyzing the 
potentials and relevance of imposing BIT obligations relating to the environment and human 
rights on IOCs is the major contribution of this thesis. The gap in the literature that this thesis 
fills is to examine how IOCs could be held accountable for environmental degradation and 
violations of human rights of the Niger Delta host communities under Nigeria’s BITs. This is as 
a result of a combination of challenges that the literature highlights, namely: the persistent 
violations of human rights of the Niger Delta people, the failure of Nigeria’s domestic laws to 
protect the human rights of the Niger Delta communities and the nonbinding status of the 
international initiatives that are meant to regulate IOCs’ activities that pollute the environment 
and violate human rights. Thus, the thesis investigates the feasibility of imposing obligations on 
IOCs in renegotiated and subsequent BITs concluded by Nigeria. 
1.6 Significance of Research 
This thesis makes an essential contribution to an increasing quest among scholars to analyze 
IOCs’ accountability for the pollution of the environment and the violation of the human rights 
of host communities. The mainstream argument which this thesis agrees with is that the Nigerian 
government should improve the protection of the environment and human rights of the Niger 
Delta communities through effective domestic regulation. As this thesis recognizes in section 1.2 
of chapter one, Nigeria’s domestic laws should be strengthened. Notwithstanding this 
recognition, this thesis focuses on international law, which is not within domestic confines, for 
its separate importance in the quest to address environmental and human rights concerns in the 
context of the business of IOCs in the Niger Delta communities. One significant importance of 
focusing on international law is to address the impact of BITs standard of treatment on the 
domestic regulation of the environment. In section 3.3.1 of chapter three, this thesis demonstrates 
that current BIT clauses such as the expropriation clause and the FET clause could have a 
regulatory effect on the measures that the Nigerian government could adopt to address 
environmental degradation and human rights violation. Therefore, addressing human rights 
violations and environmental degradation through international law as proposed by this thesis 
provides an avenue to address the impact of the regulatory chill that could be caused by these 
BIT clauses in order to ensure a more effective domestic regulation. 
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Moreover, a focus on international law provides an opportunity to assess and explore how the 
environment and human rights could be protected under international law. Specifically, this 
thesis considers the value that BITs could offer apart from the protection of IOCs’ 
investments.164 It contributes to the developing corpus of literature in international economic law 
regarding imposing obligations on corporations in BITs. For instance, authors such as 
Dumberry,165 Simons,166 Choudhury,167 and Krajewski168 have suggested that BITs could play an 
essential role in addressing issues that relate to environmental protection and human rights in the 
operations of IOCs. The core contribution of this thesis to existing literature draws from the 
views of these authors but applies them in the context of the O&G sector in Nigeria. 
1.7 Methodology for Research 
This thesis adopts a doctrinal approach to research and critically assesses domestic laws and 
international law instruments. It analyzes the rules of international law regarding foreign 
investment in Nigeria’s O&G sector as well as their implications on host communities of the 
Niger Delta. Mainly, the analysis involves the environmental and human rights issues that are 
implicated as a result of the nature of Nigeria’s BITs. The thesis also assesses the regulation of 
IOCs under Nigeria’s domestic environmental laws and analyzes scholarly literature about their 
suitability. It also includes a critical assessment of treaties and soft law instruments and scholarly 
publications that examine the content and scope of these instruments. 
The analysis extends to how BITs could be explored for the protection of the environment and 
human rights of the impacted communities. Further, it analyzes how international law generally 
and, in particular, the home states will respond to incorporating obligations relating to 
environmental protection and human rights in BITs. Considering that the central purpose of this 
thesis is to enhance the protection of Niger Delta communities from environmental harm and 
human rights violations, the thesis also analyzes the potential adverse impacts of some BIT 
provisions on Nigeria’s efforts to curb these problems. 
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165 Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 144 at 3. 
166 Simons, supra note 42 at 18. 
167 Choudhury, supra note 147 at 430. 
168 Krajewski, Human Rights supra note 158. 
 
 
27 
 
In undertaking these analyses, the thesis relies on primary sources such as statutes, BITs and 
other international law instruments, and judicial decisions. Secondary sources such as books, 
journal articles, newspaper articles and international organizations’ reports also form central 
sources for the thesis’ analysis. 
1.8 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is divided into four chapters. This chapter is the introductory chapter, which outlines 
the literature review, relevance of the study and methodological approach of the research. 
Chapter two analyzes the extent of the environmental issues that bedevil the Niger Delta people 
and the laws that regulate the O&G sector in Nigeria. It also examines the environmental and 
human rights implications of the operations of the IOCs in the O&G sector in Nigeria. It further 
justifies the argument of this thesis that it is necessary to impose BIT obligations on IOCs. In 
chapter three, the thesis examines international regulations relating to corporate misconduct. 
Chapter three also examines some of Nigeria’s BIT clauses and their implications for 
environmental protection and environment-related human rights protection in Nigeria. Finally, it 
proposes the renegotiation of Nigeria’s BITs to incorporate obligations that relate to 
environmental protection and human rights in Nigeria and discusses the location of these 
obligations in BITs. Chapter four examines the potential challenges that could face the Nigerian 
government and the home countries of the IOCs as they renegotiate the relevant BITs to 
incorporate obligations relating to environmental protection and human rights as proposed by 
this thesis. It further examines two enforcement mechanisms for the obligations imposed on 
IOCs. First, it argues that the Nigerian government may enforce these obligations before arbitral 
tribunals. Secondly, it evaluates the possibility of the Niger Delta communities relying on these 
BIT obligations to bring a direct claim against IOCs for a breach of their obligations regarding 
human rights and environmental protection in their home states. 
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CHAPTER TWO: ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF 
IOCs’ OPERATIONS: JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONALIZATION OF OBLIGATIONS 
THROUGH BITS 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines environmental issues such as oil spillage and gas flaring caused by IOCs 
in the Niger Delta communities and the human rights implications of the activities of the IOCs in 
Nigeria’s O&G sector. The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part analyzes the 
environmental concerns, that is, the incidences of oil spillage and gas flaring in Nigeria. In 
particular, it identifies that incidences of oil spillage and gas flaring have been in existence in the 
Niger Delta communities since 1956 when oil was discovered in Nigeria, and have continued 
unabated. It further evaluates major Nigerian laws that regulate environmental pollution. 
Second, the chapter analyzes the adverse human rights implications of the activities of the IOCs 
in the Niger Delta communities. In its analysis, it examines the jurisprudence of Nigeria’s courts 
and Africa’s regional bodies. This part of the chapter evaluates the human rights implications of 
environmental degradation, as well as human rights violations that involve the Nigerian 
government with the complicity of IOCs. 
The chapter argues that the current domestic laws appear not to effectively control the operations 
of the IOCs in Nigeria as the IOCs’ activities continue to raise both environmental and human 
rights concerns. The chapter concludes by justifying the central argument of this thesis for the 
imposition of obligations relating to environmental and human rights protection on IOCs in 
Nigeria’s BITs. 
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2.2 Environmental Concerns in Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Sector 
In Nigeria, almost all produced O&G resources are extracted from the Niger Delta region.169 As 
a result of the failure of the IOCs to adopt the standard practice in the exploration and production 
of O&G, there have been continued oil spills and gas flaring, resulting in environmental 
pollution. 
2.2.1 Oil Spillage 
The issue of oil spillage dates back to the period when oil exploration started in the Niger Delta 
and has continued to date. Nigeria has no reliable reporting system of oil spills in the Niger Delta 
area.170 However, between 1970 and 1983, the volume of oil that was spilled is approximately 
1,711,354 barrels.171 The records of the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) show that 
between the periods of 2010 and 2017,172 there were over 4,500 oil spill incidences, and in 2018, 
Shell alone admitted a total of 148 oil spills incidences.173 This figure does not include minor 
spills and may not necessarily represent the actual state of affairs. Indeed, several years of oil 
spill occurrences in the Niger Delta region dwarf the Gulf of Mexico oil spill that occurred in 
Louisiana, the United States of America, in 2010, which attracted significant attention around the 
globe.174 
There are two broad causes of oil spills: the poor maintenance of oil pipelines and third-party 
intervention. IOCs had earlier admitted that their infrastructure needed work and that corrosion 
was responsible for most of the oil spills.175 However, in recent times, IOCs attribute almost all 
the oil spill occurrences to third-party intervention, otherwise known as an act of sabotage by 
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individuals in the Niger Delta in an attempt to circumvent liability for compensation.176 While 
some of the oil spills may have been caused by acts of sabotage, IOCs should at least be 
expected to bear liability for their failure to safeguard their oil pipelines from malicious damage 
by third parties. 
2.2.2 Gas Flaring 
Environmental pollution in the Niger Delta is also attributed to gas flaring. Similar to oil spills, 
gas flaring is as old as oil exploration in Nigeria.177 Continuous gas flaring in the Niger Delta 
region has contributed significantly to the release of greenhouse gases into the air, and acid 
rain.178 In Nigeria, oil companies flare over 313 million standard cubic feet of gas yearly, and as 
a result, emit 16.5 million tons of carbon dioxide.179 This figure makes Nigeria the seventh-
highest “gas flarer” in the world.180 Sadly, some flare sites are located within human settlement 
areas in the Niger Delta community, burn 24 hours a day and have burnt for more than forty 
years.181 
As fairly described, the attitude of IOCs in the Niger Delta is that of “go to Rome and behave 
like the Romans”182 as IOCs do not flare gas at the rate they do in Nigeria in other countries that 
have a stronger regulatory approach. Eaton argues that many of Shell’s operations in Nigeria 
would be illegal in other parts of the world.183 The burning of associated gas is hugely wasteful 
and environmentally damaging.184 It is a consensus that the only viable way to end gas flaring as 
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it is obtainable in other parts of the world is through utilization and commercialization of 
associated gas.185 
2.2.3 Review of Nigeria’s Environmental Protection Regulations in the Oil and Gas Sector 
The following analysis of Nigeria’s principal laws and regulations for the protection of the 
environment is intended to demonstrate that Nigeria has laws that seek to curb oil spills and gas 
flaring in the O&G sector. More importantly, the ineffectiveness of these laws and regulations 
shows that IOCs pollute the Niger Delta region without any consequences, and therefore, the 
people of the Niger Delta are left without a remedy. The essence of analyzing these principal 
environmental laws and regulations is to demonstrate that there are gaps in these laws and 
advance an argument that Nigeria’s government needs to improve its laws in addition to 
renegotiating Nigeria’s BITs to reflect IOCs’ obligation relating to environmental protection, 
which is the core argument of this thesis. 
2.2.3.1 The Petroleum Act 
The Petroleum Act186 is the bedrock of any discussion on the regulation of O&G exploration and 
production in Nigeria, as it is the foremost law in this regard. Under the Petroleum Act, 
petroleum “means mineral oil (or any related hydrocarbon) or natural gas as it exists in its natural 
state in strata, and does not include coal or bituminous shales or other stratified deposits from 
which oil can be extracted by destructive distillation.”187 In conformity with the regulatory power 
wielded by the Minister under the Petroleum Act for the prevention of pollution of watercourses 
and the atmosphere,188 the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations, the Petroleum 
Refining Regulations and the Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations were enacted. 
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2.2.3.1.1 The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations, 1969 
Regulation 25 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations, (PDPR)189 is the most 
significant provision relating to the protection of the environment and requires that oil companies 
should: 
                            adopt all practicable precautions including the provision of up-to-date 
equipment approved by the Director of Petroleum Resources, to prevent the 
pollution of inland waters, rivers, watercourses, the territorial waters of Nigeria 
or the high seas by oil, mud or other fluids or substances which might 
contaminate the water, banks or shoreline or which might cause harm or 
destruction to freshwater or marine life and where any such pollution occurs or 
has occurred, shall take prompt steps to control and if possible, end it. 
Also, regulation 37 (d) of the PDPR respectively enjoins oil companies to carry out their 
activities or “operations in a proper and workmanlike manner” in accordance with “good oil field 
practices” and to avoid the leakage of “petroleum into any water, well, spring, stream, river, lake, 
reservoir, estuary or harbor.” 
While the PDPR purports to ensure that IOCs do not pollute the environment, the primary 
concern of its provisions is that it allows the director to have a wide latitude of discretion.190 
Although it is not clear whether the director has ever exercised the discretion wrongfully, it has 
been argued that this discretion may either be influenced by bribery or exercised in accordance 
with the desire of the director to accommodate a vital business entity191 for its economic benefit 
to Nigeria. This argument is tenable considering that there is no basis for assessing whether the 
discretion has been exercised in the interest of the public. This has necessitated an argument for 
the establishment of guidelines to check the excesses of the director in the exercise of 
discretion.192 However, even if guidelines are established, there is no guarantee, for instance, of 
strict implementation of the “good oil field practices” due to the economic gain that accrues to 
Nigeria from the O&G sector. What this means is that the interest of the Niger Delta people as it 
relates to their environment could be shortchanged within the domestic legal framework, and this 
necessitates consideration of how this interest could be protected under Nigeria’s BITs. 
 
189 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations Cap P10 LFN 2004. 
190 Oshionebo, Regulating Transnational Corporations, supra note 32 at 52. 
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2.2.3.1.2 The Petroleum Refining Regulations, 1974 
The Petroleum Refining Regulations (PRR) requires that: 
                            The Manager [of an oil company] shall adopt all practicable precautions 
including the provision of up-to-date equipment as may be specified by the 
Director [of Petroleum Resources] from time to time, to prevent the pollution 
of the environment by petroleum or petroleum products; and where such 
pollution occurs the manager shall take prompt steps to control and, if possible, 
end it.193 
The effect of this regulation is that although IOCs could alter the environment in areas covered 
by their licences, they are not allowed to unreasonably cause environmental pollution as they are 
obliged to take measures to prevent the pollution of the environment.194 By regulation 45(1), any 
contravention of the provisions of the PRR attracts either a paltry sum of 100 (NGN) as a penalty 
or imprisonment for six months. Also, some punishments, which are provided under section 8 (d) 
Petroleum Act, are applicable. These include the arrest of a person who is alleged to have 
contravened the Petroleum Act or any of its regulations by the Minister of Petroleum. As with 
the PDPR, the provisions of PRR are rarely enforced against the IOCs owing to the latter’s 
contribution to the Nigerian economy.195 
Some critics have raised concerns about the vagueness of some phrases in the PDPR and the 
PRR, such as “practicable precautions,” “operations in a proper and workmanlike manner,” and 
“good oil field practices.”196 However, it is arguable that such imprecision may allow the 
Nigerian authorities to make some amendments to its laws to prevent subsequent irresponsible 
“exploration and production” practices.197 For instance, it has been argued that if these phrases 
were defined in the regulations, some practices that currently degrade the environment might be 
acceptable.198 
 
 
193 The Petroleum Refining Regulations, 1974, reg. 43 (3). 
194 Oshionebo, Regulating Transnational Corporations, supra note 32 at 52. 
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2.2.3.1.3 The Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations, 1997 
The Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations,199 which are made under the Petroleum Act, is another 
instructive regulation that is related to the protection of the environment in Nigeria. Regulation 7 
requires that procedures for the production and handling of oil and gas shall conform to “good oil 
field practice,” which is appropriately covered by the “appropriate current Institute of Petroleum 
Safety Codes; or the American Petroleum Institute Codes; or the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers Codes.”200 Authors such as Ekhator have argued that this provision 
automatically requires IOCs operating in Nigeria to comply with international standards.201 As 
plausible as this argument might appear, this thesis argues that another environmental regulation, 
as analyzed below, has relaxed the application of this provision and has indeed provided lower 
standards as it allows IOCs to determine the suitable standard to follow. 
2.2.3.2 The Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, 1984 
The Associated Gas Re-Injection Act (AGRA) is the primary legislation that regulates gas flaring 
in Nigeria.202 The AGRA applies to all associated gas in all lands.203 The AGRA prohibits gas 
flaring unless the Minister authorizes such. Despite fixing the date for terminating gas flaring at 
January 1984,204 the Minister has extended this date because IOCs refused to comply with the 
deadline.205 It further grants the Minister a broad discretion to authorize gas flaring, where he 
considers that gas utilization or reinjection is not feasible in respect of an oilfield.206 This 
discretion allows the Minister to either make an authorization for gas flaring by specifying 
certain conditions at his discretion or by attaching a fine for flaring gas.207 Sadly, this discretion 
effectively exempts 86 out of 155 oilfields from the anti-flaring provisions.208 While the 
requirements for the exercise of the Minister's discretion in favour of flaring of gas may include: 
 
199 The Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations, 1990, pursuant to the fourth paragraph of the Fourth Schedule to the 
Petroleum Act, supra note 71. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ekhator, Public Regulation of the Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria, supra note 195 at 63. 
202 AGRA, supra note 95. 
203 Ibid, section 6. 
204 Ibid, section 3. 
205 Omoregbe, supra note 98. The Minister has extended this date for the umpteenth time and thus, IOCs are 
permitted to continue flaring gas. 
206 AGRA, supra note 95, section 3 (1) and (2). 
207 Ibid, section 3 (2) (a) and (b). 
208 Mohammed, supra note 96 at 1254.    
 
 
35 
 
where 75 percent of the gas is utilized or conserved effectively; where the gas contains over 15 
percent impurities; and if an ongoing program is interrupted by the failure of equipment,209 the 
amount to be paid per unit of flared gas is prescribed by the Minister.210 The provision for the 
payment of a fine for gas flaring is one reason for IOCs’ complacency.211 The payment of this 
fine is more economically viable for IOCs as an official of an IOC is quoted to have said, “it was 
cheaper to flare gas, while gas flaring would cost the company only $1 million, the cost of 
switching from water to gas injection would cost $56 million.”212 
Given the permissive provisions of the AGRA, it is beyond doubt that it seeks to either 
encourage IOCs to utilize gas through the use of technologies213 or to generate revenues for the 
government through penalties. Therefore, the AGRA intends to curb gas flaring in Nigeria. 
Statistics demonstrate that IOCs in Nigeria have continued to neglect the provisions of the 
AGRA because of their economic interest and, perhaps, the lax attitude of the government 
towards enforcing the AGRA.214 
Apart from the AGRA, the Nigerian government has recently approved the Flare Gas 
(Prevention of Waste and Pollution) Regulations (Regulation). This Regulation seeks to reduce 
the environmental and social impacts of gas flaring following the National Gas Flaring 
Commercialization Programme.215 The Regulation prohibits any oil producer from flaring gas 
unless such producer is issued a certificate to do so by the Minister of Petroleum under the 
AGRA.216 In this case, the oil producer would be liable to the Nigerian government for a flare 
payment.217 However, it is too early in the life of the Regulation to ascertain its effectiveness in 
its objective to reduce gas flaring in the Niger Delta region. Apart from the AGRA and the 
Regulation, the Nigerian government has taken some initiatives such as the National Gas Policy 
(NGP) towards placing primary consideration on gas utilization over other ways of handling 
 
209 The Associated Gas Re-Injection (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 43 of 1984, 
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associated gas.218 According to the NGP, the commercialization of gas is essential in attaining a 
national plan for flare-out by 2020.219 
2.2.3.3 The EGASPIN, 2002 
The Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industries in Nigeria 
(EGASPIN) also regulate oil spillage in Nigeria and were issued by the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR). Notably, the EGASPIN reiterates the obligation of the oil companies 
concerning the environment and therefore does not permit the discharge of wastes in the course 
of oil exploration and production into inland waters, swamp, coastal, shallow offshore and any 
pit other than the approved temporary holding retention unless such discharge is permitted by the 
Director of Petroleum Resources.220 The EGASPIN envisages self-enforcement by oil operators 
in the sector as it expects oil corporations to perform some duties in their operations.221 Oil 
corporations appoint a management representative who has the responsibility of ensuring that 
environmental policies are established, as well as appropriately implemented.222 The most 
striking aim of the environmental system is to ensure that unexpected, “identified and 
unidentified environmental issues are contained and brought to an acceptable minimum.”223 
Another responsibility of the oil companies that is tied to the self-enforcement mechanism is the 
fact that oil corporations are required to carry out self-monitoring exercise(s) to ensure 
compliance with the standards under EGASPIN by monitoring the emission of oil-related wastes 
from the production process224 and patrol for the inspection of oil pipelines once in a month or as 
directed by the Director of Petroleum Department. 
Additionally, the remediation process and requirements demonstrate the primary role of oil 
corporations in ensuring the EGASPIN’s enforcement. While the oil corporations are mandated 
to restore an affected environment to its original state before the occurrence of an oil spillage as 
 
218 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Ministry of Petroleum Resources “National Gas Policy” (last visited 20 November 
2018) at 61, online (pdf): <www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/National-Gas-Policy-
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220 EGASPIN, supra note 101, Article 3.4. 
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much as possible, they also have the responsibility “to monitor the impacted environment 
alongside the restorative activities.”225 
The main reason for the self-enforcement requirement is connected with the fact that identifying 
toxic substances requires in-depth scientific knowledge and necessary equipment, which the 
DPR does not possess.226 The self-regulation system practically leaves the regulation of oil spills 
and their detrimental effects on host communities solely on oil corporations. Oshionebo argues 
that this deficiency is the bane of regulation in Nigeria.227 
2.2.3.4 The Environmental Impact Assessment Act, 1992 
The Nigerian government enacted the Environmental Impact Assessment (the EIA Act) in 
1992.228 The EIA Act applies to all operations, notwithstanding the sector, that affects the 
environment in Nigeria. Being proactive, the EIA Act requires that if the nature or location of a 
project is likely to affect the environment, then an assessment of such impact should be taken 
before undertaking such projects229 and the measures that are in place to tackle the environmental 
impacts.230 The objectives of an environmental impact assessment as set out in section 1 of the 
EIA Act are as follows: 
establishing the activities that may likely, or to a significant extent affect the 
environment before a decision is taken by any person, authority, corporate 
body intending to undertake or authorize the undertaking of any activity; 
promoting the implementation of appropriate policy in all Federal, State and 
local government lands consistent with all environmental impact assessment 
laws and decision-making processes; and encouraging the development of 
procedures for information exchange, notification and consultation between      
organs and persons when proposed activities are likely to have significant 
transboundary environmental effects. 
Markedly, if, in the opinion of the Federal Ministry of Environment (FME), the O&G projects 
will likely have adverse impacts on the environment, it may refuse to grant a permit required to 
 
225 Ibid, Articles 2.11.1, 2.11.2 and 2.11.3 
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undertake the project either in whole or part.231 An equally significant provision of the EIA Act is 
its requirement for the consultations of persons where the proposed projects are likely to have a 
substantial impact on the environment of surrounding villages and towns.232 
Despite these provisions that tend to protect the environment, the EIA Act provides for 
exceptions that undermine its effectiveness in ensuring environmental safety. Under the EIA Act, 
an impact assessment is not required in the following circumstances, to wit: where the President 
of Nigeria or the Federal Environmental Protection Council is of the view that the environmental 
impacts of the project may likely be minimal, the project is to be undertaken during national 
emergency period for which the government has taken temporary steps, and the FME is of the 
view that such a project is in the interest of public health or safety.233 These exceptions are 
responsible for non-compliance with the environmental protection provisions by IOCs.234 For 
instance, the first exception may be explored by IOCs with political connections with the 
President to avoid compliance with the requirements of the EIA Act.235 The last exception that 
allows non-compliance with the environmental impact assessment requirement appears to 
counteract the entire objective of the EIA Act. This is because the only way to determine whether 
a project is safe or healthy for the public is by assessing its potential impacts on the environment. 
2.2.3.5 The NESREA (Establishment) Act, 2007 
The National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) 
Act236 (the NESREA Act) is an enactment that generally regulates the protection of the 
environment in Nigeria. The NESREA Act establishes an agency that is responsible for ensuring 
that environmental standards, laws and regulations are enforced.237 The NESREA Act proscribes 
the discharge of harmful quantities of hazardous substances into the air, water and on the land 
unless such discharge is permitted by any law.238 In this context, the NESREA Act defines 
hazardous substances as any chemical and physical materials that threaten human health and the 
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environment.239 The NESREA Act criminalizes any violation of its provision by an individual or 
corporation with a fine not exceeding 1,000,000 Naira (USD 3,269). 
Moreover, it provides for an additional fine of 50,000 Naira (USD 163) for an offence committed 
by corporations for each day the offence persists,240 and “every person who at the time the 
offence was committed was in charge of the body corporate shall be deemed to be guilty of such 
offence.”241 This thesis argues that the fines imposed by the NESREA Act are not substantial 
enough to dissuade IOCs from discharging harmful quantities of hazardous substances. Another 
criticism of the NESREA Act is that the agency is not empowered to investigate oil spillages.242 
This thesis further argues that the absence of such a provision inhibits the powers of the 
NESREA to curb oil spillage, and also signifies regulatory deficiency in Nigeria’s O&G sector. 
However, the lack of power that incapacitates the NESREA from investigating complaints of oil 
spillage has been attributed to the fact that the drafters of the NESREA Act intended to avoid 
potential conflict between the roles of the NESREA and the National Oil Spillage Detection and 
Response Agency (NOSDRA).243 
2.2.3.6 The National Oil Spillage Detection and Response Agency Act, 2006 
The National Oil Spillage Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) is charged with the 
responsibility of detecting and responding to all oil spill incidences in Nigeria.244 Considering 
that the NOSDRA has the power to sue in its name, it could bring a claim against an IOC for a 
failure to comply with the standards set under the NOSDRA Act.245 Among others, the objective 
of the NOSDRA is to coordinate and implement the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (Plan) 
for Nigeria, and this includes establishing a viable national operational organization to ensure a 
safe, timely and effective response to ‘major or disastrous’ oil pollution.246 A critical 
examination of sections 6 and 7 providing for the functions of NOSDRA suggests that apart from 
the detection of oil spills, it also coordinates responses to oil spills in Nigeria.  The responsibility 
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to coordinate responses has been described as a leadership role in a multi-agency response to oil 
spills in Nigeria.247 
The major criticism of the NOSDRA concerns its capacity to respond to oil spillage in Nigeria. 
Amnesty International reported that investigations regarding oil spillage are led by the personnel 
of IOCs, and thus, the NOSDRA relies on IOCs to take it to oil spill sites and to provide 
technical data regarding the spills.248 This indicates that the NOSDRA could only act on the facts 
and figures presented to it by the IOCs, and that makes it impossible for them to carry out their 
primary objective. Secondly, the NOSDRA Act undermines itself by providing that an objective 
of NOSDRA is to ensure a response to ‘major or disastrous’ oil pollution. Invariably, minor oil 
spills are permitted under the NOSDRA Act. Moreover, the NOSDRA Act does not provide what 
constitutes ‘major or disastrous’ oil pollution, thereby leaving a broad discretion for the 
NOSDRA. 
2.3 Human Rights Implications of the Operations of the International Oil Companies in 
Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Sector 
The focus of this section is on the human rights implications of the operations of the IOCs. 
Frequent oil spills pollute the environment upon which human survival depends and they are 
harmful to human health.249 Equally, gas flaring has serious health implications. Dermal 
exposure to the hydrocarbons in the air can lead to skin redness, edema dermatitis, rashes and 
blisters; inhalation exposure can lead to red, watery and itchy eyes, coughing, throat irritation, 
shortness of breath, headache and confusion, and ingestion of hydrocarbons can lead to nausea 
and diarrhea.250 Environmental degradation affects the quality of life, enjoyment of life, and the 
guaranteed fundamental human rights.251 This section also considers the complicity of the IOCs 
in the violations of human rights of the Niger Delta communities by the Nigerian government. 
Regarding human rights implications of environmental pollution, while this part of the chapter 
acknowledges other methods of enforcing Nigeria’s environmental laws such as through the law 
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of torts,252 it restricts its discussion to the human rights approach to environmental justice in 
Nigeria in light of the scope of this thesis. 
Equally, this section acknowledges that under the theory of state responsibility, the Nigerian 
government bears the obligation to ensure compliance with, and protection of, human rights and 
the environment of the Niger Delta people through regulation of private conduct,253 including the 
activities of IOCs that violate these rights. However, the thesis’ approach, which argues for the 
imposition of obligations relating to human rights and environmental protection on IOCs, is 
similar to what Oshionebo explains as progressively assaulting and maybe, theoretically 
demystifying the conventional perspective.254 Essentially, imposing obligations regarding 
environmental and human rights protection on IOCs through Nigeria’s BITs as proposed in this 
thesis challenges the conventional international law approach that TNCs are not generally direct 
bearers of international law obligations relating to environmental and human rights obligations. 
2.3.1 Human Right to a Healthy Environment 
At the global level, no treaty provides for a stand-alone right to a healthy environment. This is so 
even though it is been several decades since “the first formal international law recognition of the 
links between environmental protection and human rights.”255 This recognition dates back to the 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 
Declaration) of 1972.256 Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration states that “man has the 
fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a 
quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being and he bears a solemn responsibility to 
protect and improve the environment for the present and future generations.”257 
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However, since 1972, there has been a “widespread public and legal recognition of the right to a 
healthy environment across the world”258 that has led to the on-going debate for its recognition 
by the United Nations. The recognition of the right to a healthy environment would strengthen 
the understanding that the protection of human rights requires environmental protection.259 Thus, 
the “recognition of the right to a healthy environment by the United Nations would not only 
make this right universal in application but would also serve as a catalyst for the implementation 
of stronger measures to effectively respect, fulfil and promote this right.”260 Moreover, such 
recognition will complement and strengthen both “regional and national norms and 
jurisprudence” that have developed over the years.261 
Over 100 states have recognized the right to a healthy environment in their constitutions,262 with 
Portugal being the first to do so.263 Some states’ constitutions have included the procedural 
aspect of environmental rights such as rights to obtain information, “participate in decision-
making” regarding environmental issues, as well as “obtain access to justice if the right to a 
healthy environment” has been either endangered or violated.264 Others have enacted laws 
spelling out the substantive elements of the right to a healthy environment.265 Indeed, no other 
relatively ‘new’ human right has attracted such prevalent recognition in national constitutions.266 
However, the Nigerian constitution does not provide for the right to a healthy environment. 
Chapter 2 of the Nigerian constitution refers to the environmental objectives of the state and 
provides that “the state shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, air, 
and land, forest, and wildlife in Nigeria.”267 While the main aim of this provision is to ensure a 
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healthy environment,268 the Nigerian constitution prevents the courts from giving effect to it.269 
Section 6 (6) (c) of the Nigerian constitution provides: 
The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this 
section – shall not except as otherwise provided by this constitution, extend to 
any issue or question as to whether any act or omission by any authority or 
person or as to whether any law or any judicial decision is in conformity with 
the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy set out in 
Chapter II of this Constitution. 
This provision implies that all provisions of chapter 2 of the constitution, including the 
provisions relating to the environment in section 20, are non-justiciable. As a result, the host 
communities are not allowed to rely on section 20 of the Nigerian constitution to claim a breach 
of a right to a healthy environment against the Nigerian government before a law court in 
Nigeria. The Nigerian courts are also, in some cases, reluctant to give effect to the claims of host 
communities regarding environmental pollution as the courts prefer to take an economic-
approach as opposed to a sustainable approach and consider that the Nigerian economy depends 
on O&G.270 Although writers have suggested that section 6 (6) (c) of the Nigerian Constitution 
inhibits the enforceability of the right to a healthy environment in a Nigerian court,271 this thesis 
argues that the domestication of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African 
Charter) in Nigeria undermines the argument. This is because the ratification of the African 
Charter automatically makes it an Act of the legislature which all government authorities, 
including the courts of competent jurisdiction, are bound to enforce.272  Moreover, the non-
justiciability of chapter 2 applies only to the extent that section 6 (6) (c) of the Constitution 
provides.273 The Supreme Court of Nigeria made this point in Attorney General of Ondo State v 
Attorney General of Nigeria, where it held that where an Act is passed into law in fulfillment of 
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the directive principles of state policy, such an Act becomes enforceable in any court of law in 
Nigeria.274 
At the regional level, Article 24 of the African Charter recognizes the right to a healthy 
environment.275 The Nigerian government is a party to the African Charter, with an obligation to 
protect the right to a healthy environment of the Niger Delta communities. The African Charter, 
in its article 24, provides that “all peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development.” Although the content of the right to a healthy 
environment has been disputed,276 its existence, particularly concerning the environmental 
degradation caused by IOCs in Nigeria, is beyond contestation. As a result, Niger Delta 
communities, through various nongovernmental organizations, have relied on the African 
Charter in search of a remedy. An author notes that: 
The Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Centre for       
Economic and Social Rights (CESR) communication against Nigeria before the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission or 
Commission) reiterates the fact that inadequate protection of human rights at 
the domestic level necessitates the existence of human rights mechanisms at an 
international level.277 
Relying on Article 24 of the African Charter, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community 
of West African States in Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v Nigeria, 
held that that the Ogoni people of the Niger Delta had their rights to a healthy and satisfactory 
environment violated by the failure of the Nigerian government to prevent pollution from oil 
exploration in the community.278 Also, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Commission) in Socio and Economic Rights Action Center v Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (SERAC Case), found merit with the Communication filed by the SERAC that the 
Nigerian government violated the right to a general satisfactory environment of the Ogoni people 
 
274 The Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of Nigeria, (2002) 9 Nigeria Weekly Law Report, Part 
772 at 222. 
275 African Charter, supra note 18. The United Nations Economic Commission for Economic Commission for 
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of the Niger Delta under article 24 of the African Charter by “failing to protect the Ogoni 
population from the harm caused by the NNPC-Shell Consortium but instead used its security 
forces to facilitate the damage.”279 The African Commission noted that the right to a general 
satisfactory environment is also known as the right to a healthy environment.280 
As applaudable as the judgment is, it is unsatisfactory for the African Commission to merely 
“appeal” to the Nigerian government to conduct an investigation into the human rights violations 
and undertake a “cleanup of lands and rivers damaged by oil operations.”281 The use of the word 
“appeal” reduces the effect of the obligation owed by the Nigerian government to the Niger 
Delta communities. However, the decision of the African Commission is understandable in the 
light of the fact that it is only empowered to make recommendations to state parties, which 
according to Oshionebo, can either be accepted or rejected by states.282 
2.3.2 Human Right to Health 
Article 12 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
provides for “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health.”283 This provision encapsulates the right to health. Although the 
provision does not expressly guarantee a right to a healthy environment, it is arguable that certain 
acts that amount to a breach of the right to a healthy environment under the African Charter may 
affect the enjoyment of the highest standard of physical health.284 
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights acknowledges that the 
right to health includes several socio-economic conditions that lead to a healthy life and also 
extends to the fundamental determinants of health such as access to safe water, healthy 
 
279 SERAC v Nigeria, supra note 29, paragraph 50. Also, in Gbemre v SPDC, supra note 12, a Nigeria’s Federal 
High Court held that SPDC’s continuous gas flaring in the course of oil exploration violates the applicant 
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environment and food.285 States have an obligation to respect, protect and fulfill the right to 
health and the content of these obligations extends to preventing third parties such as IOCs from 
violating the right to health.286 The right to health will be violated if the state of the environment 
is such that it would upset human health. Individuals in the Niger Delta communities suffer from 
diseases such as cancer, leukemia, chronic bronchitis, respiratory disorders and cardiovascular 
diseases as a result of inhaling air that is contaminated by flared gas.287 The pervasive water-
related diseases such as typhoid and cholera are often linked to the pollution of their 
environment, which is caused by the operations of the IOCs.288 
Further, Article 12 of the ICESCR states that “the steps to be taken by the State Parties to the 
present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for . . . 
[t]he improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene.” Regarding this 
provision, “the need to protect and improve the environment is mentioned as a means of 
achieving the right to health.”289 
2.3.3 Human Right to Life 
The Nigerian Constitution provides a broad scope of human rights from which a right to a 
healthy environment can be derived, and one of such is the right to life. Section 33 of the 
Nigerian Constitution provides that “every person has the right to life and no one shall be 
deprived intentionally of his life...” The right to life is also protected under international 
instruments.290 Article 4 of the African Charter provides that “every human being shall be 
entitled to respect for his life” and that no person should be deprived of the right to life.291 The 
right to life is universal and obligatory, and no other right makes sense without it, and the 
protection of it extends to the protection of the environment. Regarding the scope of the right to 
life, Hunter David stated that: 
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Initially, the right to life was aimed at preventing arbitrary killing by the 
government. In recent years, the right to life has evolved to extend to address 
certain environmental harms that directly or indirectly infringe on the right to 
life. This extension of the ambit of the right to life is as a result of the efforts 
and works of environmental and human rights advocates.292 
The above quote demonstrates that the right to life has gone beyond the brutality of a state’s 
security agents that leads to the death of its citizens. Similarly, the UN Human Rights Committee 
has interpreted the right to life broadly.293 Accordingly, the right to life also concerns the right of 
all persons “to be free from acts and omissions that are intended or may be expected to cause 
their unnatural or premature death.”294 States have an obligation to adopt necessary laws and 
measures for the protection of their citizens from all foreseeable threats, which include threats 
from corporate entities.295 For states to protect the right to life, they should take necessary steps 
to “address the general conditions in the society that may” pose direct threats to life, including 
environmental degradation.296 Degradation of the environment and “unsustainable development” 
are considered to be a serious threat to the right to life of both “present and future generations,” 
and therefore, states should ensure that the environment is protected against the pollution that is 
caused by corporate actors.297 Indeed, any activity by either the state or a corporate body that 
reduces life expectancy breaches the right to life.298 Therefore, there is no doubt that 
environmental pollution continues to constitute a threat to life as it reduces life expectancy and 
could cause death. For instance, after a significant oil spill several years ago, about 180 people 
were reported to have died in a Niger Delta community as a result of the discharge of toxins into 
the environment.299 
The idea that the right to life could be threatened by environmental degradation has also attracted 
judicial recognition in Nigeria. In the celebrated case of Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development 
Corporation of Nigeria Ltd,300 the federal high court interpreted the right to life to include the 
right to be free from pollution that endangers life such as gas flaring. In the case, Mr. Gbemre 
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sued SPDC, NNPC and the Attorney General of the federation in a representative capacity, for 
and on behalf of himself and a community in the Niger Delta. He claimed, among others, that gas 
flaring caused by SPDC violates their right to life, the dignity of persons and general satisfactory 
environment as stipulated in Nigeria’s constitution and the African Charter which has been 
domesticated in Nigeria. Among others, the court held that the fundamental rights to life 
(including a healthy environment) and dignity of a human person under the constitution and the 
African Charter were violated by the gas flaring activities of SPDC in the course of their oil 
production.301 The court further held that the failure of the SPDC to conduct an environmental 
impact assessment also contributed to the abuse of the fundamental rights to life and dignity of 
human person.302 
However, after several years, the final judgment of the court granting a restraining order against 
the SPDC as partly sought by the plaintiff is yet to be enforced, and this has raised questions 
regarding its value to the Niger Delta people and their quest to protect their environment and 
human rights. This, perhaps, explains why the pronouncement of the court has not deterred IOCs 
from their continuous gas flaring in the Niger Delta communities. Be that as it may, a major 
significance of this case is its recognition of IOCs as duty bearers within Nigeria’s domestic law 
as it demonstrates the applicability of environmental and human rights provisions on IOCs in 
Nigeria.303 
2.3.4 Human Rights to Water and Food 
“Water, water everywhere, not a drop to drink.”304 
The access to clean water and food of communities across the Niger Delta is closely related to 
land and environmental quality.305 Environmental degradation directly affects the quality of 
water and food to which the Niger Delta is entitled. One of the studies of the environmental 
impacts of oil operations in the Niger Delta region reveals that incessant oil spills of various 
magnitudes have resulted in massive pollution of water bodies as well as degradation of 
 
301 Ibid at 30 
302 Ibid. 
303 Onwuazombe, supra note 4 at 135. 
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“agricultural land, destruction of” the artisanal fishery, and general adverse socio-economic 
consequences.306 
The rights to water and food are considered economic and social rights, which are guaranteed 
under the ICESCR.307 Article 11 of the ICESCR guarantees the right to an adequate standard of 
living, which includes adequate water and food.308 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has articulated a three-pronged obligation of states regarding the rights under the 
ICESCR.309 They are the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil, among others, the rights to 
water and food in the context of the impacts of business activities.310 The state obligations apply 
to businesses whether their operations are transnational or purely domestic, or whether private 
actors or states wholly own them.311 
In the context of business activities’ impacts on the rights to water and food, states' obligation to 
protect is the most relevant.312 Within the ambit of the obligation to protect, states should adopt 
an appropriate legal framework to ensure that businesses engage in due diligence to ensure that 
they “identify, prevent and mitigate the” adverse impact of their operations on the rights to water 
and food.313 Besides, states should ensure that they provide access to remedies to victims of 
corporate abuses of economic and social rights.314 The obligation of the state to respect the rights 
to water and food is violated when the state prioritizes business interests over these rights 
without a good reason,315 while the obligation to fulfil requires that states take appropriate steps 
to encourage the enjoyment of the rights to water and food.316 All of these show that corporate 
activities could violate economic and social rights such as the rights to water and food, and states 
have an obligation to ensure the protection of these rights. 
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The right to water is necessary for securing an adequate standard of living because it is one of the 
essential conditions for human survival.317 As it relates to the right to water, three factors are 
relevant under all circumstances in considering the adequacy of water: availability, quality and 
accessibility.318 The Niger Delta communities do not have access to water that meets these 
requirements. This is because acid rain resulting from gas flaring pollutes drinkable rainwater319 
and contaminates freshwater. 
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights interpreted the content 
of the right to food to include not only the availability of food but also the quality and quantity of 
food that is “free from adverse substances.”320  Regarding the impact of environmental pollution 
on the right to food, oil pipelines run across farmlands, and head and flow stations are often close 
to farmlands.321 Consequently, when an oil spill occurs, its spillage on the land makes cultivation 
difficult for these communities, and when they eventually cultivate, the yield is inferior.322 The 
African Commission in the SERAC Case held that the minimum expectation of the right to food 
is that the Nigerian government should not contaminate food sources and should not allow IOCs 
to contaminate food sources or prevent efforts of the people to feed themselves as the right to 
food is essential to the fulfilment of other rights such as rights to health.323 Unfortunately, the 
Nigerian government has failed in its obligation under ICESCR and the African Charter to 
protect these rights as the IOCs continuously violate them. 
2.3.5 International Oil Companies’ Complicity in Violations of Human Rights in Niger Delta 
Communities 
The doctrine of ‘complicity’ recognizes the indirect participation of an actor in the irresponsible 
conduct of another party who commits the actual offence.324 The subject of corporate 
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‘complicity’ takes four different forms.325 These are: where a corporation either aids or abets the 
violation of human rights; where a corporation has a joint venture agreement with a host state 
and knows or ought to know of the human rights violations committed by the latter in fulfillment 
of the agreement; where the corporation benefitted from the abuse, for instance, the state security 
forces are used to suppress peaceful protest against business operations, and finally, where there 
are continuous violations of human rights and the corporation remains silent.326 
In the context of the Niger Delta communities and the IOCs, it is widely-acknowledged that 
IOCs encouraged the Nigerian government to engage the Nigerian military force to pulverize 
individuals who protested against the environmental degradation and human rights violations 
that were examined earlier as being caused by the IOCs. Therefore, apart from the direct 
violation of environmental and human rights, the complicity of IOCs leads to a breach of the 
human rights of the people of the Niger Delta, such as rights to life and dignity of the human 
person. 
Muchlinski explained complicity in the context of Ken Saro Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum,327 
where he noted that the plaintiffs claimed that SPDC was allegedly “supporting the Nigerian 
state in its repression of the Ogoni people through inter alia the supply of money, weapons and 
logistical support to the Nigerian military which carried out the abuses.”328 In the critique of 
human rights violations involving the complicity of an IOC in Nigeria, Amnesty International 
reports that “the evidence [it has] reviewed shows that [SPDC] repeatedly encouraged the 
Nigerian military to deal with community protests, even when it knew the horrors this would 
lead to – unlawful killings, rape, torture, the burning of villages.”329 Similarly, it reports that 
“sometimes [SPDC] played a more direct role in the bloodshed – for example by transporting 
armed forces to break up protests, even when it became clear what the consequences would 
be.”330 
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The establishment of the complicity of IOCs in respect of human rights violations in the Niger 
Delta community remains a topical issue that has suffered a setback as a result of the difficulty of 
establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction in foreign courts before which such cases are brought. 
Providing a mechanism that offers a legal basis for establishing the extraterritorial jurisdiction of 
the domestic courts of the home states of the IOCs operating in Nigeria is partly the primary aim 
of this thesis. 
2.4 Justifying the Internationalization of IOCs’ Obligations through Nigeria’s Bilateral 
Investment Treaties 
The idea that IOCs’ obligations regarding environmental and human rights protection should be 
internationalized through BITs may arouse inquisitive skepticism as it is generally accepted that 
such obligations should be addressed through domestic laws. Although this view is tenable, this 
thesis argues that making efforts at the domestic level alone is insufficient to address the 
environmental and human rights issues arising from the operation of IOCs. 
The survey and analysis of Nigeria’s domestic regulations reveal that there are several 
deficiencies in Nigeria’s environmental laws, and this situation could be described as the 
‘governance gap,’ having regard to their direct and indirect negative impacts on the human rights 
of host communities.331 Further, the thesis recognizes that the economic relevance of the O&G 
sector to the Nigerian government may have contributed to the lack of political will by the 
government to address these deficiencies. The Nigerian government often takes cognizance of 
the revenue that accrues from O&G production in Nigeria,332 as it contributes significantly to 
Nigeria’s economy accounting for sixty-five percent of the government’s total revenue.333 Since 
the government has equity stakes in the investments of IOCs through Joint Venture Agreements, 
strict regulation of the activities of the IOCs may also affect the economic benefits that accrue to 
the government. It is expected, however, that the Nigerian government should rise above its 
economic interest to bring its domestic laws in line with the realities facing the Niger Delta 
people as the importance of effective domestic regulations cannot be overemphasized. 
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Several works have demonstrated how these regulations could be significantly improved to 
address the environmental and human rights implications of IOCs’ operations in the Niger 
Delta.334 However, dealing with the domestic laws alone will not address the challenges that the 
Nigerian government might face within Nigeria’s BIT. These challenges, as addressed in section 
3.4.2 of chapter 3, are a result of the government’s BIT obligations such as protection from 
expropriation and the obligation under the FET clause that may have a regulatory chill on the 
efforts of the government to improve its domestic laws. This thesis argues that it is equally 
necessary to tackle these challenges within the BITs by amending the clause regarding 
expropriation, and in the process, impose obligations relating to environmental and human rights 
protection on IOCs in BITs. 
Beyond domestic regulation, this thesis argues that through BITs, international law could also 
play a significant role in ensuring that IOCs are held accountable for the pollution of the 
environment and violation of human rights. This argument builds on Simons’ and Macklin’s 
suggestion that the “governance gap” could be observed [and perhaps addressed], among others, 
from the perspective of the failure of a host government and home states, and from the inability 
of “international legal orders to assert effective governance over TNCs.”335 This thesis observes 
the lack of accountability by the IOCs through the optics of international law and, connects with 
the objective of the Third World Approaches to International Law to offer an alternative legal 
edifice for international governance336 for addressing IOCs’ misconduct through BITs. 
Since non-state actors such as IOCs in Nigeria are protected by international instruments such as 
BITs, and also, they leverage on the failure of existing international law regime that does not 
insist on corporations’ liability for pollution of the environment and violation of human rights, it 
is not unreasonable to explore the potential of international law to tackle these problems. The 
approach of this thesis to turn to international law through BITs is already garnering support 
from the United Nations Intergovernmental Working Group (the UN Intergovernmental Working 
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Group).337 The UN Intergovernmental Working Group acknowledges in the Zero Draft Treaty 
that agreements between states such as BITs could be used to provide access to justice to victims 
of human rights violations, which include environmental rights.338 However, the practical 
challenges of using BITs as an international instrument to address environmental and human 
rights concerns in the Niger Delta, particularly the possible lack of political will by both the 
Nigerian government and the relevant home states, are recognized in chapter 4. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The crux of the argument in this chapter is that IOCs’ activities in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
communities affect the environment and human rights. The analysis of Nigeria’s environmental 
laws in this chapter demonstrates some inadequacies, which make them ineffective. The analysis 
points to the need for domestic legislative reforms in Nigeria in order to address IOCs’ pollution 
of the environment and violation of human rights. 
However, in light of the ultimate aim of this thesis to consider how international law can be 
employed to complement Nigeria’s laws to hold IOCs accountable, this chapter argues that 
Nigeria could explore BITs for this purpose. In effect, the chapter argues that regulating IOCs 
should not be restricted to arguments for the improvement and effective enforcement of 
Nigeria’s regulations. 
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CHAPTER THREE: INCORPORATING OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA’S BITs 
3.1 Introduction 
Having examined Nigeria’s domestic regulations relating to the O&G sector and their 
challenges, which have led to environmental degradation and human rights violations in the 
Niger Delta communities, this chapter examines international mechanisms that have been 
adopted to address these challenges. It discusses international codes, principles, and guidelines 
that stipulate IOCs’ obligations regarding environmental and human rights protection. The core 
argument of this chapter concerning these international instruments is that they are ineffective in 
executing their aims and objectives. This may be attributable to the fact that they are not 
designed to be legally binding on IOCs. Instead, they are intended to encourage IOCs to consider 
them in their operations. Therefore, IOCs are not liable for a failure to operate within their 
provisions. 
The second substantive part of this chapter situates BITs within the broader conversation in 
international law concerning IOCs’ obligations regarding environmental protection and human 
rights. It examines the objectives of Nigeria’s BITs, as well as provisions such as the ‘guarantee 
against expropriation’ and the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ clauses, which may have 
implications on the environmental and human rights protection of the Niger Delta communities. 
The last part of the chapter analyzes the incorporation of IOCs’ obligations relating to the 
environment and human rights in Nigeria’s BITs and adopts a model draft for these obligations. 
Also, it argues that imposing these obligations on IOCs in Nigeria’s BITs could provide options 
for ensuring that IOCs operate within internationally recognized standards. 
Overall, the central argument of this chapter is that international law does not currently offer an 
effective measure that tackles environmental degradation and human rights violations in the 
context of IOCs’ operations in the Niger Delta. As a result, this chapter advances an argument 
for obligations in BITs relating to the environment and human rights, which could be enforced 
against IOCs. 
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3.2 International Regulation of International Oil Companies 
This section examines international law’s approaches for responding to IOCs’ contributions to 
environmental degradation and human rights violations in the Niger Delta. Specifically, it 
analyzes the initiatives of multilateral organizations such as the UN, the OECD and the World 
Bank in this regard. Two points must be noted in respect of the provisions of these initiatives. 
First, they generally recognize that business activities could violate human rights. In particular, 
they acknowledge that environmental degradation adversely impacts human rights. Second, these 
initiatives seek to influence rather than compel IOCs to respect the environment and human 
rights of their host communities. Perhaps, the soft nature of these initiatives is connected to why 
they have been ineffective in their bid to address the pollution of the environment and violations 
of human rights by TNCs in Third World countries,339 and this raises a compelling question 
regarding the value of their existence and the need for a change. As a scholar rhetorically asked: 
Of what good is the jungle of documents created by these fancy international 
organizations if' they cannot deliver an iota of satisfaction to the poor masses 
of our so-called civilized universe? When we encounter a situation like this, we 
are forced to reassess our profound claims to wisdom. Immediately, a feeling 
about the inadequacy of traditional methods of negotiation comes to mind. If 
we are to evolve beyond the current stalemate to prove that we are not a static 
society, then an innovative experiment is necessary.340 
This concern, which was raised a couple of decades ago, continues to be relevant in the 
contemporary practice of international law, considering that IOCs are consistent in their acts that 
pollute the environment as well as violate human rights in the Niger Delta region. The following 
section analyzes some of these initiatives and highlights their inadequacies. 
3.2.1  The United Nations Global Compact, 2000 
In 2000, the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) was inaugurated as a multilateral initiative 
seeking to engage the commitments of private businesses, UN agencies and civil society 
organizations towards the protection of human rights, labour rights, and the environment.341  The 
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UNGC has ten principles, five of which encourage companies to embrace a set of primary values 
within their scope of influence in the areas of human rights and environment. Specifically, 
companies should respect states’ effort to protect internationally recognized human rights and to 
endeavour that they are not complicit in any abuse of human rights in their operations.342 Also, 
corporations should support precautionary approaches to environmental issues and should carry 
out initiatives in order to promote their responsibilities regarding the environment.343 Member 
corporations are expected to make an annual report demonstrating their commitments to these 
principles.344 
Over the years, there have been debates about the effectiveness of the UNGC. Although some 
argue that the UNGC presents opportunities for businesses, international organization and civil 
societies to dialogue in order to develop a global standard for environmental practices,345 it is 
arguable that the UNGC does not have the capacity to implement its principles. The dialogue 
approach is what Mujih describes as an “era of cooperation” instead of actual regulation by the 
UN.346 The most significant criticism against this approach is the fact that such cooperation 
between UN agencies and TNCs would result in conferring legitimacy on TNCs with poor social 
and environmental records.347 This entails that the UNGC permits irresponsible corporations to 
use the UN logo in carrying out their activities without complying with the principles.348 
There is no enforcement mechanism within the UNGC. Rather, it expects self-regulation from 
the TNCs.349 Although Oshionebo recognized this deficiency, he argues that the integrity 
measures in place have the potential to address the abuse of the UNGC principles by TNCs350 as 
a failure by a partner corporation to file a Communication expressing its compliance progress for 
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two consecutive years may result in labeling such corporation as “inactive.”351 Further, the 
UNGC Office introduced a 3-differentiation level based on the depth of participant’s disclosure 
of their efforts to “uphold the ten principles of the UNGC.”352 Similarly, in the event of a written 
complaint about a violation of UNGC principles by a participant corporation, the UNGC Office 
evaluates it to determine if it is frivolous.353 Given that when such a complaint is found not to be 
frivolous and forwarded to the relevant TNC for a written response to the complaint,354 the 
UNGC could facilitate the resolution of the problem.355 Oshionebo argues that a refusal to 
resolve the problem by the TNC involved may lead to the UNGC Office declaring the TNC as 
‘inactive’ on the UNGC website – a declaration that negates the criticism against UNGC that it 
offers an opportunity for the TNCs to violate human rights as well as degrade the environment 
while simultaneously enjoying a good public image through their participation in the UNGC.356 
Despite Oshionebo’s argument, which seems plausible, this thesis argues that the UNGC should 
have a clear regulatory structure instead of relying solely on the reports of the corporations to 
determine their good-standing. It has been suggested that the UNGC Office should scrutinize 
prospective TNC partners to ensure that those with poor history and tendencies towards 
environmental and human rights issues are excluded.357 
According to Voegtlin and Pless, the debate about the impact of the UNGC is demonstrated in 
the O&G sector where IOCs – BP and Shell – were removed from the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index (DJSI) in 2010.358 BP was removed due to the environmental disaster it caused in the Gulf 
of Mexico, and Shell was removed for its role in the environmental degradation in the Niger 
Delta.359 Subsequently, BP was listed, while Shell is yet to be listed. With regard to the 
controversy surrounding the effectiveness of the UNGC, it is instructive to note that BP and 
Shell are signatories to the UNGC. Despite being a signatory to the UNGC and being delisted 
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from DJSI, Shell continues to pollute the environment and violate human rights in the Niger 
Delta region. Worrisome situations such as the case of the Niger Delta prompt authors to 
continue to question the effectiveness of the UNGC regarding its objective to ensure that 
corporations incorporate international standards in their operations. Moreover, the non-
regulatory system of the UNGC poses a challenge. The UNGC is not a code of conduct and does 
not set out particular standards with which participant corporations should comply.360 
3.2.2 The United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human rights 
Following the rejection of the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights 2003 (the Norms),361 the UN 
Commission on Human Rights established a mandate in 2005 for the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises.362 As a result of this mandate, the then SRSG – John Ruggie – 
developed the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in 
2011. The UNGPs provide 31 principles and rest on three different but complementary pillars 
which are: 
a) “The states’ existing obligations to respect, fulfill and protect human rights against abuse 
within their jurisdiction by third parties which includes business; 
(b) The role of business as specialized organs of the society which performs specialized 
functions, required to comply with all applicable laws and to respect human rights; and 
(c) The need for human rights to have appropriate and effective remedies    provided by the states 
when they are breached.”363 
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The obligation of the state to protect human rights under the UNGPs requires that a state must 
take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate and provide remedies for their abuse through 
policies, regulations, legislation and adjudication.364 This obligation is derived from the 
international human rights agreements that states have ratified.365 As part of their obligation to 
protect human rights, states must ensure that they “enforce existing laws that directly or 
indirectly regulate” corporations’ respect for human rights, including environmental laws.366 
While it is clear that states have duties to protect human rights within their territories, it remains 
debatable whether states are required to regulate the extraterritorial conducts of their 
corporations as a matter of international human rights law – an issue that is dealt with in detail in 
Chapter 4. The question is: if host states such as Nigeria are unable or unwilling to provide a 
remedy for human rights violations within their territory, can a home state of a TNC rely on its 
international human rights treaties’ obligations to regulate the violations of human rights by such 
TNC? 
Ruggie’s response to this question is conservative. He expressed that human rights treaties 
neither require states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over business abuse nor do they 
generally prohibit states from doing so, provided there is a recognized basis for their 
jurisdiction.367 The SRSG’s view has been criticized for being a misrepresentation of the opinion 
of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which interpreted the 
General Comments of the Committee on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ to entail the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of states.368 
The second pillar is related to the responsibility of corporations to respect human rights. Unlike 
the obligation on states, the responsibility of corporations to respect human rights is not legally 
binding on corporations. This principle has influenced the formation of some multilateral 
initiatives such as the OECD Guidelines, as will be discussed shortly. A significant improvement 
from the provisions of the OECD Guidelines is the provision that TNCs should ensure they 
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respect internationally recognized human rights even when domestic laws do not address the 
challenges facing business and human rights.369 The second pillar expects corporations to avoid 
violating human rights and also requires a positive due diligence duty on their part to ensure that 
the adverse effects of their operations on human rights are addressed.370 Concerning these 
negative impacts, corporations are encouraged to prioritize ‘severe human rights impact,’ which 
has been described as any activity that affects an increasing number of people, such as 
environmental degradation.371 The United Nations Human Rights Council’s categorization of 
environmental harm as having “severe human rights impact” based on the number of people that 
are affected reflects the environmental pollution caused by IOCs that affect the human rights of a 
significant number of the people in the Niger Delta region. 
Human rights due diligence also requires TNCs to identify, prevent and mitigate their adverse 
human rights impacts by conducting an assessment of actual and potential human rights impacts, 
integrating and acting on these findings as well as communicating how these impacts are 
addressed.372 In this regard, IOCs in Nigeria have the scientific and technological knowledge to 
conduct due diligence but have failed to do so.373 Consequently, Abe374 argues that according to 
the UNGPs’ provision on human rights due diligence, Nigeria should criminalize the activities of 
IOCs that do not comply with the due diligence requirements under the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Act.375 
The third pillar is formulated on the basic principle of international law that victims of human 
rights abuse should be provided with an effective remedy. For a remedy to be effective, it must 
be accessible, affordable, adequate and timely.376Access to remedy refers to the process of 
providing justice for human rights abuse and the substantive outcome of the process, which 
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should compensate for its negative impacts.377 For right holders to consider a remedy to be 
accessible, they must know that such a remedy exists and should have “access to it without too 
much expenses” and inconvenience.378 Although the UNGPs emphasize the duty of states to 
provide remedy through “judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means,”379 it is 
appropriate for corporations to provide remedies through cooperation with other state and non-
state remedy mechanisms and in most cases, corporations are better disposed to provide 
remediation.380 
Regarding affordability, it should be considered that a remedy that may be regarded as affordable 
from an objective viewpoint may be viewed as unaffordable by the impacted host 
communities.381 Similarly, the adequacy of remedy should be determined by the quantum of 
compensation, although this might not always work.382 Also, both the current and future needs of 
the victims should be considered to determine the adequacy of a remedy.383 Finally, considering 
that, for the most part, justice delayed is deemed justice denied, a remedy should be timely.384 
The most critical factor that determines whether a remedy is timely is what a right holder deems 
as timely considering the circumstance.385 Others may include the complex nature of a case, the 
number of impacted people, the nature of the human rights violation and the nature of the 
remedy sought.386 
Although the UNGPs provide essential guidelines for regulating IOCs, the most significant 
critique they attract is concerning their legal status. While the first and third pillars of the UNGPs 
reaffirm states’ existing obligations and responsibility under international human rights to protect 
human rights and provide access to justice for human rights victims, the second pillar is legally 
nonbinding on corporations including IOCs. The use of the term ‘responsibility’ to respect 
instead of ‘obligation’ suggests that the UNGPs do not intend to impose a direct human rights 
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obligation on corporations, although domestic laws could impose such duty.387 This suggests that 
the UNGPs are only an appeal to non-state actors to address the negative impacts of 
environmental pollution and human rights violations, and therefore, a breach of the UNGPs 
provisions would not attract sanctions. 
3.2.3 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the Guidelines) is another multilateral 
initiative for regulating TNCs.388 Adopted in 1976, the Guidelines were substantially revised in 
2000 and 2011. The latest version contains a chapter on the human rights obligations of TNCs, 
which is a significant improvement on the 2000 version that made scanty reference to the TNCs’ 
human rights obligations.389 Specifically, Chapter 4 of the 2011 version of the Guidelines has six 
paragraphs that essentially mandate TNCs to respect internationally recognized human rights in 
their operations.390 
As it relates to the environment, the Guidelines encourage TNCs to consider the need to protect 
the environment, public health and safety, and to conduct their activities in a way that contributes 
to the broader goal of sustainable development.391 In this regard, the Guidelines recommend that 
TNCs establish and maintain a system of environmental management appropriate to the 
enterprise, which includes collecting and evaluating adequate and timely information relating to 
the environmental, health, and safety impacts of their activities; to establish measurable 
objectives; and to monitor and verify the progress of environmental, health, and safety objectives 
regularly.392 
Another significant improvement in the Guidelines is the introduction of commentaries, which 
aid the interpretation of the substantive provisions. The commentary on TNCs’ expectation to 
respect human rights explains that the fact that a state either fails to enforce its relevant domestic 
laws or implement its international human rights obligations or act contrary to its laws or its 
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international obligations does not reduce the expectation for TNCs to respect human rights.393 
Another commentary explains that “in countries where domestic laws and regulations conflict 
with internationally recognized human rights, enterprises should seek ways to honour them to the 
fullest extent, which does not place them in violation of domestic law and consistent with 
paragraph 2 of the Chapter on Concepts and Principles.”394 
Concerning the latter commentary, this thesis posits that if the TNCs are to comply with 
domestic laws at the expense of internationally recognized human rights standards in situations 
of conflict as suggested, then such compliance defeats the entire purpose of the Guidelines to 
encourage TNCs to act according to international standards. Thus, IOCs are not expected to 
comply with the Guidelines beyond the standards obtainable in host states.395 What the 
commentary’s expectation from IOCs to honour domestic laws and policies in situation of 
conflict with international human rights could mean is that IOCs could continue to engage in 
environmental pollution which causes human rights violations since Nigeria’s laws and 
regulations are weak given that the Minister of Petroleum could permit gas flaring, for instance. 
Hence, it could be argued that the Guidelines do not genuinely support strict regulation of TNCs’ 
behaviour396 as they are merely a preemptive effort by developed countries to shut out the 
clamour by developing countries and nongovernmental organizations for TNCs’ international 
regulation by avoiding strict international regulation.397 
The ineffectiveness of the Guidelines in the context of the Niger Delta could also be attributable 
to their scope. The Guidelines are addressed by the OECD-compliant governments to TNCs that 
operate in or from OECD-adhering countries, and this raises a question as to the scope of the 
Guidelines. Mainly, the question is whether they are appropriate for the regulation of TNCs 
operating in non-member states such as Nigeria.398 The Guidelines serve the economic interest of 
member states, which prevails over those of the non-member states.399 Considering that effective 
regulation of TNCs that operate in non-member states may affect the economic interest of TNCs 
as well as member-states, it may not be convincingly argued that the OECD is a desired platform 
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for international regulation400 of IOCs in Nigeria. However, the scope of the Guidelines extends 
to all countries, and adhering governments are recommended to encourage TNCs that operate in 
their countries to observe the Guidelines wherever they operate provided they take into account 
the particular circumstances of each host country.401 To this extent, it should be expected that 
IOCs operating in Nigeria’s O&G sector should develop and maintain a responsible business 
culture, but unfortunately, they do not. 
The legal status of the Guidelines is unequivocally stated as nonbinding and legally 
unenforceable as they are recommendations addressed by governments to TNCs.402 Besides, 
even though the Guidelines address TNCs, they wield significant influence in the process of 
making OECD policies, and this makes the Guidelines remarkably weak.403 As a result, the 
Guidelines are not a genuine effort to regulate TNCs but are designed to deflect disapprovals of 
TNCs activities404 as well as advance the economic interest of the TNCs and OECD member 
states. 
3.2.4 International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) could be influential in the regulation of IOCs in 
Nigeria. This is because the IFC provides financial support for investment in the extractive sector 
by private investors.405 The IFC’s performance standards require that clients should manage the 
environmental and social impacts of their projects on the communities.406 In particular, the IFC’s 
pollution prevention policy prohibits the emission of pollutants by investors whose investments 
are funded by the IFC, and where the emission of pollutants is impossible to avoid, the borrowers 
are expected to minimize the intensity of their release.407 This mandate applies to the pollutants 
of air, water, and land as a result of the routine, non-routine, and accidental release, which has 
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potential impacts on home communities.408 According to Oshionebo, the IFC’s policies prescribe 
international best practices for O&G development, including emissions, hazardous wastes and 
flaring.409 
Admittedly, the IFC performance standards generally say very little about human rights. 
However, the Performance Standard 1 stipulates that “business should respect human rights, 
which means to avoid infringing on the human rights of others and address adverse human rights 
impacts business may cause or contribute to.”410 Also, each performance standard should have 
the elements that are “related to the human rights dimension that a project may face in the course 
of its operation.”411 Therefore, there is a need for due diligence in order for a business to address 
several human rights implications of a project.412 
As a means of ensuring compliance with its policies, the IFC only finances investments that are 
expected to meet the requirements of the performance standards within a reasonable time, and a 
continuing delay in meeting the requirements may lead to a withdrawal of IFC’s financial 
support for the project.413 Given that there is no known O&G project in Nigeria that is being 
financed by the IFC, it would be difficult to comment on the effect of the IFC’s performance 
standards in Nigeria’s O&G sector. 
Assuming there is an O&G project which is financed by the IFC, the environmental pollution 
caused by the relevant IOC in the course of executing such a project may be challenged by the 
Niger Delta communities. This is because of the existence of the IFC’s Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman (CAO), which was expressly set up to address complaints by the impacted 
individuals or communities regarding environmental and social concerns of an IFC sponsored 
project.414 Upon such complaints by communities such as the Niger Delta community, the CAO, 
through its dispute resolution mechanism, could draw up a voluntary agreement between the 
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community and the relevant IOC for future plans to address the complaints and states remedial 
actions to be taken.415 Also, by exploring its compliance function, which may consider human 
rights and environmental laws,416 the CAO could conduct an audit into the complaints of the 
Niger Delta community and file a report of noncompliance to the IFC’s performance standards 
by the relevant IOC to the IFC management for appropriate action.417 
While the CAO mechanism seems a valuable platform for addressing host communities’ 
complaints regarding projects that negatively impact their environment,418 the CAO “yields a 
much narrower result” in respect of compensation that may be awarded to the impacted 
communities.419 The CAO’s complaints mechanism, which ensures that they play dispute 
resolution, compliance, and advisory roles420 is not “a legal enforcement mechanism,”421 but a 
“flexible, collaborative, problem-solving approach”422 involving the impacted communities, 
states and relevant investors. 
3. 2. 5 The Zero Draft Treaty 
In the context of TNCs’ impact on the environment and human rights, there has been a recurring 
argument for binding obligations on corporations through a multilateral human rights treaty. As a 
result, the United Nations Human Rights Council established the UN Intergovernmental 
Working Group on TNCs and other business enterprises in respect of human rights and mandated 
it “to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human 
rights law, the activities of TNCs and other business enterprises.”423 After several deliberations, 
the UN Intergovernmental Working Group published the Zero Draft Treaty in 2018, which was 
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revised in July 2019.424 The preamble states that all businesses irrespective of size, sector, 
ownership and structure shall respect human rights by avoiding contribution to adverse human 
rights effects through their activities and address the impacts where they occur. Human rights 
violation means any harm done by a business entity against an individual or group of persons, 
including the impairment of environmental rights.425 
The Zero Draft Treaty applies to human rights violations as a result of the activities of all 
businesses and particularly those that have a transnational character.426 In order to prevent these 
violations, state parties to the treaty shall ensure that businesses with a transnational character 
within their territory, shall have due diligence obligations, identify and take appropriate actions 
to prevent the actual and potential human rights risk associated with their business activities.427 
Also, Article 6, paragraph 7, provides that “state parties shall ensure through their domestic law 
that natural and legal persons may be held criminally, civil, or administratively liable” for 
violations of human rights undertaken in the context of business activities. 
A remarkable improvement in the revised 2019 Zero Draft Treaty is seen in Article 6. Article 6 
(1) mandates state parties to ensure that their domestic laws provide liability for business 
activities, including those of a transnational nature that violate human rights. Further, Article 6 
(6) enjoins all state parties to provide domestic legislation for the liability of a transnational 
business entity for its failure to prevent another business entity which it has a contractual 
relationship with from causing harm. A contractual relationship means “any relationship between 
natural or legal persons to conduct business activities” and includes “those activities conducted 
through affiliates, subsidiaries, agents, suppliers, any business partnership or association, joint 
venture, beneficial proprietorship.”428 In this vein, the liability of a parent or associate company 
could be possible where it either controls the activities of the subsidiary or should have foreseen 
a risk of violations of human rights in the course of the business operations, notwithstanding 
where the activity takes place.429 
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Collectively, these provisions emphasize that the obligation to enforce the Zero Draft Treaty 
resides in the state parties and do not impose direct obligations on corporations. This entails that 
the Zero Draft Treaty does not deviate from the rules of international law, where only states have 
direct obligations for human rights. Thus, it provides in the preamble that “all business 
enterprises shall respect all human rights,” and that states have the obligations and primary 
responsibility to promote, respect, protect and fulfill human rights. This provision reiterates the 
traditional rule of international law regarding the controversy over the legal status of TNCs in 
international law discussed in chapter 4. 
The Zero Draft Treaty should be applauded for its provisions on the possibility of the court of a 
home state exercising jurisdiction in respect to violations of human rights in other territories 
where the TNCs are domiciled in such home states.430 Moreover, the Zero Draft Treaty 
encourages state parties to enter into more conducive agreements, including BITs, for the 
protection and fulfillment of human rights by providing further access to justice to victims of 
human rights violations related to business activities.431 The possibility of the home state option 
suggested in Article 6 (6), where state parties including home states of the IOCs could make laws 
that enable the liability of business entities with transnational operations, is similar to one of the 
core arguments that this thesis makes concerning having obligations relating to the environment 
and human rights enforceable against IOCs in their home states. 
Despite the promises of a stand-alone instrument such as the Zero Draft Treaty, this thesis argues 
that the imposition of BIT obligations regarding environmental and human rights protection on 
IOCs remains necessary. First, negotiating and completing a multilateral treaty such as the Zero 
Draft Treaty takes a significant length of time.432 The Zero Draft Treaty is currently in the 
negotiation process. The UN Intergovernmental Working Group is working tirelessly with 
several stakeholders to ensure the success of the negotiation process.433 Only the passage of time 
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will determine the successful conclusion of the Zero Draft Treaty. The possibility of its failure is 
also not ruled out considering that efforts made in the past to negotiate a similar multilateral 
treaty failed.434 
Second, as argued in the previous paragraph, the Zero Draft Treaty envisages the use of BITs to 
provide “access to justice and remedy to victims of human rights violations in the context of 
business activities” without more. This thesis, unlike the Zero Draft Treaty, analyzes in detail 
potential enforcement mechanisms for the IOCs’ obligations in BITs. Further, it is not clear 
whether the provisions of the Zero Draft Treaty would apply to existing BITs in order to permit 
an investment tribunal to rely on its provisions in their interpretation of those BITs. This is 
because Article 12 (6) provides that a BIT between state parties shall be interpreted to reflect the 
provisions of the Zero Draft Treaty on the protection of human rights without referring to 
whether such interpretation should extend to existing BITs. This explains why Krajewski argues 
that the Zero Draft Treaty is not clear on its effect on existing BITs.435 It is, however, the 
argument of this thesis that existing BITs should be interpreted in a manner that makes them 
compatible with the provisions of the Zero Draft Treaty. However, in order to ensure the 
primacy of human rights over other BIT provisions, there is a need for an express provision on 
IOCs’ obligations regarding environmental protection and human rights in BITs, and this is 
partly what this thesis intends to achieve. 
Finally, although related explicitly to the protection of human rights that are violated by TNCs, 
the Zero Draft Treaty provides, among others, for states’ obligation to regulate conduct that 
violates human rights at the domestic level. Similar obligations on states, though not directly on 
the point of business and human rights, have been provided under other human rights treaties 
without achieving the desired result.436 Therefore, the argument of this thesis for the imposition 
of direct obligations regarding the environment and human rights on IOCs is relevant despite the 
 
(February 2019) online: https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/0ee77b2f/consultations-
open-on-the-un-zero-draft-treaty-on-business-and-human-rights. 
434 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights supra note 361, which was a multilateral treaty regarding corporations’ international  human rights 
obligations was not successful.   
435 Krajewski, supra note 154.   
436 For example, article 24 of the African Charter, supra note 18, provides for the right to a general satisfactory 
environment. 
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possibility of the Zero Draft Treaty coming into force. Since this thesis explores BITs, the 
following section examines the nature and scope of Nigeria’s BITs 
3.3. Nigeria’s Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Oil and Gas Sector 
The exponential growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a relatively recent phenomenon 
that is attributable to globalization. Globalization is a process that increases the cross-border 
trade of goods, services, assets, and know-how.437 Due to the lack of finances and technical 
expertise for the exploitation of their natural resources, developing countries such as Nigeria turn 
to TNCs for investment.438 In an effort to attract FDI and considering the competition from other 
countries of the global south, developing countries tend to remove obstacles from the way of 
foreign investors. Hence, the liberalization of FDI regimes in many countries has accelerated the 
process of globalization, and one of the tools for such liberalization is BITs.439 
BITs are traditionally used to ensure the protection of the investments of a national of one 
contracting state party in the territory of another. Globally, about 2956 and 2358 BITs have been 
signed and are in force, respectively,440 out of which Nigeria has signed thirty, with fifteen of 
them in force.441 Three out of the fifteen, which are partly the focus of this thesis, are between 
the Nigerian government and the governments of Italy,442 the United Kingdom (U.K.)443 and the 
Netherlands.444 The provisions of these BITs seek to protect the investments of the major IOCs 
in Nigeria along with other foreign investors, given that they are nationals of Italy, the U.K. and 
the Netherlands. Where there is a breach of provisions of these BITs, there is an extensive 
arbitral procedure for the IOCs to challenge such breach in international investment arbitration. 
Against this backdrop, the following section will discuss the nature and scope of some of the 
protections of the IOCs’ investments under Nigeria’s BITs to determine how their provisions 
 
437 Surya Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principles 2nd ed (Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2012) at 88 [Subedi]. 
438 Prem Sikka, “Accounting for Human Rights: The Challenge of Globalization and Foreign Investments 
Agreements” (2011) 22 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 1 at 10 [Sikka].  
439 Subedi, supra note 437 at 132. 
440 UNCTAD, “Investment Policy Hub” (2019) online: <investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA>.  
441 UNCTAD, “Investment Policy Hub” (2019) online: <investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/153>.  
442 Nigeria – Italy BIT, supra note 41. 
443 Nigeria – UK BIT, supra note 41. 
444 Nigeria – Netherlands BIT, supra note 41.       
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may potentially undermine the efforts of the Nigerian government towards the environmental 
and human rights protections of the Niger Delta communities. 
3.3.1 Clauses Relevant to the Environment and Human Rights in Nigeria’s Bilateral 
Investment Treaties 
BITs generally have two main objectives.445 First, they specifically protect FDI. Secondly, they 
encourage the flow of foreign investments by creating a stable and foreseeable legal environment 
for investors as well as stimulate the economic relations between the state parties.446 The 
preamble to the Nigeria - Italy BIT underscores these purposes: 
The Government of the Italian Republic and the government of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria hereinafter referred to as “the Contracting Parties” desiring 
to establish favourable conditions for improved economic cooperation between 
the two countries, and especially for investment by nationals of one 
Contracting Party, in the territory of the other Contracting Party and 
acknowledging that offering encouragement and mutual protection to such 
investments will contribute towards stimulating business ventures that will 
foster the prosperity of both Contracting Parties . . . 
Despite the purposes that are highlighted in the above provision, the reality is that almost all the 
substantive provisions of BITs have one objective, which is to protect investors who are the 
primary beneficiaries, notwithstanding that they are not a party to BITs.447 Despite these 
protections for IOCs as this thesis will analyze shortly, Nigeria’s BITs do not impose any form 
of obligation on the IOCs. The failure of these BITs to impose corresponding obligations on 
IOCs has been described as the “asymmetrical nature of BITs” and has attracted criticism, 
especially from environmental and human rights standpoints.448 The key argument of the critics 
is that a regulatory measure that could be taken by a government to protect the environment and 
human rights may be viewed as a violation of BIT provisions.449 Therefore, the following section 
considers a few of these BIT provisions,450 especially those that may interfere with the efforts of 
the government to protect the environment and human rights of the Niger Delta communities. 
 
445 Gazzini, supra note 57, at 106. 
446 Ibid at 107. 
447 Ibid. 
448 Ibid. 
449 Ibid at 127.  
450 There are other provisions that generally protect investors such as the National Treatment and the Most Favoured 
Nation clauses. 
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3.3.1.1 Clause Regarding Expropriation of Investments 
Generally, the provision of ‘guarantee against expropriation’ of investments in Nigeria’s BITs 
was made to assuage the fears of foreign investors regarding the sovereign power of the Nigerian 
government to control natural resources within its territory. A similar guarantee is also available 
in the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act.451 According to the Nigeria-Italy452 and 
Nigeria-Netherlands BITs,453 expropriation is any act or measure that either directly or indirectly 
deprives or limits an investor of a contracting party of its investment or the use of it. Under these 
provisions, it is clear that an act of expropriation could either be direct or indirect. While direct 
expropriation is the outright and explicit taking of property of a foreign investor,454 
indirect/regulatory expropriation includes any regulatory measure taken by the government that 
restricts the right of a foreign investor over its investment.455 However, the effect of globalization 
and the increasing existence of an extensive body of law on FDI make direct expropriation 
increasingly rare.456 
Nigeria’s BITs provide that the Nigerian government may only expropriate the investments of 
the IOCs where doing so is non-discriminatory, for national interest or public purpose, and such 
expropriation shall be accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective compensation.457 While 
this provision seems fair to the Nigerian government and the IOCs, an analysis of the literature 
and jurisprudence shows that its major issue could lie in its chilling effect. 
Given the decisions of investment arbitration tribunals and scholars’ arguments, this thesis 
argues that the requirement for the payment of compensation for expropriation in Nigeria’s BITs 
could have a chilling effect on the regulatory power of the Nigerian government even when the 
operations of the IOCs pollute the environment as well as violate human rights as they do 
currently in the Niger Delta communities.458 Although it may not always be the case, Ren 
 
451 Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act CAP N117, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, Section 25. 
452 Nigeria – Italy BIT, supra note 41, Article 5. 
453 Nigeria – Netherlands, supra note 41, Article 6. 
454 Collins, supra note 56 at 158. 
455 Ibid at 162. 
456 Subedi, supra note 437 at 118. 
457  Nigeria – Italy BIT, supra note 41, Article 5, the Nigeria – Netherlands BIT, supra note 41, Article 6 and the 
Nigeria – U.K. BIT, supra note 41, Article 5.  
458 The decisions of the investment tribunals in De Santa Elena, S.A. v The Republic of Costa Rica, supra note 38 
and Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States, supra note 60 firmly adopt the view that as long as the 
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observed that regulatory measures for environmental protection directed towards IOCs could 
amount to either a direct or indirect expropriation because such measures would either 
expropriate an investment project entirely or limit its benefit for environmental reasons.459 This 
is because complying with an environmental measure may require a considerable amount of 
money from an investor, thereby reducing the financial benefits of a project. For instance, IOCs 
consider it economically viable to flare gas instead of re-injecting it into oil wells and an 
insistence on the latter practice by the Nigerian government may substantially affect the 
commercial return from an IOC’s investment, thereby attracting the payment of compensation if 
challenged by an IOC. 
Applying this logic to the Nigerian situation, the threat by the Nigerian government to withdraw 
the licences of IOCs that continue to flare gas, which is apparently for a public purpose, would 
potentially amount to an indirect expropriation which requires the payment of compensation by 
the government if the IOCs challenge such before an arbitral tribunal.460 Such withdrawal of 
licence may amount to indirect expropriation because an arbitral tribunal suggested that any 
measure that affects ‘the capacity to earn a commercial return’ amounts to expropriation.461 
There is little doubt that the withdrawal of their licences would affect the economic viability of 
the investment of the relevant IOCs. Considering that the Nigerian government may prefer to 
refrain from withdrawing these licences in order to avoid payment of compensation if declared 
an indirect expropriation, there is a ‘chilling effect’ on the power of the government to make and 
implement environmental policies against IOCs. 
A review of investment arbitration practice reveals doubt over the weight attached to 
environmental protection as well as human rights in the process of decision-making by arbitral 
tribunals as they are divided on the role of public purpose in their assessment of damages. While 
it has been argued that a measure taken for a public purpose should mitigate compensation,462 
 
host states’ regulations had caused damages, and a case of either direct or indirect established, the payment of 
compensation must be made irrespective of the intent of the government.    
459 Ren, supra note 63 at 119.  
460 Jerome Mario Utomi, “Gas Flaring and Kachikwu’s Threat” The Nigerian Voice (1 October 2018) online: 
<thenigerianvoice.com/news/271148/gas-flaring-and-kachikwus-threat.html>  
461 Burlington Resources Inc v Republic of Ecuador, (2012) CASE No ARB/08/5 at para 456 (International Centre 
Settlement Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Brigitte Stern and Francisco Orrego 
Vicuña). 
462 Ren, supra note 63 at 139.  
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arbitral tribunals have justified an award of damages for expropriation irrespective of the public 
purpose aim of a regulatory measure by the government based on the ‘sole-effect principle.’463 
The case of Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd (BGT) v the United Republic of Tanzania,464 involved 
Tanzania’s termination of a contract with BGT for water investment. In the case, an amicus 
noted that “human rights and sustainable development issues” are to be considered in 
determining the degree of the responsibility of an investor, and that foreign investors that are 
“engaged in projects intimately related to human rights” are expected to meet their obligations 
because such investments pose a danger to the public.465 However, it appears that the tribunal 
was resistant to the reasoning of the amicus because BGT succeeded in its expropriation claim, 
although no compensation was awarded to BGT because BGT failed to establish a link between 
its claims and the government’s termination of the contract.466 This failure was because, at the 
time of the government’s wrongful action, the City Water investment owned by BGT had zero 
economic value as its liability was more than its total assets.467 In Santa Elena v Costa Rica, the 
arbitral award held that environmental reasons for expropriation are not relevant in determining 
whether there should be payment of compensation. 
Further, the decision of the tribunal in SAUR International v. Argentina468 clearly illustrates the 
point that an establishment of public purpose by a government does not necessarily exclude 
compensation. In the case, the investor alleged that the intervention of Argentina in its business 
amounts to expropriation. The arbitral tribunal agreed with Argentina that human rights in 
general and the right to water in particular are some of the sources of international law to take 
into account to resolve an investment dispute.469 
 
463 Sole-effect doctrine means that the impact on the investor’s ability to use the property is the exclusive factor in 
expropriation. See Ren, ibid at 116. See also, Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States, supra note 60 at 
para 111. 
464 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd (BGT) v the United Republic of Tanzania (2008) Case No ARB/05/25 
(International Centre Settlement Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Gary Born, Toby Landau and Bernard 
Hanotiau). 
465 Ibid, para 380. 
466 Ibid, para 805. 
467 Ibid, para 795. 
468  SAUR International v The Argentina Republic, (2014) Case No ARB 04/4 (International Centre Settlement 
Investment Disputes) (Juan Fernández-Armesto, Bernard Hanotiau and Christian Tomuschat) [reported in French 
and Spanish] reported in English in Kube & Petersmann, supra note 134 at 83. 
469  Kube & Petersmann, Ibid. 
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Notwithstanding, the tribunal held that the human rights obligation of Argentina did not 
contradict the obligation of Argentina, which emanates from an expropriation clause, to pay 
compensation to the investor. A similar decision was also reached in Tecmed v Mexico where the 
arbitral tribunal applied the proportionality test to rule that environmental harm caused by 
investment was not enough to necessitate the non-renewal of licence by the government and does 
not preclude the payment of compensation.470 
It has been argued, on the other hand, that investment tribunals should consider and decide an 
investor’s claim for an infringement of an expropriation clause in favour of the host state based 
on the protection of human rights and the environment.471 In Chemtura Corporation v 
Government of Canada, the investment tribunal held that a governmental measure does not 
amount to an expropriation provided that such is for a public purpose.472 After considering 
whether there was a “substantial deprivation” of the claimant’s investment by the cancellation of 
licences for the use of harmful pesticide (lindane) in agricultural production, the arbitral tribunal 
held that even if such was a substantial deprivation of the claimant’s investment in Canada, it 
does not amount to a regulatory expropriation as it was within Canada’s powers to protect public 
health and the environment.473 
It is important to note that there is a marked difference with respect to the decisions of the 
arbitral tribunals in the latter case and the former cases analyzed. This may be explained by the 
fact that an arbitral tribunal’s decision is not binding on other tribunals. The inconsistencies in 
tribunals’ decisions may instil a degree of uncertainty on the possible outcome of investment 
arbitration concerning the interpretation of the clause against expropriation, thereby contributing 
to regulatory chill. 
The uncertainties generated by these decisions may affect states’ confidence in their ability to 
legislate and implement laws in a manner that is consistent with their environmental and human 
rights duties in light IOCs’ rights under BITs. It is, therefore, essential for Nigeria to be cautious 
in the assessment of its obligation under the expropriation clause because IOCs will likely not 
 
470 Tecmed v Mexico (2003) Case No ARB(AF)/00/2 at para 121 (International Centre Settlement Investment 
Disputes) (Arbitrators: Horacio Grigera Naon, Jose Carlos Farnandez and Carlos Bernal Verea). 
471 Cordes, Johnson & Szorke-Burke, supra note 134. 
472 Chemtura Corporation v Government of Canada, (2010) Ad Hoc NAFTA Arbitration under UNCITRAL, para 
266 (Arbitrators: Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Charles Brower and James Crawford).  
473 Ibid at para 254. 
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hesitate to pursue compensation against the Nigerian government where they perceive that the 
latter’s policies aimed at protecting the environment and human rights violate the expropriation 
clause in BIT. 
One way for the Nigerian government to avoid the potential chilling effect of the expropriation 
clause is to renegotiate its BITs with the home states of the IOCs and model them towards either 
the US or Canada model BITs. The US model BIT provides that the distinction between indirect 
expropriation and lawful exercise of regulatory powers is on case to case and fact-finding bases 
that consider the economic impact of the measure on the investor, the extent of interference with 
the reasonable expectation and the nature of the governmental actions.474 Furthermore, the US 
and Canada model BITs recommend that the regulatory measure of a host government should not 
be regarded as an indirect expropriation when it is intended to protect public interest objectives 
(e.g., health, safety or the environment).475 Recent trends in BIT-making show that more than 
half of post-2010 BITs have either made reference to or included exceptions for the preservation 
of the environment and human rights,476 and this figure demonstrates the growing recognition of 
the prohibitive effect of BITs on policy-making of the host governments around the world. 
Adopting this approach will achieve two purposes: it would place IOCs on a check regarding 
their operations and precludes the possibility of payment of compensation by providing clear 
guidance for arbitral tribunals on what constitutes lawful expropriation. 
3.3.1.2 Fair and Equitable Treatment Clause 
The Fair and Equitable Treatment Clause (FET) is found in almost all of Nigeria’s BITs.477 The 
broad interpretation of the FET clause covers almost all measures and actions undertaken by the 
government that are not covered by other provisions.478 This explains why it is a preferred 
provision among the investor community, and a majority of investor-state claims have 
 
474 The US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 2004, Annex B, article 4 (a) [US Model BIT].  
475 Ibid, US Model BIT, ibid, Article 4 (b) and Canada Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 2004, Article 13 (1) (c). 
476 UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains, Investment and Trade for Development” at 
102, (2013) online (pdf): <unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf>. See also Ren supra note 63 at 125.  
477 Nigeria – U.K. BIT, supra note 41, Article 2 (2), Nigeria – Netherlands BIT, supra note 41, Article 3 (1) and 
Nigeria – Italy BIT, supra note 41, Article 2 (3).  
478 Kavaljit Singh, “An Analysis of India’s New Model Bilateral Investment Treaty” in Kavaljit Singh & Burghard 
IIge, eds, Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties: Critical Issues and Policy Choices (Amsterdam, Both Ends: 
2016) 81 at 87 [Singh]. 
 
 
78 
 
successfully relied on the breach of the FET standard.479 Even though the meaning of FET 
standard is subject to debate, it is generally agreed that the principle mandates host states to 
protect “the reasonable expectations which have been relied upon by the investor to make 
investment,”480 and this includes any contractual provision, which guarantees the stability of the 
legal regime that governs the contract481 so that any new law that imposes an additional 
environmental obligation on the investor for its compliance may be considered as affecting the 
investment.482 
The FET standard simpliciter has a similar effect as a stabilization clause in investment 
contracts. This is because a “reasonable expectation” of an investor has been interpreted to mean 
that the foreign investor expects a host state to act consistently so that the former would know 
about the regulations that govern its investment before any investment is made so it could plan 
how its investment would comply with the regulations.483 If, for instance, the Nigerian 
government insists that IOCs utilize gas instead of flaring gas, such insistence may be considered 
not to be a reasonable expectation of an IOC that has received an oil mining lease to operate its 
business in Nigeria before the enactment of the AGRA484 such as the SPDC and, therefore, a 
breach of the FET clause. In the strict legal sense, given that the FET clause “protects the 
reasonable expectations of investors arising from a concession contract including the expectation 
that the legal regime prescribed in the concession contract would not be amended or changed,” it 
could “limit the host state’s ability to take legislative action promoting its sustainable 
development goals,”485 since pre-existing environmental standards under domestic laws were 
established before the investments were made in order to determine the legitimate expectation of 
the investor.486 
 
479 Ibid.  
480 Deutsche Bank AG v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (2012) Case No ARB/09/2, para 420 
(International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Makhdoom Ali Khan, David Williams and 
Bernard Hanotiau). 
481 Oshionebo, Stabilization Clauses, supra note 65 at 27.   
482 Evaristus Oshionebo, Corporations and Nations, supra note 35 at 429. 
483 Tecmed v Mexico, supra note 470, para 154. 
484 The AGRA, supra note 95 which was enacted in 1984 generally prohibits gas flaring in Nigeria, although an IOC 
could be permitted by the Minister under Section 3 (1) and (2) to flare gas where gas utilization is not feasible.  
485 Oshionebo, Stabilization Clause supra note 65 at 28. 
486 Collins, supra note 56 at 257. Note that pre-existing environmental standards refer to pre-AGRA era when there 
was no primary legislation for the regulation of gas flaring in Nigeria.   
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Furthermore, the FET provision in Nigeria’s BITs contains an umbrella clause that mandates 
Nigeria to “observe any obligation it may have entered into with regards to investments” of the 
IOCs.487 A similar provision to Nigeria’s BIT FET provision has been explained to be an 
“umbrella clause” of a “catch-it all” nature, which guarantees compliance with obligations under 
investment contracts between a host state and an investor.488 This entails that apart from the 
interpretation of the FET clause as explained earlier, a violation of a stabilization clause in an 
investment contract (or legislation), for instance, could be considered a violation of the FET 
provision resulting in a treaty claim.489 If this is considered correct, then, the Nigerian 
government’s amendment of its laws to ensure strict environmental standards would amount to a 
breach of the stabilization clauses in Nigeria’s investment contracts, and by extension a violation 
of its BIT FET provision because such amendment would change the legal regime (which 
currently allows the IOCs to either flare gas or spill oil) in some material respects.490 This would 
depend on whether the stabilization clause has a freezing effect or maintains the economic 
equilibrium.491 
Regardless of the form that a stabilization provision takes, the shared denominators are that it 
protects foreign investors from the application of regulations that are enacted after the execution 
of investment contracts and requires a payment of compensation for their breach. It has been 
argued that stabilization clauses can impede the ability of a host state to place and monitor 
human rights obligations on IOCs and that it prevents host states from complying with their 
obligations under international law.492 It also “promotes social irresponsibility by freezing the 
legal regime governing resource extraction projects and as such hurt human rights and 
environmental protection of developing states” like Nigeria.493 
 
487 Nigeria – U.K. BIT, supra note 41, Article 2 (2) and the Nigeria – Netherlands BIT, supra note 41, Article 3 (4). 
488 Singh, supra note 478 at 91. 
489 Ibid at 92. 
490 Oshionebo, Stabilization Clause, supra note 65 at 26. This thesis argues that the legal regime in Nigeria allow gas 
flaring because the Minister of Petroleum has wide discretion to permit gas flaring under the AGRA as shown in 
section 2.2.3.2 of chapter 2.   
491 While the one with a freezing effect prohibits a host state from a unilateral amendment or change of its laws, the 
“economic equilibrium clause” permits a change in legislation but with a condition that where such change 
adversely impacts the economic interests of IOCs, they should be put in the position they were before the change. 
Putting the IOCs in the position they were before the changes or amendments in law were made could be achieved 
through the payment of compensation. See, ibid at 2 – 8, for a detailed analysis of both types. 
492 Ibid at 224. 
493 Oshionebo, Stabilization Clauses supra note 65 at 20. 
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However, some argue that a stabilization clause does not place an absolute bar on the legislative 
powers of the country.494 While this argument sounds convincing, in reality, the government of 
Nigeria might incur the cost for compensation if challenged as a breach of the umbrella clause 
before an investment tribunal by an IOC. The resultant effect is that the Nigerian government 
may well be deterred by the possibility of being liable to pay huge compensation to the IOCs for 
new regulations that breach its obligation under a stabilization clause. 
In Nigeria, guarantees for the stabilization of regulatory regimes governing the Nigerian 
Liquefied Natural Gas project have been codified in the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Act 
(NLNG Act) and provides: 
Without prejudice to any other provision contained herein, 
neither the company nor its shareholders in their capacity as 
shareholders in the company shall in any way be subject to 
new laws, regulation and taxes, duties, imports or charges of 
whatever nature which are not applicable generally to 
companies incorporated in Nigeria or to shareholders in 
companies incorporated in Nigeria respectively,495 ... the 
government further agrees to ensure that the said guarantees 
[not to be subject to new laws], … shall not be suspended, 
modified or revoked during the life of the venture except with 
the mutual agreement of the government and the shareholders 
of the company.496 
This provision is capable of posing a problematic challenge to, or may restrain the government of 
Nigeria from making and implementing regulations that may affect IOCs economically even 
when they seek to protect the environmental and human rights of host communities. The 
provision ties the hands of the Nigerian government for the entire period of a project.497 In Niger 
Delta Development Commission (NDDC) v Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) (the NDDC 
Case),498 the NLNG successfully relied on the stabilization provision of the NLNG Act to ward 
 
494 Patrick Dumberry, “International Investment Contracts” in Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De Brabandere, eds, 
International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) at 221. 
495 Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Amendment Act, 1993, Second 
Schedule, para 3.   
496  Ibid at para 6. 
497 Oshionebo, Stabilization Clauses supra note 65 at 16.  
498 NDDC v NLNG, (2010) Suit No: CA/PH/520/2007. At the Court of Appeal, the case was not necessarily decided 
on its merits, but on the ground that the NDDC did not lead evidence or canvass arguments to show that the 
‘freezing effect’ of the provision of the NLNG Act contravenes the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1999 (as amended) on the exclusive power of the National Assembly to make the NDDC Act so as to be entitled to 
collect tax accruable to it from the NLNG.    
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off the claims of the NDDC (an agency of the federal government of Nigeria) to pay taxes 
imposed on it in a subsequent legislation. Although the issue at stake in the NDDC Case was for 
the payment of tax, it is arguable that applying the same logic, the guarantee for the stabilization 
of regulatory regime under the NLNG Act and investment contracts between Nigeria and IOCs 
may deter the implementation of regulations that prioritize public purpose. 
Considering the effect that the FET clause may have on the environment and human rights in the 
context of the stabilization clauses in Nigeria’s investment contracts and legislations, this thesis 
argues that the FET clause in Nigeria’s BITs should be expunged as was done by the Indian 
government in its BITs.499 This is because of the broad meaning that could be ascribed to the 
FET standard by investment tribunals, as discussed earlier. However, this research acknowledges 
that relevant home states may resist the proposal to expunge the FET clause from Nigeria’s BITs 
considering the degree of protection it has for investors and the asymmetrical economic relations 
that exist between the relevant home states and the Nigerian government. The possible resistance 
evinces a lack of political will from the home states, which is a significant challenge to the 
practicability of the central argument of this thesis, as discussed in chapter 4. 
Because of the potential negative impacts of the “clauses against expropriation” and the “FET 
standards” on the pursuit of environmental and human rights, several governments have 
commenced the negotiation of BITs that refer to the importance of the environmental and human 
rights protection. Recent BITs such as the Nigeria-Morocco BIT referred to the right of the state 
parties to regulate and introduce new legislative measures in order to balance the rights and 
obligations of the state parties and the investors.500 Also, it imposes some obligations on 
investors, which are examined in the next section alongside the proposed imposition of 
obligations relating to environmental and human rights protection on IOCs. 
3.4 The Proposed Obligations Relating to Environmental and Human Rights Protection: The 
Choice of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 
499 Singh, supra note 478 at 88 – 89. 
500 Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement Between The Government of the Kingdom of 
Morocco and The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 3 December 2016, preamble and Article 23 
[Nigeria – Morocco]. 
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The analysis in the previous section indicates that BITs provide overwhelming protection for 
foreign investments in Nigeria’s O&G sector. Perhaps, this leaves the Nigerian government in a 
disadvantaged position if it intends to strengthen its environmental laws. When taken together 
with the earlier argument of this thesis regarding the importance of exploring an international 
law perspective in addressing IOCs’ pollution of the environment and human rights violations in 
Nigeria’s O&G sector,501 it becomes apparent that relying solely on the idea of improving 
domestic regulations negates the reality that confronts the government as explained in section 
3.4. Therefore, this thesis advocates for a turn to international law. While it is generally accepted 
that the impact of businesses on the environment and human rights requires regulations from an 
international law perspective, it remains a question of debate whether imposing obligation on 
TNCs should be made in a multilateral treaty or a BIT.502 
While some propose that BITs should be explored for this purpose,503 scholars such as Duruigbo 
have suggested that the straight-forward way of incorporating IOCs’ obligations would be 
through a multilateral treaty.504 Although the latter argument has gathered significant support, 
which has resulted in drafting the Zero Draft Treaty as analyzed earlier, only the passage of time 
will determine its success. The last attempt to impose legally binding human rights and 
environmental obligations on corporations on a multilateral basis through the Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights was mostly unsuccessful.505 Therefore, from a practical perspective, one 
fundamental reason for the choice of BITs for imposing binding obligations on IOCs is because 
the negotiation of a BIT involves two states, unlike a multilateral treaty that may include nearly 
200 countries.506 This reason is tenable, notwithstanding that it may also take a considerable 
length of time and resources to re-negotiate the relevant BITs. A multilateral treaty-making 
 
501 See Chapter two, section 2.4 above. 
502 Choudhury, supra note 147 at 442. 
503 Simons, supra note 42 at 18. 
504 Duruigbo, supra note 196 at 206.  
505 Pini Pavel Miretski & Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, “The UN ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’: A Requiem” (2012) 17 Deakin L Rev 
6 at 9 [Miretski & Bachmann]. 
506 Choudhury, supra note 147 at 476. 
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process is much more prolonged and cannot match the urgency of action that the challenges of 
business and human rights require.507 
Secondly, since BITs form part of the legal basis for the investment of IOCs in Nigeria, the 
enforcement mechanisms under BITs could be explored for the enforcement of IOCs’ obligations 
under the BIT. A BIT offers a robust and easily accessible avenue to investment arbitration for 
remedies and enforcement of BIT obligations.508 As has been observed, investment arbitration 
mainly provides a remedy for foreign investors, but the imposition of obligations in BITs could 
also offer remedies to other actors.509 Relatedly, imposing obligations on investors in BITs could 
serve as a balancing mechanism, since Nigeria’s BITs require Nigeria to accord IOCs FET, 
national and most-favoured-nation treatments, among others, without a corresponding obligation 
on IOCs. 
The framework for obligations regarding the environment and human rights protection in 
Nigeria’s BITs as proposed in this thesis is partly inspired by the works of Simons,510 
Dumberry511 and Choudhury512 who have analyzed how inserting obligations for human rights 
and environmental protection for corporations in BITs could address environmental pollution 
and human rights violations caused by corporations in Third World countries. Their works focus 
mainly on imposing obligations on TNCs in BITs as a way of balancing the competing interests 
of host states and TNCs since TNCs’ right of access to investment arbitration for a breach of a 
BIT clause by host states is considered to restrict the regulatory powers of the latter. 
While this thesis agrees with their views, it proceeds to argue further that not only should the 
IOCs’ obligations in BITs be explored in the context of investment arbitration but also that the 
relevant obligations should be enforced in the home states of the IOCs by the individuals of the 
impacted host communities of the Niger Delta. This is because no rule of international law 
prevents state parties from imposing substantive obligations, including those related to the 
 
507 John Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: Treaty Road Not Travelled” May 2008 at 42 – 3 cited in Anita 
Ramasastry, “Closing the Governance Gap in the Business and Human Rights Arena: Lessons from the Anti-
corruption Movement” in Surya Deva & David Bilchitz, eds, Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the 
Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 170. 
508 Choudhury, supra note 147 at 464. 
509 Ibid. 
510 Simons, supra note 42 at 18. 
511 Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 144 at 3. 
512 Choudhury, supra note 147 at 430. 
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protection of human rights and environmental standards on IOCs, as well as providing a 
functional enforcement mechanism in home states.513 This thesis does not intend to argue that 
providing IOCs’ obligations in BITs addresses all the issues relating to environmental pollution 
and human rights that are facing the Niger Delta communities. There are no magic wands for 
resolving the environmental pollution and human rights issues caused by IOCs in Nigeria. 
Instead, this thesis presents a preliminary idea on how formulating these obligations in the 
context of Nigeria’s BITs could provide additional remedial options for the Niger Delta 
communities in their demand for responsible operations by IOCs in their region, and this 
enhances IOCs’ accountability. 
3.4.1 The Language of Obligations Relating to Environmental and Human Rights Protection 
The content and scope of BITs have evolved over the years. As it relates to environmental and 
human rights provisions in BITs, three generations of BITs are identifiable. The first generation 
of BITs has a narrow focus, which is limited to the protection of foreign investment and does not 
make reference to environmental and human rights protection.514 However, as the operation of 
foreign investment began to have both environmental and human rights impacts, states started 
introducing provisions relating to environmental and human rights protection in their BITs to 
ensure responsible investments in their territory. Hence, the second generation of BITs such as 
the Nigeria – Austria BIT refers to environmental protection in its preamble.515 This thesis’ 
categorization of BITs as second-generation BITs is because their provisions often refer to the 
responsibility of state parties in respect of environmental and human rights protection.516 The 
provision of environmental protection in the Nigeria – Austria BIT is narrow as it focuses on the 
commitment of state parties to achieve the BIT objectives “in a manner consistent with the 
 
513 Gazzini, supra note 57 at 107. 
514 They contain several provisions that are intended to offer protection to the investment of foreigners against 
actions and measures that may be taken by host states. Such provisions include the clause regarding expropriation of 
investment and the FET clause as discussed earlier in this chapter. Other provisions include the Most-favoured 
Nation clause, the National Treatment clause and the Umbrella clause. 
515 Austria- Nigeria Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment between the Republic of Austria and 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 8 April 8 2013 (not in force) [Austria – Nigeria BIT]. The preamble to the 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria on the Promotion and Protection of Investments (entered into force 20 March 2007). 
516 This categorization applies even if the environmental and human rights provisions are found in the main text of a 
BIT, and it does not matter that such provisions are enforceable against the state parties. 
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protection…the environment.”517 The commitment of state parties in this regard is, however, not 
legally binding on them. 
Another second-generation BIT that is relevant is the US Model BIT.518 Before the era of the 
third-generation BITs, BITs did not contain substantive provisions regarding human rights and 
neither did they condition an investor’s “rights… upon responsibilities of the investor”.519 Article 
12 of the US Model BIT acknowledges that domestic “environmental laws and policies” should 
play an essential role in the effort of state parties to protect the environment. It further 
“recognizes that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by weakening or reducing the 
protections afforded in domestic environmental laws” or by failing to ensure the enforcement of 
such laws.520 While these provisions refer to the protection of the environment, they neither bind 
state parties nor foreign investors. At best, they are meant to encourage the relevant state parties 
not to lower environmental standards in a bid to accommodate or encourage foreign investments. 
Similarly, the Nigeria-Canada BIT provides that states “recognize that it is inappropriate to 
encourage investment by relaxing… safety or environmental measures” and that these measures 
should not be waived in order to encourage the operation of foreign investment.521 However, the 
provision regarding environmental standards in the Nigeria – Canada BIT differs from the 
provision under the US Model BIT because unlike the latter provision, it envisages that a state 
party could bring a claim against the other contracting party before an investment tribunal where 
it considers that the other contracting party relaxed its environmental law in order to encourage 
an investment within its territory.522 The implication is that the environmental protection in 
Nigeria – Canada BIT confers an enforceable obligation on the state government to protect the 
environment. This is a significant development in the field of international investment law. 
Another critical aspect of the Nigeria – Canada BIT is its use of environmental and human rights 
language. It recognizes the responsibility of the state parties to encourage corporations to 
 
517 Austria – Nigeria BIT, supra note 515.  
518 US Model BIT 2012, supra note 474. 
519 Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, “International Human Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties and in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration” at 8, (April 2003) online (pdf): < 
iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_rights_bits.pdf> 
520 US Model BIT, supra note 474, Article 12 (2). 
521 Agreement between Canada and the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, 6 May 2014, Article 15 [Nigeria – Canada]. 
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voluntarily integrate recognized international standards such as the principles that address 
environmental and human rights issues, among others, in their practice.523 Such hortatory 
language, which merely encourages IOCs to incorporate recognized international standards, is 
unlikely to be effective524 as it allows IOCs to engage in self-regulation, which has proven not to 
prevent them from degrading the environment and violating human rights.525 Indeed, they are not 
legally binding on either the state parties or investors. 
The recent Nigeria-Morocco BIT represents a third-generation BIT.526 While the Nigeria – 
Canada and US Model BITs address only state parties in respect of environmental and human 
rights standards, the Nigeria – Morocco BIT addresses both state parties and investors in treaty-
like language. Article 15 (6) provides that state parties “shall ensure that their laws, policies and 
actions are consistent with the international human rights agreements [that] they are a Party.”527 
It further provides that “investors and investments shall uphold human rights in the host state” 
and shall not operate their investments in a manner that undermines international environmental 
and human rights obligations to which the state parties are a party.528 Interestingly, the Nigeria – 
Morocco BIT provides for the civil liability of investors in their home states where their acts 
“lead to significant damage, personal injury or loss of life.”529 The mandatory language such as 
shall that is used in the Nigeria – Morocco BIT demonstrates that the provisions are framed as 
obligations that must be complied with by investors. While the provisions of the Nigerian – 
Morocco BIT are commendable, it is not clear whether the provision on the civil liability of 
investors in their home states where their acts “lead to significant damage, personal injury or loss 
of life” applies to environmental pollution and human rights violations caused by investors. 
Moreover, the Nigeria-Morocco BIT does not apply to IOCs in Nigeria because there is no 
Moroccan oil company operating in Nigeria’s O&G sector. 
 
523 Ibid, Article 16.  
524 Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 144 at 6. 
525 Anthony VanDuzer, Penelope Simons & Graham Mayeda, “Integrating Sustainable Development into 
International Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing Countries” (August 2010) at 304, online (pdf): 
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The obligations that this thesis envisages must be specific, with mandatory environmental and 
human rights obligations for corporate activities.530 Nigeria’s BITs should create mandatory legal 
obligations, which compel IOCs to adopt environmental and human rights standards.531 While 
the Nigeria – Morocco BIT may envisage civil liability for an investor in only an investor’s 
home state for a breach of obligation,532 this thesis envisages the liability of IOCs in their home 
states as well as before investment tribunals for a breach of the obligations relating to 
environmental and human rights protection. This thesis adopts the model proposed by VanDuzer, 
Simons and Mayeda, and tracks most of its language, with some modifications.533 Although the 
model appears to use only human rights language, its choice is hinged on the fact that it has 
broad provisions that also accommodate environmental pollution and their negative impacts on 
human rights. Relying on the model, IOCs’ obligations relating to environmental protection and 
human rights could be provided as follows: 
Investors of a Party and their investments shall respect internationally-
recognized human rights in their operations in the other Party. For greater 
certainty, the obligation to respect human rights means that: investors of a 
Party and their investments have a legal obligation to exercise due diligence to 
avoid violating or contributing to the violation of the human rights of 
individuals and communities in the other Party; investors of Party and their 
investments shall exercise due diligence to prevent or mitigate adverse human 
rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, including the human 
right impacts of environmental pollution, products or services by their business 
relationships in the Party even if the investor or the investment has not 
contributed to those impacts; where an investor of a Party or its investment 
violates the human rights or is complicit in the violations of human rights of 
individuals or groups of individuals in the Party, the investor and/or its 
investment shall take measures to mitigate such adverse impacts and shall 
provide reparations to the victims, including restitution, compensation and 
satisfaction, as appropriate.534 
While this provision should form part of the substantive provisions in Nigeria’s BITs, a reference 
to the obligations of IOCs should also be made in the preamble of the BITs. This is because 
Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that treaty obligations 
 
530 Penelope Simons, “Corporate Voluntarism and Human Rights: The Adequacy and Effectiveness of Voluntary 
Self-Regulation Regimes” (2004) 59 Industrial Relations 101 at 130.   
531 Cf, VanDuzer, Simons & Mayeda, supra note 525 at 304. 
532 Nigeria – Morocco BIT, supra note 500, Article 20. 
533 VanDuzer, Simons & Mayeda, supra note 525 at 308. 
534 Ibid. Emphasis mine and it represents the modification made by this thesis to reflect its argument. 
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are interpreted in the context of the purpose and objective of the treaty.535 A preamble often 
indicates the purpose and context of an obligation in a treaty.536 Consequently, since a preamble 
of a BIT, for the most part, stipulates investment protection as its purpose, it is necessary to also 
refer to environmental and human rights objectives in BITs as a court or an investment tribunal 
prefers an interpretation that best reflects the goals of the preamble.537 
3.5 Conclusion 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter can be summarized as follows. The extant position of 
international instruments regarding the regulation of IOCs is not sufficient for the protection of 
the environment and human rights of the Niger Delta communities. It mainly adopts an approach 
that leaves the regulation of IOCs solely to Nigeria’s domestic laws. This chapter concludes that 
this neglects the challenges that are facing the Nigerian government in regulating the IOCs and, 
by extension, the need to explore other complementary regulatory approaches using an 
international law mechanism. This chapter, therefore, concludes with a discussion of a model 
framework for the imposition of environmental and human rights obligations on IOCs in BITs. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PRACTICABILITY OF IMPOSING OBLIGATIONS ON IOCs 
AND EXAMINATION OF ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
4.1 Introduction 
So far, one of the significant arguments this thesis has advanced is that ‘soft’ international 
instruments have not been able to address environmental pollution as well as human rights 
violations caused by the IOCs in the Niger Delta region. This partly informs the main argument 
of this thesis that not only should there be binding obligations on IOCs relating to environmental 
protection and human rights, but that such obligations should be enforceable by exploring the 
potential that BITs may offer. 
This concluding chapter is divided into two substantive parts. The first part analyzes the potential 
challenges to the argument of this thesis that Nigeria and the home countries of the IOCs in 
Nigeria should renegotiate the relevant BITs to incorporate obligations relating to environmental 
protection and human rights. There are two relevant challenges to this argument. The first 
problem deals with the political will of the Nigerian government and the home states of IOCs to 
incorporate these obligations. The second problem is related to the national treatment clause in 
Nigeria’s BITs. In this part, this thesis also discusses the debate regarding the current status of 
IOCs in international law, with a view to demonstrate that corporations generally have rights and 
obligations under international law. Elements of this debate include the status of IOCs as 
‘subjects’ of international law, the interpretation of this status and its implication on the 
argument for enforceable obligations against IOCs as proposed by this thesis. 
The second part examines two enforcement mechanisms for the obligations placed on IOCs that 
operate in Nigeria. This part of the chapter argues that these enforcement mechanisms could 
improve the accountability of IOCs. First, it discusses the possibility of the Nigerian government 
initiating a claim for a breach of these obligations against the relevant IOCs in investment 
arbitration. Second, it examines how, and the extent to which such obligations could facilitate the 
initiation of transnational litigation by the Niger Delta people in the home state of an IOC that 
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violates its obligations in BITs. While undertaking these analyses, this part also reviews the 
potential challenges that are likely to face the enforcement mechanisms proposed by this thesis. 
The chapter ends on an optimistic note that the implementation of the framework explained in 
this thesis could improve the accountability of IOCs by deterring them from carrying out 
activities that pose a menace to the environment as well as human rights of the Niger Delta 
communities. 
4.2 The Practicability of Imposing Obligations Relating to Environmental Protection and 
Human Rights on IOCs in BIT 
There are three relevant challenges that could confront the imposition of BIT obligations 
regarding the environment and human rights on IOCs. While the first problem relates to the 
political will of the Nigerian government and the home states of IOCs, the second and third are 
legal issues. 
4.2.1 The Nigerian Government and Home States’ Political Will 
Considering that the renegotiation of Nigeria’s BITs to include obligations for IOCs in BITs 
would require the concurrence of the relevant governments, it is necessary to examine the extent 
to which the Nigerian government and the home states of the IOCs would want to renegotiate 
these BITs. On the one hand, the reliance of the government of Nigeria on the economic benefit 
of the O&G sector may be an indication that it could resist the idea of imposing BIT obligations 
regarding the environment and human rights on IOCs. This argument may be supported by the 
assumption that strict regulation of IOCs could lead to the withdrawal of their investments. 
Indeed, an ExxonMobil executive was quoted to have asserted that “developing countries [such 
as Nigeria] cannot afford environmental protection, and if they insist on such measures, foreign 
investments might just go elsewhere.”538 
While the preceding argument might appear plausible, this thesis argues that it should not 
dissuade the Nigerian government from renegotiating the relevant BITs. This is because IOCs 
are likely to continue operating their investments as UNCTAD noted that “corporate objectives 
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have remained unchanged” in the quest for maximization of profit.539 Moreover, IOCs have 
made so much financial investment in Nigeria’s O&G sector. For instance, IOCs in Nigeria have 
spent an enormous amount of money on drilling oil wells under the oil exploration and 
prospecting licences540 and may find it difficult to withdraw their investments provided that they 
still make a commercial profit from their operation. Oshionebo notes that: “it may not be feasible 
for [IOCs] to divest from Nigeria…given their huge financial investments in extant projects.”541 
Therefore, there is no real risk of the government losing its economic benefits if it decides to 
renegotiate BITs to bring them in tune with the arguments of this thesis. 
At present, it seems that the Nigerian government has realized that the negative impact of the 
operations of IOCs in the Niger Delta should be addressed as it has started considering “quality” 
instead of “quantity” of investments and this has conduced to a review of Nigeria’s BITs.542 
Accordingly, Nigeria’s model treaty was drafted in 2016, bearing obligations regarding the 
environment and human rights for investors with a plan to renegotiate or terminate BITs that fall 
short of this standard.543 Renegotiating Nigeria’s BITs would also provide an opportunity to 
amend other aspects of these BITs to ensure that future amendment of Nigeria’s environmental 
laws, which is also as relevant as the model being proposed by this thesis, would not breach any 
BIT clause that protects an IOC as discussed in the previous chapter. 
On the other hand, the operations of the IOCs in the Niger Delta have economic benefits for their 
home states and, therefore, their home states may fear that consenting to strict regulation of IOCs 
could affect their competitiveness.544 Since the current international law regime of not holding 
IOCs responsible for their conduct promotes the economic interests of the home states,545 it is 
doubtful that countries such as the United Kingdom, Netherlands and Italy would have the 
 
539 UNCTAD, “Economic Development in Africa: “Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct Investment” (2005) 
Online: <unctad.org/en/Docs/gdafrica20051_en.pdf> 1 at 44. 
540 Under the Petroleum Act, supra note 186, Article 2, IOCs are given licences to explore designated areas for 
potential oil discovery. They bear all the risks and costs of oil exploration but recoup from the produced crude oil if 
there is a break through. See Omoregbe, supra note 98 at 47.   
541 Oshionebo, Regulating Transnational Corporations, supra note 32 at 78. 
542 International Institute for Sustainable Development, “The Changing World of Investment Negotiations: From 
bilateral protection to...?” (February 2018) at 10, online: <iisd.org/sites/default/files/meterial/11th-annual-forum-
report-en.pdf>. This is a report of the address by Ms. Ajuma Patience Okala, the Deputy Director and Legal Adviser 
of Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission, Nigeria in the 11th Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment 
Negotiators. 
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political will to renegotiate their BITs for stricter regulation of IOCs. The suggestion that the 
powerful states resisted the implementation of the draft Norms546 which tend to impose 
obligations relating to environmental and human rights protection on IOCs on the ground that it 
would dilute the primary responsibilities of the state in this regard547 seems to support the 
possible lack of political will by the home states. 
The possible lack of political will raises a cogent doubt on the issue of whether home states may 
agree to renegotiate their BITs with Nigeria to reflect the argument of this thesis. However, the 
reliance on the suspicion that home states may not accede to such re-negotiation may be 
insufficient to warrant a conclusion. This thesis is hopeful that at a time when the more 
‘powerful’ states such as the United States of America and Canada have shown a growing 
interest towards environmental and human rights considerations in their BIT models,548 there 
may be an indication that renegotiating BITs that bear such obligations as proposed by this thesis 
will not face an insurmountable opposition from the home states. The environmental and human 
rights considerations in these BITs are not as extensive as the proposal made in this thesis, 
however. Article 12 of the Nigeria – Canada BIT merely requires states to encourage 
corporations to voluntarily include international environmental and human rights standards in 
their practices.549 Therefore, it remains to be seen how these powerful home states would react to 
the idea of inserting obligations regarding human rights and environmental protection in their 
BITs, considering that these are model BITs and states are at liberty to discard the environmental 
and human rights considerations before they enter into force. 
A study that investigated the contribution of O&G companies to climate change suggests that the 
business operations of IOCs such as Shell, Exxon and Chevron contribute over 10% of the global 
emission of carbon dioxide since 1965.550 In fact, Nigeria acknowledges that gas flaring in the 
 
546 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, supra note 361. 
547 Miretski & Bachmann, supra note 505 at 32. See Chapter three above for a detailed analysis of the Norms. 
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Niger Delta region contributes to climate change and that it intends to end gas flaring by 2030.551 
Since Nigeria and the home states of IOCs are parties to international instruments on climate 
change such as the Paris Agreement, which intends to enhance universal and determined efforts 
to address climate change and its impacts,552 renegotiating Nigeria’s BITs to impose obligations 
relating to environmental and human rights protection on IOCs will demonstrate a commitment 
on the part of the Nigerian government and relevant home states under the Paris Agreement to 
reduce greenhouse gas emission. 
While this thesis strengthens its hope that the Nigerian government and IOCs’ home states would 
renegotiate the relevant BITs to reflect its arguments on the basis that it is within their ethical 
obligation to promote respect for human rights, it does not suggest a magic wand to the problem 
of lack of political will.553 However, it provides an answer to the first research question, which 
is, if the relevant states consent to do so, “what value could imposing obligations relating to 
human rights and the environment on IOCs in Nigeria’s BITs offer to the quest to hold IOCs 
accountable for the violation of these obligations?” It focuses on the analysis of legal 
impediments facing the model proposed by the thesis but recognizes the political considerations. 
Hence its second research question: “Are there any legal impediments to imposing enforceable 
obligations relating to human rights and the environment on IOCs in BITs?” 
4.2.2 The National Treatment Standards 
The imposition of obligations relating to environmental protection and human rights on IOCs 
could be seen as violating national treatment clauses in Nigeria’s BITs. The relevant BITs 
provide that treatments that are given to the investment activities of foreign investors in Nigeria 
shall not be less favourable than that accorded to comparable activities of the investments of 
domestic investors.554 At the minimum, the national treatment provision ensures that a host 
government does not make a negative differentiation between the management of investments of 
 
551 United Nations Climate Change, “Nigeria’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution” (last seen 22 January 
2020) at 11 online (pdf): 
<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Nigeria%20First/Approved%20Nigeria's%20INDC
_271115.pdf>.   
552 United Nations Climate Change, “The Paris Agreement” (last seen 22 January 2020) online: 
<https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement>.  
553 Cf. Simons & Macklin, supra note 33 at 273. 
554 Nigeria – U.K. BIT, supra note 41, Article 3, Nigeria – Netherlands BIT, supra note 41, Article 3 and Nigeria –
Italy BIT, supra note 41 Article 3. 
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foreign investors and domestic investors through its laws.555 Therefore, IOCs should be allowed 
to compete on an equal basis with Nigerian companies that operate in the O&G sector.556 
Some BITs, however, may exclude the application of the national treatment standard in some 
circumstances.557 Notably, a Nigerian BIT excludes any treatment accorded to Nigerian 
companies under an agreement between the contracting state parties, which includes a BIT.558 
Without exceptions such as this, what the national treatment provision might entail is that 
imposing such obligations on IOCs could amount to differential treatment against IOCs if 
challenged before investment arbitration on the basis that these obligations do not apply to 
Nigerian oil companies. Once an IOC establishes that the obligations relating to environmental 
protection and human rights do not apply to Nigerian oil companies that operate similar 
investments as it does, an arbitral tribunal may declare that such obligations incorporated under a 
BIT violate the national treatment standard. In Marvin Feldman v Mexico, the tribunal held that 
there was a violation of the national treatment standard where a different treatment was given to 
a foreign investor that was in a similar business with domestic investors.559 
However, proving that there is a differential treatment in the context of this thesis may be 
difficult because primarily the national treatment provision only affects the differential 
application of domestic laws of the host state,560 and a BIT is not domestic law. Notwithstanding 
this argument, this thesis suggests that the Nigerian government and the IOCs’ home states 
should expressly exclude the national treatment standard from applying to obligations regarding 
the environment and human rights in the relevant BITs.561 
4.2.3 The “Subjecthood” and International Law Obligations on IOCs 
Over the years, there has been a debate about the status of corporations in international law. 
Indeed, there have been two opposing theories – the orthodox and emerging – that have engaged 
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in the conversation over who falls within the scope of subjects of international law.562 The 
orthodox theorists insist that states and international institutions such as the UN are the only 
entities imbued with the capacity of being subjects of international law.563 The application of this 
theory to this thesis means that imposing obligations on IOCs in Nigeria’s BITs, which are 
international law instruments, contradicts international law as IOCs being corporations are not 
subjects of international law. However, critics of the orthodox theory have argued that 
considering the extensive rights and obligations of corporations in international law, corporations 
are subjects of international law.564 According to this view, since corporations can bring legal 
claims for a breach of human rights instruments,565 investment treaties and contracts, as well as 
enter into investment contracts, they are subjects of international law with rights and 
obligations.566 
This thesis agrees with the view that corporations are subjects of international law. TNCs have 
rights and obligations under various aspects of international law567 as they can be held liable 
where they are complicit in the acts that violate human rights.568 In the context of international 
investment law, TNCs, including IOCs, have rights and obligations in international law and are 
subjects of international law.569 Developments in the field of international investment law have 
 
562 Duruigbo, supra note 196 at 192. 
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and Nations, supra note 35 and Durrigbo, supra note 196 . 
565 Autronic AG v Switzerland [1990] ECHR Application No 12726/87 at para 65. In this case, the European Court 
of Human Rights held that a corporation has a right to freedom of expression which it can sue to protect. 
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Corporations in International Law” Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper No 129.    
568 Jose Alvarez, “Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?” (2011) 9 Santa Clara J Intl L 1 at 3. 
569 TNCs have rights under various BITs, including BITs between Nigeria and home states. See Urbaser S. A. v the 
Argentine Republic, supra note 157, at 1194 where an investment tribunal expressly held that corporations are 
capable of bearing obligations under international law. Also, under the international environmental law “Polluter 
Pay Principle”, IOCs can be liable for causing serious environmental damage, including oil spills. See the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 29 November 1969 973 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 19 June 1975).   
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tremendously increased the participation of TNCs,570 and therefore, international law should 
consider the degree of their impacts in determining the scope of obligations on TNCs. Since 
states determine the nature and scope of these obligations, perhaps, through BITs,571 the Nigerian 
government and the home states of IOCs should incorporate obligations relating to 
environmental and human rights protection in BITs as this thesis proposes. This thesis argues 
that imposing obligations regarding environmental protection and human rights on IOCs in BITs 
would create a layer in international law where the Nigerian government and the Niger Delta 
communities will be able to challenge IOCs for a breach of these obligations. 
4.3 Enforcement of IOCs’ Environmental and Human Rights Obligations 
It is not new to argue that investment agreements, including BITs, should be framed in such a 
way that investors would not only have enforceable rights but also have a corresponding set of 
obligations.572 What is relatively new and generates debate among scholars in the field of 
international investment law is the appropriate enforcement approach for these obligations 
against TNCs. There is arguably no version of a BIT that is currently in force, which provides 
enforceable rights for host communities.573 The reason is that most BITs that incorporate 
environmental and human rights standards do not intend that such standards become obligations 
for the TNCs574 and where they consider them as TNCs’ obligations such as in the Nigeria-
Morocco BIT,575 the mechanism for their enforcement is often unclear. 
This thesis, however, argues that there are two potential ways to enforce IOCs’ obligations 
relating to environmental protection and human rights. First, it proposes that if these obligations 
are explicitly stipulated in the BITs as discussed in chapter 3, the Nigerian government could 
rely on them to proceed against IOCs in investment arbitration for failure to abide by the 
 
570 Jennifer Zerk, James Crawford & John Bell, “Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations 
and Opportunities in International Law” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 74 [Zerk, Crawford & 
Bell]. 
571 Duruigbo, supra note 196 at 194. See also Steve Coughan et al, “Global Reach, Local Grasp: Constructing 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Age of Globalization” (2007) [unpublished, archived at Canadian Electronic 
Library] at 24 [Coughan]. 
572 Mavluda Sattorova, “Investor Responsibilities From A Host State Perspective: Qualitative Data and Proposals 
For Treaty Reform” Symposium on Investor Responsibility: The Next Frontier in International Investment Law 
(2019) online (pdf): <C:/Users/user/Downloads/Investor_Responsibilities_from_a_Host_State_Perspe.pdf>. 
573 Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, Governments, Investors and Local Communities, supra note 49 at 21. 
574 Some of the BITs like the Nigeria – Canada BIT, supra note 521, incorporate environmental and human rights 
standards as a corporate social responsibility for investors. 
575 Nigeria – Morocco BIT, supra note 500. 
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obligations. Second, this thesis argues that IOCs’ obligations could be enforced by the Niger 
Delta communities in the home states of IOCs if enabling provisions are provided in BITs. 
 
4.3.1 Nigeria’s Claim in Investment Arbitration 
At first, the notion that the Nigerian government could institute a claim against IOCs for a breach 
of their obligations relating to environmental protection and human rights may attract doubt 
because most investment arbitration or conciliation disputes are often initiated by foreign 
investors against host governments. A scholar’s opinion that investment arbitration is an 
“international quasi-judicial review of national regulatory action” suggests that only investors are 
entitled to challenge the actions of host governments in an investment arbitral tribunal.576 
Against this assumption, the World Bank Executive Directors who drafted the International 
ICSID Convention unambiguously validated the notion that “the [ICSID] Convention permits the 
institution of the proceedings by host states as well as by investors,” maintaining that “the 
provisions of the Convention should be equally adapted to the requirements of both cases.”577 
This view strongly indicates that the system of investment arbitration does not reserve an 
exclusive right to bring a claim in the investment arbitration to the IOCs. An arbitrator described 
the view that a host state cannot bring a claim in investment arbitration as “colourful as 
misconceived.”578 
Although differently worded, almost all Nigeria’s BITs contain a dispute resolution clause, 
which provides for arbitration under the ICSID Convention in the event of any dispute between 
the Nigerian government and an investor.579 A review of Nigeria’s BITs reveals that IOCs could 
institute claims against the Nigerian government for a breach of BIT obligations, but leaves 
doubt about the possibility of the government instituting claims against the IOCs. 
 
576 Hege Elisabeth Veenstra-Kjos, “Counter-claims by Host States in Investment Dispute Arbitration “without 
Privity”” in P Kahn and T Wa ̈lde eds cited in Gustavo Laborde, “The Case for Host State Claims in Investment 
Arbitration” (2010) 1 J Intl Dispute Settlement 97 at 100 [Laborde]. As observed by Laborde, a review of the 
ICSID’s case archives shows that out of nearly 3000 cases filed at the ICSID, only three were instituted by host 
states. However, none of these three cases was based on breach of a BIT clause.  
577 ICSID Convention, supra note 43. Emphasis mine.   
578 Stephen Schwebel, “A BIT about ICSID” (2008) 23 Foreign investment LJ 1 at 5. 
579 Nigeria – U.K. BIT, supra note 41, Article 8, Nigeria – Netherlands BIT, supra note 41, Article 9 and Nigeria – 
Italy BIT supra note 41, Article 8. 
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Notwithstanding, this thesis argues that a few amendments to the provisions of the relevant BITs, 
which this thesis discusses later, could enable the government to enforce their provisions. 
A good starting point for determining whether the Nigerian government can bring a claim against 
an IOC is to examine the jurisdictional competence of investment tribunals under the ICSID 
Convention to entertain such matter.580 Article 25 of the ICSID Convention extends the 
jurisdiction of an investment tribunal “to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, 
between a contracting state [and] a national of another contracting state, which the parties to the 
dispute consent in writing to submit to the [tribunal].”581 A critical review of this provision 
evinces that there are four conditions for an investment tribunal to assume jurisdiction under the 
ICSID Convention, to wit: “the dispute must be of a legal nature,” “which directly arises out of 
an investment,” “involving a contracting state and a national of the other contracting state” and 
“parties must consent in writing.” It is not difficult to assume that the establishment of the first 
and third conditions may not pose a challenge.582 Issues of environmental and human rights 
protection are legal, and they would involve “a contracting state and a national of the other 
contracting state.” However, the other two conditions would undoubtedly require further 
examination to determine whether an investment tribunal could assume jurisdiction over a claim 
brought by the Nigerian government against an IOC for the violation of its BIT obligation. 
Regarding the second condition, according to Laborde, the operative word is “investment”583 as 
the subject matter of the claim must be shown to arise from the investment. Environmental 
degradation and human rights violations discussed in this thesis arguably arise from the 
operations of O&G investments in the Niger Delta. A leading case where the nature and scope of 
 
580 An investment tribunal set up under the ICSID Convention is not the only forum for investment arbitration as 
there are others such as arbitration under the rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), namely, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration 2014 
(UNCITRAL Rules). It is not clear whether the UNCITRAL Rules envisage that states could initiate a direct claim 
against an investor as its Article 1 (4) merely shows that an investor-state investment dispute arising from a breach 
of a BIT provision may be initiated for the protection of investment without more. Be that as it may, this thesis 
focuses on the ICSID system because all relevant Nigeria BITs make reference to it as an appropriate forum for 
settlement of disputes. Besides, only the Nigeria – Italy, supra note 41, Article 8 (2) (b) makes reference to 
investment arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules but equally offers an option for disputing parties to approach 
investment tribunals under the ICSID Convention.   
581 ICSID Convention, supra note 43.  
582 Laborde, supra note 576 at 103. 
583 Ibid. 
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“investment” are examined is Salini v. Morocco.584 The arbitral tribunal outlined four elements 
that a party must satisfy to ensure that the requirement of ‘investment’ is satisfied. These are a 
contribution of money or assets, risk, duration and contribution to the development of the host 
state.  Although it is the foreign investor who often proves these elements to establish the 
jurisdiction of an investment tribunal, there is no cogent reason why the same test would not 
apply where the host state is a claimant585 since the Executive Directors of the World Bank 
argued that “the provisions of the [ICSID] Convention should be equally adapted to the 
requirements of both [the investor and host states] cases.”586 Yet again, there is not much doubt 
that IOCs have contributed a significant amount of money or assets in their investments in the 
O&G sector in Nigeria, substantially bear risks that are associated with their investments and 
have been operating in Nigeria for a significant length of time. 
Furthermore, it must be shown that the investments of IOCs contribute to the development of the 
state. If it cannot be shown that the IOCs’ investments ensure development in the host state, then 
such investments are not entitled to be protected by a BIT as they cease to qualify as an 
investment.587 Therefore, it is unlikely that a foreign investor would advance an argument that it 
does not make positive developmental impacts in a host state,588 much less IOCs that take pride 
in having a good international reputation. Assuming without conceding that an IOC would 
advance an argument that it does not contribute to the development of Nigeria to deny the 
government access to an investment tribunal, such could easily be defeated with a proof of the 
economic development that investments in the O&G sector have brought to Nigeria. As noted in 
section 2.4 of chapter 2, the fact that the revenue from the O&G sector accounts for sixty-five 
percent of Nigeria’s entire revenue589 could be sufficient proof of the economic contribution of 
the investments in the sector to Nigeria. 
 
584 Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v The Kingdom of Morocco (2001) Case No ARB/00/04 (International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute) (Arbitrators: Maitre Robert Briner, Maitre Bernardo Cremades and 
Ibrahim Fadlallah). 
585 Laborde, supra note 576 at 104. 
586 ICSID Convention, supra note 43. Emphasis mine. 
587 M. Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) at 152 [Sornarajah]. 
588 Laborde, supra note 576at 104. 
589 See the analysis of the economic value of the O&G sector in section 2.4 of chapter two. See also NEITI Report, 
supra note 335.  
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Another relevant question to analyze is whether a human right or environmental dispute 
‘directly’ arises out of an investment. Given that neither a direct human right nor an 
environmental dispute has ever been submitted to investment arbitration, no investment tribunal 
has grappled with this question. That notwithstanding, this thesis argues that the environmental 
and human rights issues being discussed directly arise from the operation of IOCs’ investment. 
Besides, this thesis contends that Article 25 of the ICSID Convention is not the only provision 
that an arbitral tribunal considers in order to determine its jurisdiction. Instead, it should consider 
the provisions of a BIT to determine whether there has been a breach and whether it has 
jurisdiction to determine such breach. Indeed, priority should be given to BIT provisions as they 
often refer to the jurisdiction of an investment tribunal to determine legal disputes arising 
between a state and an investor with respect to the latter’s investment.590 
The last and most challenging condition for the Nigerian government to satisfy under Article 25 
of the ICSID Convention is the requirement that an IOC shall consent in writing before a claim 
could be made against it. The requirement of consent is significant because the legitimacy of an 
arbitrator is determined by the validity of the parties’ consent.591 While Nigeria’s BITs that form 
the focus of this thesis explicitly express the consent of the Nigerian government for claims 
against it by a foreign investor,592 the same cannot be said about foreign investors in favour of 
the government. As IOCs are not parties to BITs, it would not have been possible for IOCs to 
express their consent in BITs. This is further complicated by the fact that it is unlikely for an 
IOC to agree to a claim against it by the government for a breach of a BIT clause after a dispute 
arises. In this vein, the possibility of the government bringing a claim against an IOC before an 
investment tribunal becomes greatly diminished. Describing the seeming deadlock posed by this 
situation, Paulson had expressed that “the tables could not be turned: the defendant [the host 
state] could not have initiated the arbitration”593 without the consent of the foreign investor. 
It is not all despair for the Nigerian government in this regard, however. Considering the 
importance of this enforcement model for the protection of the environment and human rights of 
the Niger Delta communities, this thesis looks beyond the traditional consent system in BITs 
 
590 Nigeria – U.K BIT, supra note 41 Article 8. 
591 Sornarajah, supra note 590 at 139. 
592 Nigeria – U.K BIT, supra note 41, Articles 8 and 9 and the Nigeria – Netherlands BIT, supra note 41 
respectively.    
593 Jan Paulson, “Arbitration without Privity” (1995) 10 Intl Center for Settlement Investment Dispute Rev at 232. 
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where unilateral consent is often given by the host states. Since there is no requirement that 
‘consent in writing’ must be contained in the BIT, the government could obtain consent from an 
IOC through a separate agreement.594 Given that investment in the O&G sector in Nigeria 
involves several investment contracts including oil mining leases and oil prospecting licences, 
this thesis argues that IOCs’ consent should be obtained through an investment contract between 
the Nigerian government and the respective IOCs. While making a similar point, Schreuer 
expressed that a host state could obtain consent to a treaty-based arbitration from investors 
through an investment agreement (which may form part of the licensing process) as a 
precondition for investment.595 
Following Schreuer’s argument, this form of consent would require the relevant IOC to agree to 
treaty-based arbitration that could take place in the future since such consent would serve as a 
condition for investment in the O&G sector. Interestingly, “consent may be given” to the 
jurisdiction of an investment tribunal under the ICSID Convention for “future disputes arising 
from the investment operation” as well as for existing disputes.596 Indeed, a report has it that the 
majority of the arbitration cases under the ICSID Convention between parties are grounded on an 
agreement to arbitrate future disputes.597 
Obtaining the written consent of IOCs’ for arbitration under the ICSID rules through investment 
contracts between IOCs and the Nigerian government may be problematic from a practical 
perspective. This is because most of the investment contracts have been concluded, and IOCs are 
already operating their investments in Nigeria. Therefore, obtaining a written consent from the 
IOCs operating in Nigeria through investment contracts as proposed by Schreuer would require 
the Nigerian government to renegotiate the terms of its investment contracts with the IOCs after 
the expiration of the existing ones. The renegotiation of Nigeria’s investment contracts is 
possible, considering that they are usually valid for some time. Investment contracts in Nigeria’s 
 
594 Consent in writing can be given through BIT, national legislation, multilateral treaty and a direct agreement 
between the parties. See generally, UNCTAD, “Dispute Settlement: International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes” (2003) online: <unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add2_en.pdf> [UNCTAD]. 
595 Christopher Schreuer, “Consent to Arbitration” in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer, ed, 
The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford, New York, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 
2008) cited in Laborde, supra note 576 at 111. 
596 UNCTAD, supra note 594 at 7. 
597 Ibid. 
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O&G sector include the joint venture, production sharing contracts and service contracts.598 
Nigeria’s Petroleum Act provides information regarding oil prospecting licences and oil mining 
leases.599 
Regarding the licences and leases under the Petroleum Act, while the duration of oil prospecting 
licences does not exceed the period of five years, the validity period for an oil mining lease does 
not exceed twenty years.600 Although the contents of these investment contracts are not published 
so that their actual durations are known,601 it is beyond contestation that they are determinable 
and renewable.602 Therefore, the Nigerian government may obtain written consent to the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal under the ICSID rules from an IOC upon the expiration and 
renewal of the relevant IOC’s investment contract. Renegotiating investment contracts fall within 
the scope of the framework of this thesis, which demands the renegotiation of Nigeria’s BITs, 
and would prove a significant step towards addressing the environmental and human rights 
issues that confront the Niger Delta communities. 
A closely related jurisdictional issue is whether Nigeria’s BITs confer standing on the 
government. For a host state to have a right to arbitrate against an IOC, the dispute resolution 
clause in a BIT must not only confer standing on a foreign investor but also on the host state.603 
At present, only the Nigeria – U.K BIT confers a right to arbitrate on both the Nigerian 
government and the IOCs,604 while the Nigeria – Netherlands605  and the Nigeria-Italy606 BITs 
confer a right to arbitrate on IOCs without an equivalent right on the government. On the 
strength of their provisions, the fact that the government obtained consent through an investment 
contract, as argued above, does not by itself vest on the government the right to arbitrate.607 It is, 
therefore, the argument of this thesis that there should be a firm expression of the right to 
 
598 Omoregbe, supra note 98 at 50 – 3.  
599 Petroleum Act supra note 186, section 2.    
600 First Schedule to the Petroleum Act, ibid, sections 6 and 10. 
601 Rob Pitman & Anne Chinweze, “The Case for Publishing Petroleum Contracts in Nigeria” (2018) at 1 – 2, online 
(pdf): Natural Resources Governance Institute < resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/the-case-for-
publishing-petroleum-contracts-in-nigeria.pdf >. 
602 For an extensive analysis of the types of investment contracts and their duration in Nigeria’s O&G sector, see 
Omoregbe, supra note 98. 
603 Laborde, supra note 576 at 106. 
604 Nigeria – U.K BIT, supra note 41, Article 8. 
605 Nigerian – Netherlands BIT, supra note 41, Article 9. 
606 Nigeria – Italy BIT, supra note 41, Article 8 (2). 
607 Laborde, supra note 576 at 106. 
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arbitrate on the part of the government of Nigeria in BITs. This proposition is not a new practice 
in the system of BITs. The U.S.-Argentina BIT offers an excellent example of the expression of 
the right to arbitrate where it provides that, “once an investor concerned has so consented, either 
party to the dispute may initiate arbitration in accordance with the choice so specified in the 
consent.”608 Adoption of a similar provision in Nigeria’s BITs confers the right to arbitrate on the 
government and consequently activates the jurisdiction of investment tribunals under the ICSID 
Convention. 
Having examined the feasibility of investment tribunals assuming jurisdiction in a claim brought 
by the Nigerian government, the thesis also considers the substantive basis for such a claim. 
Substantive basis refers to the cause of action upon which the government could rely. In other 
words, in circumstances where the consent of the IOC to arbitrate is not a general agreement to 
submit all kinds of dispute to investment arbitration, an investment tribunal under the ICSID 
Convention would only assume jurisdiction if it is established by the claimant “that the facts it 
alleged if proven, could constitute a violation of the [BIT].”609 Imposing obligations relating to 
environmental protection and human rights on IOCs offers a cause of action under a BIT. In the 
context of the Niger Delta, a concern which was raised regarding the failure of the Nigerian 
government to make claims against the IOCs before an investment tribunal (as a result of the 
lack of obligation for IOCs in BITs),610 although there are several environmental and human 
rights concerns,611 would be addressed. The next section considers the second enforcement 
option, which applies to the people of the Niger Delta. 
4.3.2  Niger Delta Communities’ Claims in the Home States of IOCs 
Another possibility that this thesis proposes for the enforcement of the IOCs’ obligations in BITs 
is the home state enforcement option. In their work, VanDuzer, Simons and Mayeda analyzed 
this enforcement mechanism against TNCs. They recognized that the challenges which confront 
developing host states such as Nigeria in regulating foreign investors could ultimately lead to a 
lack of accountability for environmental damage and human rights violations, and therefore, 
 
608 Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of Investment, 14 November 1991 (entered into force 20 October 1994), Article VII. 
609 Iberdrola Energia S.A. v Republic of Guatemala, (2012) Case No ARB/09/5, paras 306, 323 -373 (International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute) (Eduardo Zuleta, Rodrigo Oreamuno and Yves Derains). 
610 Ejims, supra note 133 at 363. 
611 Ibid.  
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present a lack of adequate means of remedy for the victims.612 This thesis draws from their work 
and argues that in addition to the compliance mechanism proposed in the last section, IOCs’ 
obligations in Nigeria’s BITs could be enforced by the Niger Delta communities through a 
complementary provision for civil liability of the IOCs in their home states.613 The relevant BITs 
could expressly provide that IOCs that engage in environmental and human rights violations 
should be liable in their home states. That is to say that the impacted communities can choose 
either to pursue their claim in Nigeria or an IOC’s home state. 
In explaining the framework, VanDuzer, Simons and Mayeda argued that the imposition of civil 
liability on IOCs in their home states for the violation of a BIT obligation is a viable means of 
improving compliance with environmental and human rights standards in host states.614 
According to their study, such civil suits which may be brought against IOCs for either their acts 
or complicity with the government of Nigeria in violating human rights as well as causing 
environmental damage, perhaps, provide the sole avenue for redress directly involving victims 
such as the Niger Delta communities, given the current weak domestic mechanisms and 
processes for addressing the adverse impacts of investments.615 
Given the transnational nature of such litigation, instituting civil claims against IOCs for their 
unethical conduct in Nigeria would expose them to reputational risk as IOCs, especially the ones 
with international brands like Shell and Chevron, prefer to brandish an image as being socially 
responsible. Furthermore, the potential damage to their reputation and the financial costs of such 
suits, even where they are unsuccessful, may likely deter IOCs from future misconduct while 
operating in Nigeria.616 Moreover, a favourable outcome resulting from such transnational 
litigation for the victims of the Niger Delta communities would undoubtedly provide a remedy 
for environmental pollution as well as a human rights violation. 
 
612 VanDuzer, Simons & Mayeda, supra note 525 at 364. 
613 Nigeria – Morocco BIT, supra note 500, Article 20 provides for similar liability of an investor in its home state. 
Thus, it provides that: “investors shall be subject to civil actions for liability in the judicial process of their home 
state for the acts or decisions made in relation to the investment where such acts or decisions lead to significant 
damage, personal injuries or loss of life in the host state.”  
614 VanDuzer, Simons & Maayeda, supra note 525 at 380. 
615 Ibid. 
616 Ibid. 
 
 
105 
 
The case of Bodo v Shell Petroleum Development Company (Bodo Case) captures this point.617 
On 23 March 2012, members of the Bodo community (a Niger Delta community), numbering 
about 15,000, brought a claim in a London High Court seeking compensation for two oil spill 
incidents that occurred in 2008 and 2009. Among others, their claims are with regard to losses 
suffered to their health, land and livelihood. The plaintiffs provided evidence in support of the 
fact that the relevant pipelines ruptured because they were neglected and poorly maintained by 
SPDC, a Nigerian subsidiary of the parent company – Shell United Kingdom. Despite alleging 
that the cause of the oil spills was sabotage and theft by the members of the Bodo community, 
Shell admitted responsibility and agreed to pay a sum of £55 million for an out-of-court 
settlement for cleaning up the spill and as damages. Consequently, a clean-up operation by the 
Bodo Mediation Initiative (with an international reputation), which was sponsored by the Dutch 
Government, was also established.618 
Although the compensation is considered inadequate given the severity of the damage and the 
length of time it took Shell to settle the case,619 the outcome of this case represents the value that 
imposing obligations as well as a corresponding civil liability on IOCs in BITs could provide to 
the Niger Delta community. Assuming a full trial commenced, the London High Court would 
have set significant legal precedence clarifying the position of the English courts in corporate 
human rights and environmental lawsuits.620 However, it is vital for Nigeria’s BITs to provide 
for IOCs’ obligations in clear terms because given the transnational nature of the suit, the 
outcome of the Bodo Case, had it gone to full trial, would be unpredictable as a result of 
challenges concerning cross-border litigation. Hence, there is a need to address the scope of 
IOCs’ obligations towards environmental and human rights protection and clarify their legal 
liability in BITs. 
4.3.2.1 Reconciling the Controversy Over Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in International Law 
 
617 Bodo Community v The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd, (2014) EWHC 1973 TCC.  
618 Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, “Shell lawsuit (Re-oil spills & Bodo community in Nigeria)” (May 
2018) online: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/shell-lawsuit-re-oil-spills-bodo-community-in-nigeria. 
619 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Long-Awaited Victory as Shell Pays Compensation for Oil Spills” (7 January 
2015) online: https://www.amnesty.org.au/nigeria-shell-oil-spill-victory/. 
620 Elodie Aba, “Shell & the Bodo Community: Settlement vs. Litigation” (12 January 2015) online: 
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/shell-pays-%C2%A355-million-out-of-court-settlement-to-nigerian-bodo-
community-over-oil-spills#c108687.  
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As demonstrated in the previous section, the essence of insisting that investors, including IOCs, 
should have obligations relating to environmental protection and human rights in Nigeria’s BITs 
is partly to enable the impacted host communities of the Niger Delta to make claims against the 
IOCs in their home states’ courts. The necessity of exploring home states’ courts as a forum for 
enforcing these obligations is partly due to the problems facing access to justice in Nigeria. 
These conundrums are explained as “judicial obstacles” ranging from endemic corruption in 
Nigeria’s judiciary,621 a turn towards economic approach instead of human rights and 
environmental approach by the Nigerian courts to the lack of resources by the impacted 
communities to pursue their claims. All of these show that a lot should be done domestically, as 
already acknowledged in this thesis. Often, the lack of resources could be addressed in IOCs’ 
home states as victims in the impacted communities can “obtain the services of lawyers in a 
position to represent them” on a pro bono basis.622 This section engages the debate regarding the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of states to regulate TNCs in respect of their activities that pollute the 
environment and violate of human rights. 
A classic illustration of violations of human rights that may involve home state jurisdiction is 
where a subsidiary of a TNC that is domestically incorporated in another state pollutes the 
environment, such as the case of IOCs in Nigeria.623 The controversy in this scenario touches 
upon the powers of the governments and courts of UK, Italy and United States, for instance, to 
either legislate or adjudicate over the activities of SPDC, Agip and Chevron Nigeria Limited 
respectively in Nigeria that violate human rights of the Niger Delta communities on the basis that 
the Nigerian IOCs are subsidiaries of their parent companies, which are headquartered in these 
countries. 
A prominent legal justification for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction624 is hinged on the 
principle of nationality. For the nationality principle to be activated, there should be a link 
between the home state and the person (natural or legal) that is being regulated. This extends to 
 
621 Eghosa O. Ekhator, “Improving Access to Environmental Justice under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: The Roles of NGOS in Nigeria” (2014) 22 African J Intl & Comparative L 63 at 63. 
622 Richard Meeran, “Tort Litigation against Multinational Corporations for Violation of Human Rights: An 
Overview of the Position Outside the United States” (2011) 3 City U Hong Kong L Rev 1 at 10. 
623 Markus Krajewski, “The State Duty to Protect against Human Rights Violations through Transnational Business 
Activities” (2018) 23 Deakin L Rev 13 at 15. 
624 By Jurisdiction, this thesis refers to the prescriptive jurisdiction of a state which encompasses both the powers to 
make laws and for its courts to adjudicate over matters that occurred outside of its territory. 
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the conduct of the national of a country outside the territory of the regulating state.625 A critical 
issue, however, is to determine the nationality of IOCs, especially considering that they are 
subsidiaries that are incorporated under Nigeria’s domestic laws, while their parent companies 
are registered in other states. While there are nuances in respect of state practice in this regard,626 
it is generally accepted in public international law that a TNC’s nationality could be the country 
where its head office is located or the state of incorporation.627 
Despite this established principle of international law, it has been argued that as a general rule a 
state may not rely solely on the “nationality principle” to regulate the activities of a subsidiary, 
which has a different legal personality in another country.628 At best, such states may only 
regulate the parent companies of the foreign subsidiaries in a way that indirectly imposes specific 
conduct on the latter.629 This thesis disagrees with this view on the basis that it is not supportable 
by any known judicial pronouncement, mainly as nationality is a legally acceptable, as well as a 
“domestically, regionally and internationally recognized basis of jurisdiction” for the regulation 
of activities occurring either wholly or partly outside the territory of a state.630 The view that 
there is no problem for a subsidiary of a parent company to be treated as having the nationality of 
the parent company based on “nationality principle” remains tenable because legally and strictly 
speaking, it is an extension of the parent entity.631 
Moreover, in the context of international investment law, a foreign investor that operates in a 
host state is considered a national of the other contracting state. This explains why the Nigeria – 
Netherlands BIT defines a national of the Netherlands as a legal person constituted under the law 
of the Netherlands.632 The reference to nationality in Nigeria’s BIT with the Netherlands, to take 
but one example, suggests that a Nigerian subsidiary company like SPDC shares the same 
nationality with the parent company in the Netherlands, and this should allow Netherlands’ law 
 
625 Currie et al, supra note 124 at 499. 
626 While common law states such as the United Kingdom and United States of America accord nationality on the 
ground of incorporation within their territories, civil law states such as Italy and Netherlands consider the country 
where a corporation has its seat of management as its nationality – see Seck, supra note 48 at 187.  
627 Currie et al, supra note 124 at 505. See also the reasoning of the court in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain), [1970] ICJ Rep 3 at 71. 
628 Seck, supra note 48 at 187 – 8.  
629 Ibid at 188. 
630 Simons & Macklin, supra note 33 at 300. 
631 Ibid at 299. 
632 Nigeria – Netherlands BIT, supra note 41, Article 1 (b) (iii). 
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to regulate SPDC’s operation in Nigeria.633 Therefore, this thesis argues that an IOC that is 
protected under a BIT has at least a dual nationality, which comprises of its host and home states. 
The implication is that a home state’s reliance on the ‘nationality principle’ to regulate the 
extraterritorial conduct of a TNC is strengthened by the fact that under BITs such TNC can be 
regarded as its national. 
Though controversial, another doctrine that may permit extraterritorial control of corporations is 
the “effects principle,” which has been explored by the U.S. to assert jurisdiction over actions 
that do not necessarily have a link with its territory, but which has economic effects in the U.S.634 
Relying on this doctrine, Zerk argues that human rights and environmental regulation by home 
states are justifiable as a failure to regulate in this manner undermines their reputation.635 Also, 
the “principle of universality” could be a third basis for the regulation of TNCs by home states. 
The nature of the act in question determines whether such action falls within this category of 
regulatory basis in international law.636 The commission of a recognized international crime by a 
TNC notwithstanding the location of the offence justifies the jurisdiction of not only the TNC’s 
home state but also of all countries. However, given the nature of human rights that are violated 
as discussed in chapter 2, it is doubtful whether the home states of the IOCs in Nigeria can rely 
on the universality principle to justify their regulation of IOCs. 
It seems that from the analysis above, the “nationality principle” provides the most reliable and 
viable basis for the home states of IOCs in Nigeria to regulate as well as adjudicate over the 
misconduct of IOCs for the advancement of environmental and human rights standards. Perhaps, 
the nationality principle was the basis for the enactment of the ATCA by the U.S.,637 which has 
been applied to cross-border litigations, including the IOCs’ human rights violations in 
Nigeria.638 However, as several U.S. administrations have expressed diverse opinions on whether 
the ATCA applies to human rights litigation in the U.S. domestic courts, and considering that the 
 
633 Ibid. Therefore, under the BIT, an investor in Nigeria whose origin is Netherland is a national of Netherland. Of 
course, it is also not out of place to argue that such investor is a national of Nigeria given that it is incorporated in 
Nigeria. Also note that SPDC is a Nigerian subsidiary co-owned by a British-Dutch oil company under the name 
Royal Dutch Shell with their headquarters in Netherlands and incorporated in the U.k as the British Petroleum. See 
https://www.shell.com.ng/about-us/what-we-do/spdc.html.    
634 Currie et al, supra note 124 at 497. 
635 Zerk, Crawford & Bell, supra note 570 at 110.   
636 Currie et al, supra note 124 at 511. 
637 ATCA , supra note 50. 
638 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, supra note 52. 
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U.S. courts have demonstrated restraint in deciding whether the ATCA applies to human rights 
and environmental issues, particularly after the Supreme Court decision in Kiobel v Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Company,639 it is difficult to sustain an argument that in practice, there is a recognized 
basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction of courts in the U.S., for instance. As argued earlier in this 
thesis, the recent work of John Ruggie appears to doubt the appropriateness of the ‘nationality 
principle’ regarding the power of home states to exercise extraterritorial functions. His 
commentary on Principle 2 of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights stipulates as follows: 
At present, states are not generally required under international human rights 
law to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their 
territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they generally prohibited from doing so, 
provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis. Within these parameters, 
some human rights treaty bodies recommend that home states take steps to 
prevent abuse abroad by business enterprises within their jurisdiction640 
While this expression initially seems neutral, it appears that according to Ruggie’s view, there is 
yet no legal obligation on other states to exercise extraterritorial powers regarding the activities 
of IOCs in Nigeria.641 A critical evaluation of this commentary through the lens of the 
interpretation of the treaty bodies demonstrates that Ruggie’s opinion does not reflect the 
intention of the international human rights treaties.642 This is because the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights interprets the General Comments of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) as imposing extraterritorial legal obligations on 
states to prevent corporations over which they wield influence from violating human rights in 
other countries.643 General Comment No 14 of the CESCR regarding the right to health states 
that “states parties have to … prevent third parties from violating the right in other countries, if 
they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal and political means.”644 Similarly, 
the General Comment No 24 of the Committee on CESCR states that “the extraterritorial 
obligation to protect requires state parties to take steps to prevent and redress infringements of 
 
639 Rachel Chambers, “An Evaluation of Two Key Extraterritorial Techniques to Bring Human Rights Standards to 
Bear on Corporate Misconduct” (2018) 14 Utrecht L Rev 22 at 33. See also, Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, ibid at 
1659. 
640 UNGP, supra note 115 at 4 [Emphasis mine].  
641 Davitti, supra note 118 at 60. 
642 Ibid at 61. 
643 Human Rights Council, “Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 
the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights” 15 January 2009, A/HRC/10/61 at para 86.  
644 General Comment No 14, supra note 285, para 39. 
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covenant rights that occur outside their territories due to the activities of business entities over 
which they can exercise control, especially in cases where the remedies available to victims 
before the domestic courts of the state where the harm occurs are unavailable or ineffective.”645 
Scholars have also argued that Article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),646 which provides for the general obligation of states, contains no 
reference to a particular form of jurisdiction, but includes an obligation [including an implicit 
extraterritorial obligation] on states to take measures either individually or through cooperation, 
in order to fully realize the ICESCR rights.647 On this basis, others contend that the failure of a 
home state to regulate the “human rights-violation” behaviour of its national’s foreign subsidiary 
gives rise to international responsibility where the home state has ratified a BIT with the host 
state.648 
In light of the comments of the CESCR, it is predicted that change was imminent in respect to 
the classical view due to the increasing recognition of interdependence of states, and a strong 
inclination “within legal doctrine to insist on the need to impose on states an obligation to seek” 
extraterritorial control “to the extent that they may exercise influence.”649 Therefore, although 
the pronouncements of the CESCR are significant as they offer a desirable interpretative value to 
human rights treaties,650 they are yet to crystalize into the position of international law that has 
either been adopted or recognized through ratification or as customary international law. 
Whatever the position of existing international law, the obligations relating to environmental and 
human rights protection in the BITs that this thesis argues confer consequential civil liability on 
IOCs in their home states for a breach by making the basis for jurisdiction explicit. This thesis 
argues that at the minimum, the ratification of BITs that have these obligations and civil liability 
 
645 General Comment 24, supra note 19, para 30. 
646 ICESCR, supra note 9. 
647 Fons Coomans, “The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the work of the United Nations Committee on Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” 
(2011) 11 Human Rights LR 1 at 31. 
648 Robert McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, “Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for 
Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights” (2007) 70 Modern LR 598 at 605 
[McCorquodale & Simons]. 
649 Olivier De Schutter, “Sovereignty-plus in the Era of Interdependence: Towards an International Convention on 
Combating Human Rights Violations by Transnational Corporations” (2010) CRIDHO Working Paper No 2010/5 at 
20. 
650 Davitti, supra note 118 at 61. 
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for IOCs in their home states represents Ruggie’s view as it is a jurisdictional basis for 
international law to recognize the extraterritorial powers of home states to regulate and 
adjudicate over claims brought in their jurisdictions against the activities of IOCs in Nigeria.651 
This is so because the absence of a clear international obligation, among other issues, makes it 
difficult for the home states to assume extraterritorial jurisdiction.652 What this means is that 
where there is a clear obligation, which may arise through an international agreement between 
two countries, one of the countries should be able to exercise extraterritorial adjudicative 
jurisdiction over matters initiated by the citizens of the other consenting state.653 This consent 
may readily be given through BITs, which provide either an ad hoc or permanent agreement for 
states to exercise extraterritorial powers.654 Indeed, customary public international law relating to 
extraterritorial adjudicative jurisdiction of states may allow states to adjudicate over events that 
occurred in other states provided there is consent.655 
4.3.3 Reviewing the Practicability of the Extraterritorial Mechanism 
As shown in the previous section, an express provision for a civil liability of IOCs in their home 
states that is projected in this thesis will preclude the controversy related to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.  However, there are a few other legal hurdles to this enforcement model, but they 
are not intractable. The discussion of these legal obstacles intends to deflate arguments about the 
legal impracticability of extraterritorial adjudicative mechanisms. Already, the model proposed 
by this thesis which is for the BITs to also provide for civil liability of the IOCs in their home 
countries has obviated most of these challenges including the challenges that would otherwise be 
presented by the doctrines of “separate legal personality” and forum non conveniens (FNC). This 
means that a claim by the host communities for compensation for breach of a BIT obligation is 
more likely to succeed.656 
The first problem is related to the complexity of the organization of TNCs. Since TNCs are 
structured as separate legal entities operating in different jurisdictions, the problem is the 
 
651 See Emphasis supra note 640, where Ruggie contends that states could exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction if 
there is a recognized jurisdictional basis.  
652 Simons & Macklin, supra note 33 at 7. 
653 For more details on the meaning of “adjudicative” jurisdiction, see Currie supra note 124 at 476. 
654 Coughan, supra note 571 at 24. 
655 Currie, supra note 124 at 477. 
656 VanDuzer, Simons & Mayeda, supra note 525 at 385. 
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difficulty in attaching liability to the appropriate entity,657 as there is no regulation that governs 
their interconnected transactions. The corporate doctrines of “separate legal entity” and [“limited 
liability”] incentivize “jurisdictional arbitrage,” which protects TNCs from legal accountability 
as related to the pollution of the environment and by implication, adverse human rights effects.658 
Over the years, there has been an attempt to hold parent companies liable for the misconduct of 
their subsidiaries in other jurisdictions, but this has been disparaged by a U.K court as an attempt 
to “pierce the corporate veil” by separating shareholders from the company.659 Given that 
corporations are seen as individual entities, a parent company is not generally liable, by the fact 
that it is a shareholder in its subsidiary.660 This is a well-established principle of common law 
that is rooted in the age-long case of Salomon v Salomon (Salomon Case).661 Therefore, this 
principle may be safely relied upon to defeat the claim of the Niger Delta communities against an 
IOC. 
However, over the years, allegations in the U.K. and Canada focus on the direct negligence of a 
parent company in the violations of human rights and environmental pollution by its subsidiary 
to circumvent the effect of the principle in Salomon Case.662 In Choc v Hudbay Minerals, 
contrary to the pre-trial motion that challenged the claim of the plaintiff on ground of lack of 
cause of action, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice affirmed that there was a disclosure of a 
reasonable cause of action in negligence on the part of Hudbay minerals – the parent company.663 
This is because the pleadings disclose the elements of duty of care owed by the parent 
company,664 and if proved, could lead to the liability of the defendant (parent company) for the 
violation of human rights at the Hudbay’s mining project in Guatemala operated by the 
defendant’s subsidiary. However, at the trial, it is expected for the court to determine the extent 
(if any) of the liability of the defendant, who the plaintiff claims was the agent of its subsidiary at 
the material time. 
 
657 Ibid at 381.  
658 Janet Dine, “Jurisdictional Arbitrage by Multinational Companies: A National Law Solution?”  (2012) 3 J 
Human Rights & the Environment 44 [Dine]. 
659 Adams v Cape Industries, 1990 BCLC 479. 
660 VanDuzer, Simons & Mayeda, supra note 525 at 387. 
661 Salomon v Salomon (1897) AC 22. 
662 Bodo v Shell Petroleum Development Company, supra note 620. See also Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., (2013) 
ONSC 1414. 
663 Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., ibid, para  70. 
664 Ibid , para 75. 
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Attempting to solve this problem, Dine has suggested that the “enterprise liability” principle 
should be embraced by home states to hold the parent and the subsidiary jointly liable for the 
latter’s environmental pollution and human rights violations (provided there is an equity 
ownership by the former in the latter), thereby, treating them as a juridical unit.665 While this 
argument potentially advances this enforcement framework, the modest approach of this thesis is 
that the Nigerian subsidiaries should be held solely liable for the breach of a BIT obligation. Of 
course, this is because most of the IOCs in Nigeria are financially capable of bearing whatever 
damages awarded against them. However, where it can be shown that an IOC in Nigeria does not 
have the financial capacity to assume liability, Dine’s “enterprise liability” theory could be 
adopted by the home courts of an IOC to hold the relevant parent company jointly liable with the 
IOC. This means that the parent companies and their subsidiaries could be sued jointly but 
liability will be attached to only the subsidiary where applicable. 
This model appears similar to the outcome in the London case of Bodo v Shell Petroleum 
Development Company, which was earlier discussed considering that the court ruled that it has 
jurisdiction to hear the matter which was against SPDC – a Nigerian subsidiary of Shell.666 In the 
case, Shell Global noted that the Nigerian subsidiary (SPDC) which was sued in the London 
court, would pay the settlement agreement sum of £55 million to the Niger Delta community.667 
As the legal counsel in the case argued, the basis for this model is to demonstrate that IOCs’ 
parent companies could have a significant role to play in ensuring that the operations of their 
subsidiaries neither degrade the environment668 nor violate human rights as the transnational 
nature of the litigation attracted the attention of Shell Global - the parent company. Nevertheless, 
adopting this option through a BIT may not appeal to the Nigerian government as it has equity 
stakes in the Nigerian subsidiaries. But it is expected that if serious measures are to be taken to 
 
665 Dine, supra note 658 at 64 – 9. 
666 See chapter four, section 4.3.2 above. See also Vedanta Resources PLC v Lungow (2019) UKSC 2017/0185 at 
para 146 where the UK Supreme Court held that a UK court has jurisdiction over the parent company over serious 
environmental pollution committed by its Zambian subsidiary in Zambia on the basis that the parent company, 
Vedanta has “the necessary financial standing to pay out any damages that are recovered”.  
667 Shell Global, “Shell’s Nigerian Subsidiary Agrees £55 Million Settlement with the Bodo Community” (January 
2015) online: <www.shell.com/media/news-and-media-releases/2015/shells-nigerian-subsidiary-settlement-with-
bodo-community.html#vanity 
aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc2hlbGwuY29tL2dsb2JhbC9hYm91dHNoZWxsL21lZGlhL25ld3MtYW5kLW1lZGlhLXJlb
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address the misconducts of IOCs, the government should prioritize the rights of its citizens over 
financial gain. 
Another problem with the enforcement framework is related to a legal cause of action. In the first 
place, a majority of the home states of the IOCs, including the U.K., do not have a specific law 
that supports a cause of action for violation of human rights and environmental pollution, which 
results from the activities of investors in other jurisdictions.669 At best such claims could be 
framed as negligence.670 Furthermore, as we have seen earlier, the ATCA could allow plaintiffs 
to make claims that are related to extraterritorial activities of IOCs, which either pollute the 
environment or violate human rights, but claims under ATCA must also be framed as tortuous 
claims. As Zerk expressed, although it is conceivable to view negligence claims against TNCs 
from the perspectives of a violation of human rights and environmental degradation, it is not 
completely correct to describe a tort-based litigation as a human rights litigation because a cause 
of action under a domestic law is required to be shown instead of a breach of international law.671 
What this means is that there should be a commitment from the relevant home states towards 
compelling IOCs to respect their obligations in BITs. The home states are expected to take 
reasonable steps in this regard. There should be a requirement for the home states to enact 
domestic laws enabling a cause of action for a remedy in respect of a breach of environmental 
and human rights-related obligations in their courts672 and not necessarily tied to the law of tort. 
Relatedly, a widely recognized potential problem associated with the home state enforcement 
mechanism is the theory of FNC. Essentially, a home state of an IOC has the discretion to refuse 
jurisdiction over a transnational claim for a breach of the BIT obligations by the IOCs on the 
basis that it is more convenient to bring such claim in a Nigerian court. Modern trend 
demonstrates, however, that foreign courts are more inclined to deny the application of the 
doctrine of FNC. Recently, a U.K. court held that the principle could not be allowed to defeat its 
jurisdiction over claims which result from environmental harm, alleged human rights violations 
and civil torts in African countries by a subsidiary of a British corporation.673 This is because 
several years earlier, the Supreme Court of the U.K. developed the law in this regard and had 
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consequently held that the court must always consider whether the claimant could establish that 
substantial justice may not be done if it were to proceed against the TNC in its host state.674 
Also, the doctrine mostly has no place in Europe,675 as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had 
held that the national courts of the European Union (EU) have no power to dismiss proceedings 
based on FNC.676 Given that the decision of the ECJ is binding on all courts of the EU, this thesis 
argues that the issue posed by the doctrine of FNC in respect of transnational litigation no longer 
exists in the U.K. and other EU countries. This thesis, however, agrees with the research of the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development that one of the ways to ensure that the 
doctrine of FNC does not interfere with the enforcement of IOCs’ obligations in their home 
states is to explicitly provide in Nigeria’s BITs that the parties shall ensure that their domestic 
courts do not deny jurisdiction based on the doctrine of FNC or “any similar judicial rule in the 
party’s” court.677 
4.4 Conclusion 
Several conclusions can be made from the analysis in this thesis. First, the Niger Delta 
communities have been victims of environmental pollution and human rights violations due to 
the operations of IOCs in their region. The IOCs that operate in Nigeria’s O&G sector continue 
to flare gas as well as cause oil spillage in the Niger Delta communities since 1956 when oil was 
discovered in commercial quantity in the region. The thesis examined how oil spillage and gas 
flaring violate the human rights of the Niger Delta people. These human rights are the right to a 
healthy environment, right to life, right to health and rights to water and food that are guaranteed 
under several international human rights instruments. Apart from the violation of these rights 
through environmental pollution, the thesis also examined the involvement of the IOCs in the 
violation of the human rights of the Niger Delta people by the Nigerian government. The thesis 
argued that the complicity of IOCs in instances where the Nigerian government used military 
force to suppress the protests of the Niger Delta people against the environmental pollution 
caused by IOCs in their region amounts to a violation of human rights by IOCs. 
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Secondly, the survey of Nigeria’s environmental laws and regulations reveals that there are 
regulatory gaps and that there is a pressing need for the Nigerian government to adequately 
protect the environment of the Niger Delta communities by improving its domestic regulation. 
Such improvement at the domestic level by the Nigerian government will indirectly ensure that 
the human rights that are being violated by environmental pollution in the Niger Delta region are 
protected. 
But beyond the need to improve Nigeria’s domestic laws, this thesis examined the value that 
international law could offer in ensuring that IOCs are held accountable for environmental 
pollution and human rights violations. The thesis discussed several efforts that are being made at 
the international level to address both environmental pollution and human rights violations 
caused by TNCs, including IOCs that operate in Nigeria’s O&G sector. A review of several 
international instruments such as the UNGC, UNGP and OECD Guidelines reveals that the 
existing international law regime does not impose an enforceable obligation on IOCs. Instead, it 
tends to encourage IOCs to refrain from acts that pollute the environment and violate the human 
rights of the people of their host communities in their business operations. These instruments 
have not deterred IOCs’ contribution to environmental degradation and human rights violation. 
Consequently, the thesis argued that there should be an imposition of obligations relating to 
environmental and human rights protection on IOCs in the Nigeria’s relevant BITs that could 
enable both the Nigerian government and the Niger Delta communities to seek redress for 
environmental pollution and human rights violation in their region. The justification for this 
argument is partly based on the fact that IOCs’ activities violate several international human 
rights, including civil, economic, social, and environmental rights, and therefore, international 
instruments such as BITs should be explored to ensure their accountability. 
Considering that imposing obligations on IOCs in BITs will require the renegotiation of 
Nigeria’s BITs, the thesis also argued that Nigeria’s BIT clauses such as the clause regarding 
expropriation and the FET clause should be amended and expunged respectively. This is because 
the obligations owed to IOCs by the Nigerian government under these clauses in Nigeria’s BITs 
may be breached if the Nigerian government takes a serious step to regulate the environment 
domestically and therefore may attract the payment of large compensation to the IOCs. The 
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arguments of this thesis to amend the clause regarding expropriation and expunge the FET clause 
in Nigeria’s BITs are based on state practice and various decisions of investment tribunals. 
As the central argument of this thesis is to impose obligations regarding environmental and 
human rights protection on IOCs in Nigeria’s BITs, the thesis also examined potential challenges 
to the argument. First, it examined the possible lack of political will by the Nigerian government 
and the home states of IOCs to adopt the argument of this thesis, and argued, among others, that 
considering the favourable state practice towards making environmental and human rights 
considerations in BITs, the Nigerian government and the home states of IOCs are likely to 
impose the relevant obligations in Nigeria’s BITs. Second, the thesis examined the potential 
impact of imposing obligations regarding environmental and human rights protection on IOCs on 
the national treatment clause in Nigeria’s BITs. The thesis argued that the national treatment 
clause should also be amended to address their possible impact on the argument of this thesis. 
Thirdly, the thesis discussed the debate over the status of corporations, including IOCs as 
subjects of international law, and agreed that corporations are subjects of international law with 
rights and obligations under existing international law regimes. Therefore, the thesis argued that 
obligations relating to environmental and human rights protection could be imposed on IOCs. 
The thesis also argued that not only should obligations relating to environmental and human 
rights protection be imposed on IOCs in Nigeria’s BITs but also that the obligations should be 
enforced against IOCs for their breach. The thesis examined potential mechanisms for enforcing 
the obligations relating to environmental and human rights protection against IOCs. The thesis 
argued that these obligations could be enforced against IOCs in one of two ways. First, it argued 
that these obligations could be enforced within the current investment arbitration mechanism 
under the ICSID Convention. The examination of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention 
demonstrates that investment tribunals could assume jurisdiction over claims brought by the 
Nigerian government against IOCs for a breach of their obligations under Nigeria’s BITs. 
However, the thesis also argued that for the jurisdiction of an investment tribunal to be triggered, 
the Nigerian government should renegotiate its investment contracts with IOCs in order to 
include a written consent of IOCs to investment arbitration if they breach the obligations 
regarding environmental and human rights protection in Nigeria’s BITs. This thesis limits its 
argument that the Nigerian government could enforce a breach of IOCs’ obligations regarding 
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environmental and human rights protection only to investment arbitration conducted under the 
ICSID Convention. This is deliberate considering that the scope of this research is limited. 
Further research is necessary to determine the extent to which the argument of this thesis could 
be transposed to investment arbitration under other rules such as the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law rules.678 
The thesis also argued that, alternatively, the obligations relating to environmental and human 
rights protection could be enforced by the impacted host communities in IOCs’ home states. In 
advancing this argument, the analysis of the potential challenges to the enforcement of these 
obligations in IOCs’ home states by the Niger Delta people was undertaken. The thesis argued 
that the possible challenges, such as the age-long principles of separate legal personality and 
FNC, are not intractable. The thesis concluded that in addition to imposing obligations on IOCs, 
there should be a provision for IOCs’ civil liability in their home states in Nigeria’s BITs that 
will enable the Niger Delta communities institute claims in the domestic courts of IOCs’ home 
states for a breach of obligations relating to the environment and human rights protection. This 
thesis is confident that the renegotiation of Nigeria’s BITs to incorporate these obligations, as 
well as enabling their enforcement, would substantially deter the IOCs from future pollution of 
the environment and the violation of human rights of the Niger Delta people. 
The framework that is outlined in this research connects with the argument that BITs should be 
explored to harness sustainable development, especially in weak governance regions such as 
Nigeria. It further demonstrates that although BITs have been severally criticized by scholars for 
their negative impacts on developing countries such as Nigeria, they could be explored for the 
benefit of the Niger Delta communities. Imposing and enforcing IOCs’ obligations in BITs could 
significantly improve IOCs’ accountability towards environmental pollution and human rights 
violations in the Niger Delta region. However, as examined, relevant commitments are required 
from both the Nigerian government and the IOCs’ home states in order to overcome political and 
legal impediments that could confront the enforcement of obligations relating to human rights 
and the environment against IOCs as proposed in this thesis. 
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